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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of Aleksandr Dugin’s The Foundations of
Geopolitics, of which I have translated important sections into English and these
are included as an appendix. Despite the importance of Foundations of Geopolitics
to Russian strategic thought there has not been a translated edition published in
English. This work was published in 1997 and has been quite influential for Russian
political and military leadership. I strive to provide context for the setting in which
Foundations of Geopolitics was created through an analysis of the social and
political conditions that existed in Russia while the text was being written, as well
as how and why it came to achieve such influence. This is followed by an analysis
of the text itself. Finally, I examine the ways in which the strategic precepts offered
by Dugin in Foundations of Geopolitics have been adopted and employed by the
Kremlin in foreign and domestic policy. Additionally, I reveal the direct and
indirect links connecting Dugin and his fascist Neo-Eurasianist ideology to the
leaders and ideologues of fascist, far-right, xenophobic, and often racist
movements. This has created a network of like-minded movements advocating for
the reclamation of a traditional identity domestically, but looking to Moscow for
international leadership and guidance in foreign policy. The origins of these
developments can be traced back to Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
«Рукописи не горят»
(Manuscripts Don’t Burn)
-Mikhail Bulgakov from The Master and Margarita

Figure 1

1
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From Anton Shekohvtsov’s blog: http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2015/01/aleksandrdugin-and-syriza-connection.html
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Over the past twenty years, the star of Aleksandr Dugin has rapidly
ascended; he has gone from obscurity to serving as a shadowy advisor to Russian
political figures and taking the position of the leading ideologues of neo-fascism,
not just in Russia, but globally. Dugin has given his ideological framework several
names, ‘Eurasianism,’ ‘Fourth Political Theory,’ and ‘National Bolshevism;’
however, these differences are strictly superficial and the ideological principles he
espouses in The Fourth Political Theory (2009) are consistent with those from his
seminal work, The Foundations of Geopolitics (1998). Foundations of Geopolitics
remains untranslated in English, but I have translated important sections to help
rectify this. According to John Dunlop, a leading scholar of the Russian far-right:
There probably has not been another book published in Russia during the
post-communist period that has exerted an influence on Russian military,
police, and statist foreign policy elites comparable to that of Aleksandr
Dugin's 1997 neo-fascist treatise, Foundations of Geopolitics.2
For a self-proclaimed traditionalist and an Old Believer, Dugin has
demonstrated a remarkably adroit use of social media and the internet to make
contacts and disseminate his views to all corners of the globe. He has tens of
thousands of followers across his social media pages and is linked to prominent
neo-Nazis and other racist ultranationalists in the United States, Italy, France, and
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John Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics,” Demokratizatsiya,
January 31, 2004, https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics.
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elsewhere.3 His think tanks, such as Katheon and the Center for Conservative
Studies, are likely to have received some funding from the Russian government
and he was employed as the head of the International Studies Department at
Moscow State University (MGU), one of the two most prestigious universities in
Russia, until he was removed from his position due to an interview he gave where
he stated that there are “terrible people” in Ukraine who must be “killed, killed,
killed.”4 Once the mask of fascism had slipped from Dugin’s ‘Eurasianist,’ façade,
the university was left with little choice, but to remove him from his position after
a petition with 10,000 signatures, organized by students, was presented to MGU’s
rector demanding his dismissal.
Dugin’s Eurasianism, sometimes referred to as ‘Neo-Eurasianism’, to
distinguish it from earlier iterations of Eurasianism, has diverse, and at times
contradictory origins. Much like Eisenstein’s original use of montage to stitch
together vignettes to produce a powerful message, although for an opposing
ideological message, Dugin cuts and stitches together ideas from many sources to
produce a whole. There are four significant themes in this ideology. The first a
dichotomy between land-based, continental civilization and coastal, seafaring
civilizations based in the work of several historical figures, chiefly Alfred Mahan
and Halford Mackinder. He stresses the superiority of tellulocratic (land based)
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Danila Galperovich, “Russian Social Media Sites Have Become Meeting Places for the American
Ultra-Right” VOA Russia, August 26, 2017.
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Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Russia This Week: Dugin Dismissed from Moscow State University?”,
The Interpreter, June 27, 2014. (Stephenson 2015) (Gessen 2017) (Clover 2017)
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civilizations over talassocratic (sea based) ones. For him the former USSR and the
Eastern Bloc embody Eurasian, continental civilization, while NATO and the
United States are talassocratic ‘Atlanticists.’ Nations, peoples, and ideas that Dugin
views sympathetically are labelled Eurasianist, while all those he opposes are
Atlanticist. The second theme lies in the titular Geopolitics, whose foundations, he
alleges, can be located in Friedrich Ratzel’s theory of Lebensraum, which would
become the central idea motivating Nazi expansionist aggression. Under this
theme Dugin advocates irredentism and expansionism, particularly to sparsely
populated lands in the North and East, in a direct imitation of American Manifest
Destiny, acknowledged by Dugin himself. A third is Dugin’s selective application
of Marx’s works and Soviet symbology and imagery to appeal to the many Russian
and former Soviet citizens who retain a favorable view of his ideology and
nostalgia for the Soviet period. He describes Marx as a Eurasianist and a mystic,
advocating for revolution against bourgeoisie, Atlanticist societies. However,
Dugin is unconcerned with the plight of workers. He admires Marx for his
opposition to the West and revolutionary fervor, but, beyond their enthusiasm for
revolution, their ideas are diametrically opposed; Dugin simply appropriates his
name and attributes ideas to him that are not present in Marx’s works. In
Foundations of Geopolitics, Dugin distorts the core of Marx’s ideology to present
his ideas as being in line with Eurasianism, when they are not. Dugin seeks statist
control of the means of production, but strictly for the good of the Eurasian
“Empire of Many Empires” and its elites, rather than for any improvement in
4

workers’ lives. While Dugin’s Eurasianist “internationalism” is authoritarian,
fascist, based on elite rule and rooted in ethnic, rather than class identity.
A last feature of Dugin’s view is a fascination with the “ethnos,” rooted in
blood libel (a racist conspiracy that alleges Jews use the blood of Christian children
for religious purposes), eugenic racial theories from the early 20th and late 19th
centuries and Slavophilia. However, it is important to note that Eurasianism does
not endorse a strict, narrow version of ethnic Russian supremacism, but rather
portrays the ‘Holy Rus’ as exemplary Eurasians, not a master race. This strange
brew of ideas has produced one of the more influential fascist ideologies of the
new millennium.
Dugin’s direct influence on the path of policymaking in Russia is difficult to
trace, as he has had no formal positions in either the military or government, but
vocabulary from Foundations of Geopolitics has unquestionably found its way into
the highest levels of political and military discourse in Russia. The Kremlin and
those trying to curry favor with it have employed the terms and ideas found in
Foundationsof Geopolitics for both national domestic politics and as foreign policy
tools over the past two decades. Many of the tactics used in the so-called
‘information war’ being waged by Russia against electoral institutions and
intended to mislead the electorate of voters in the United States and Europe can
be traced back to the Foundations of Geopolitics. His ideas have been echoed by
Putin and others in the Kremlin at times and certain strategic elements have been
extracted from his writings. But Foundations is not a playbook for the Kremlin by
5

any means, as many of Dugin’s fantasist ideas would be immensely impractical or
impossible to achieve. Still, there is no doubt that many of Russia’s top military
leaders have read or are familiar with Foundations, and have been uniquely
influenced by it.
It is important to note that Foundations of Geopolitics was not written in a
vacuum. Dugin’s anti-Western thinking was profoundly shaped by his personal
experiences during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the social and economic
chaos that followed. And he is far from alone in this. There were a number of
fundamental problems in the Soviet Union that its collapse exposed, but these
were compounded by American policymaking following its disintegration. The
Russian economy was devastated by the fundamentally inefficient and unequal
reforms that were conducted with the encouragement of American policymakers.
The American government was deeply involved with propping up the teetering
Yeltsin administration, all while denying Russia entry to NATO, any sort of
Marshall Plan that would have helped bridge the gap for Russia’s economy
between the two systems, and expanding NATO up to Russia’s borders despite
assurances made by Clinton and Bush that this would not happen. The result was
endemic corruption, drastic declines in all health metrics, and political and social
instability. Given these experiences, it is quite easy to see how many Russians are
predisposed to view the United States as the implacable enemy of Russia, no
matter the form of government Russia maintains. Of course, this is just perception,

6

but opinion polling has shown that is held by many Russians, and it is constantly
reinforced by the Kremlin’s propaganda machine.
If there is any intellectual or moral merit in Foundations of Geopolitics, it is
Dugin’s rejection of the creeping American monoculture that has been a
byproduct of globalization and the neoliberal world order and is profoundly
unpopular in many countries and societies across the world. A rise in ultranationalism, reactionary politics, and fascism, enabled and promoted by elites in
different countries, as a misguided way to reclaim supposedly threatened
traditional cultural identities, has been one negative result of neoliberal
economics, as well as covert or overt support for authoritarian and corrupt regimes
that maintain a neoliberal economic system. Thus, in some respects, the ideas in
Foundations of Geopolitics, and their reception in Russia and elsewhere can be
viewed in Chalmers Johnson’s language as blowback. Indeed, the blowback goes
deep into American history, as many of the ideas Dugin adopts from Nazi
ideologues were originally borrowed from Americans, particularly in regard to
racial theories and Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, which championed
the genocide of the native people of America and a deterministic view of colonial
expansion.

7

Chapter 2: Biography of Dugin Prior to the Collapse of the
Soviet Union
Born in Moscow, 1962, Aleksandr Dugin enjoyed a privileged upbringing.
There is little information on his father, Geli, who left Dugin’s mother, Galina,
when he was three. Galina was a doctor and Geli was an officer in the military,
although his exact role is unclear. Dugin told British journalist Charles Clover, who
has written the definitive English language biography of Dugin, Black Wind, White
Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism, that Geli was a general in the GRU
(military intelligence), but also that towards the end of his career, he worked for
the customs police.5 Dunlop writes that he was a colonel, and cites one source also
stating that he worked in the GRU.6
Regardless of his exact position, per Clover, Dugin’s friends are “adamant
that his father must have been someone of rank…the family had the accoutrements
of prestige—a nice dacha, relatives with nice dachas, and access to opportunities.”7
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Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 157.
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John Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics,” Demokratizatsiya,
January 31, 2004, https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics.
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Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 156.
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For those Soviet citizens who were born before World War II and grew up during
the profound social and economic uncertainty generated by Stalin’s purges and
collectivization before the war, this was a time of stability and comfort, with
families no longer having to share communal housing due to the widespread
construction of khrushchyovkas. Additionally, although there was not a great
variety of food, it was affordable and famines were firmly a feature of the past,
healthcare was free, and modern appliances like refrigerators and televisions were
now common in middle class households. Clover notes that “Dugin and his
generation were the first to grow up with the accoutrements of a normal middleclass lifestyle,” however, despite these material comforts, “Soviet life in the 1970s
was like America in the 1950s: ideological rigid, materialist, one-dimensional and
dull.”8
Dugin, a precocious teenager with a knack for languages, rebelled
outlandishly against this conformity. Clover reports that many of Dugin’s close
friends and associates from the 1980s remember well their first meetings with him,
as he cut a very striking figure:
He sported a well-trimmed goatee beard and a simple pudding-bowl haircut
with a straight fringe—an affectation popular in Russian intellectual circles
of the time and known as a skobka or ‘parenthesis’ haircut. It evoked the
simple and austere style of the medieval peasant, much like the nineteenthcentury Slavophiles inhabited St. Petersburg mansions wearing peasant
murmolka caps. He had an erect bearing and a habit of trilling his ‘rs’ a little
too heavily in a sign of aristocratic affectation; he sometimes accented this

8

Ibid, 155.
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pose by speaking French. Most impressively, he often wore ‘galife’
trousers—the jodhpur like breeches of a cavalry officer of a century before.9
The charismatic young Dugin, who at the time went everywhere with his
guitar, made his debut in the ‘schizoid’ underground bohemian scene of Moscow,
appearing at the dacha of Sergey Zhigalkin, a translator of Heidegger, where he
announced his presence with this song:10
The fucking end of the Sovdep
Is just around the corner
Two million in the river
Two million in the oven
Our revolvers will not misfire11
When Dugin performed, it was under the name ‘Hans Sievers,’ taken in
honor of the former Reichsgeschaftsfuher, Wolfram Sievers, the director of the
Ahnererbe, which was an organization established by Heinrich Himmler to
research paranormal and mystical phenomena. The real Sievers was hanged in 1947
after being found guilty of gruesomely experimenting on concentration camp
prisoners at the Nuremberg trials. This loathsome character provided the basis for
Dugin’s alter-ego, which Clover describes rather generously, as being “composed of
as many antisocial elements as its creator could find—a total and malevolent
rebellion,” this rebellion was aimed “not just against the Soviet Union, but against

9

Ibid, 158.

10

Dugin is an admirer of Heidegger and has written extensively on him later in his career. He may
have been emulating Heidegger’s habit of wearing Bavarian peasant clothing as well.
11

Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 154.
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convention and public taste.”12 This depiction makes it seem as if Dugin was just a
Soviet Sid Vicious, armored in Nazi imagery, but this belies Dugin’s meaningful
embrace and understanding of Nazi ideology. Another song performed by Dugin
vividly illustrates this:
Forward men, violent and rude
We are inspired by the swastika in the night
We see how your dead bodies dance the tango in the gas oven
How nice and fresh the roses
As happy and cheerful as the Russian forest
On the last journey on the Via Dolarosa
Goes the SS division13
Dugin told Clover in 2005 that this alter-ego and his habit of spouting ‘Heil
Hitlers’ regularly in public was motivated by a “shamanistic crisis of selfactualization…I was completely normal in every sense: morally, rationally,
psychologically. “14 Of course, Dugin’s self-diagnosis as ‘normal,’ is highly
subjective. But his fondness for the tenets and figures of Nazism and his
admiration of its aesthetics and belief in the occult, paranormal, and esoteric
persistently emerge in his writings and Foundations of Geopolitics is no exception
to this weltanschauung. In fact, a great deal of his ideological underpinning was
manifested in Hans Sievers—the ahistorical mix of Slavophilia (through his
haircut), aristocratic affectations, militarism, and Nazism.

12

Ibid, 158.
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Ibid, 160.
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Ibid, 155.
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The crew of bohemian misfits, weirdos, poets, would-be philosophers, and
hangers on of all sorts that Dugin enmeshed himself into was led by Evgeny
Golovin. Golovin was, according to Arkady Rovner (a member of the circle), “a
Moscow-based mystic who joined the circle in the 1960s,” he described Golovin to
Clover as a “natural Russian phenomenon—a classic combination of aesthetic
snobbishness, esoteric misanthropy, alcoholic inspiration, plus a hot peppering of
black fantasy and American horror movies.”15 Of course, mysticism in of itself is
not inherently bad, and there have been mystics who cared deeply about the
human condition such as Tolstoy and Gandhi. But there was more to Golovin than
just these traits, he was also, according to Clover, “completely obsessed with the
Third Reich, seeing in it a monstrous and mystical yin to humanity’s yang…he
began to refer to himself as the Fuhrer.”16 Golovin even “named his followers ‘the
Black Order of the SS’ and told them all to wear Nazi paraphernalia. He hung a
picture of Hitler on the wall.”17 “There was nothing anti-Semitic about it,”
according to Igor Dudinsky (another member of the circle), “There were lots of
Jews at these gatherings. We would all shout ‘Seig Heil’ and ‘Heil Hitler’ and all we
meant was ‘down with Soviet power!’”18 This assertion is ridiculous, as Nazism is
and was impossible to separate from its anti-Semitism, but anti-Semitism is like

15

Ibid, 153.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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any ideology, and Jews themselves can be anti-Semitic, assuming Dudinsky is
being truthful about this. The group sought out anything esoteric, occult, and
mystical and their interests caromed between any new discovery, particularly
when it came to banned topics and authors.
Dugin in particular was greatly influenced by the works of René Guénon, a
French philosopher of the twentieth century who espoused ‘traditionalism’ and an
idea that all world religions were expressions of a single type of metaphysics.
Masha Gessen, in her seminal The Future is History, writes that for Dugin and
Guénon: “Modernity was the opposite of Tradition,” what “Dugin was seeking
could be located only by stripping away all views and things contemporary and
working backward. Another word for ‘modern’ might be ‘Western.’”19 Dugin
learned Italian, just so he could translate the works of another great influence,
Baron Julius Evola, an Italian aristocrat who worked with the SS, as Mussolini was
too moderate for his taste, and he inspired fascist, right-wing terror groups in postwar Italy. He believed in ‘spiritual racism,’ which would divide humanity into
castes based on their function in society and that war was a crucible through
which humanity could gain a higher form of spiritual existence.20 Dugin would
adopt this idea of a purifying war to restore traditional societies in his geopolitics.

19

Masha Gessen, The Future is History (New York: Riverhead Books, 2017), 53.

20

Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 159.
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Despite his capacity for languages, Dugin received little formal academic training,
as he was expelled from the Moscow Civil Aviation Academy after two years.
These ‘intellectual’ pursuits, his nonconforming circle of friends, and his
provocative performances were likely to land Dugin in trouble sooner or later and
it happened in 1983 after a performance of ‘Fuck the Damned Sovdep’ at a small
concert. Zhigalkin and Dudinsky, who were in his reactionary circle, both believe
Dugin’s father tipped off the KGB, who brought him in for interrogation the next
day.21 Dugin was released after ratting on a man who had given him an archive of
samizdat (published underground) writings by Mamleev and was released;
however, his father was transferred to the customs service, a severe demotion, and
never spoke to his son again. According to Clover, this was the climax of a long
series of disagreements between father and son, writing that:
According to Dugin’s close friend and collaborator Gaidar Dzhemal, Geli
Dugin had, on more than one occasion intervened from a high-ranking
position in the Soviet state to get his son out of trouble…Geli was Dugin’s
‘get out of jail free’ card, which allowed his son to violate regularly the
orthodoxies of Soviet life and get away with it. Undoubtedly this fueled
complicated feelings of both entitlement and further resentment at the
unfair privilege.22
This final break with his father meant that Dugin was now on his own, his
writings, ‘artistic’ pursuits, and social circles meant he would not be accepted into

21

Ibid, 161.
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Soviet academia or the political establishment, even if he had desired it, and Dugin
worked menial jobs to make ends meet.
Rescuing Dugin from obscurity was Dmitry Vasilyev, the head of the
Pamyat (Monument) organization. Pamyat was founded in 1979 as a relatively
apolitical organization devoted to preserving historical monuments, an
uncontroversial task, as the Soviet Union by the Brezhnev era had moved away
from destroying historical buildings, mainly churches and other religious building
as well as Tsarist monuments and ‘bourgeoisie’ architecture. Vasilyev took control
of Pamyat in 1986, following a heated speech where he absurdly accused ‘’Zionists’
of seeking the destruction of architectural landmarks.”23 Under his leadership,
Pamyat “mutated from a gaggle of intelligentsia curiosities into a crypto-fascist
street gang—an agglomeration of football hooligans and middle-class aesthetes.”24
This mélange of anti-social elements constituted an organization that “would also
be a sort of boot camp for a new generation of nationalist extremists.”25 According
to Dugin, “It was Pamyat that gave birth to all other patriotic movements.”26
Pamyat also gave Dugin entrée into the confusing and often contradictory
world of perestroika politics. He joined Pamyat in 1987 and quickly was appointed
to the organization’s central board, along with Dzhemal, due to their intellectual
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background, which was much more extensive than most members. Pamyat
emulated the outfits of the notoriously anti-Semitic Black Hundreds of the Tsarist
era and so did their racist ideology, with Vasilyev reading the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion at meetings, railing against Zionist plots to ‘alcoholize’ Russia, and
on one occasion, according to Clover, asserting that, “Adolf Eichmann was
‘representative of the Jewish people.’”27 Eichmann was not Jewish and this is a vivid
indication of Vasilyev’s derangement.
Pamyat did not gain its power due to the skillful leadership and wisdom of
Vasilyev, who was in Dugin’s opinion, “an actor and a schizophrenic,” rather it was
a krysha (literally, roof, but meaning official protection), likely provided by
someone or some group within the KGB that supported Pamyat and its activities.28
According to Clover, Dugin confessed that “Vasilyev said that there was a krysha in
the central committee. But I don’t know whether it’s true because he did not make
me privy to that.”29 The facts remain that Pamyat was the first political
organization allowed in the Soviet Union aside from the Communist party and it
held the first unsanctioned public rally in Soviet history when 500 people rallied in
front of the Kremlin in May 1987, so it must have had some sort of official
protection, if not the endorsement, from a relatively powerful figure or figures,
likely on the central committee. Clover speculates that nationalists in the ‘Russian

27
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Party,’ a group of military and political officials sympathetic to Russian
nationalism, “turned a blind eye to Vasilyev, seeing in him a potential ally who was
worthy of support.”30 This is supported by the fact that “Pamyat mercilessly
criticized and harassed the hardliners’ opponents such as Alexander Yakovlev,
Gorbachev’s right-hand man and chief liberal reformer.”31 Another theory
proposed by Clover is that Boris Yeltsin, an insatiably ambitious politician who had
just been appointed first secretary of the Moscow Communist Party city
committee, was looking for allies wherever he could find them as he sought to
climb the ranks of power and challenge Gorbachev. For evidence, Clover notes that
Yeltsin had a meeting with Pamyat after their May 1987 demonstration and at the
meeting he made a pledge “to reduce the number of limitchiki (migrant workers)
in Moscow, and to look into registering Pamyat as a society. And it may not be a
coincidence that after Yeltsin was forced out by Gorbachev in 1987, Pamyat began
to disintegrate.”32 Dugin and Dzhemal were expelled from the movement in 1988,
due to an internal power struggle in the group when Dugin and Dzhemal sought to
replace Vasilyev as leaders of the organization.33
Pamyat was the first organization protected by elements within the KGB
who were preparing a rearguard action to control the democratic process

30
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accompanying the collapse of the Soviet system, which was becoming more and
more apparent to those in the intelligence services. From behind the scenes, they
attempted to create and control different parties from across the political
spectrum as a way to restrict and manage any nascent democratic movement.
Clover asserts that had Pamyat, “not been led so erratically by an obvious
sociopath, Pamyat could ultimately have been registered as an independent
party.”34 Instead the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), which was, and is,
as liberal and democratic as the Holy Roman Empire was holy and Roman, would
be the first party registered. While Vasilyev’s madness was no act, the leader of the
LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, an ex-KGB agent who was expelled from Turkey for
espionage in 1970, cynically copied his political persona. Clover notes that Dugin,
“an associate of both men, insists that Zhirinovsky used to listen to tapes of
Vasilyev’s speeches and learned his trademark demagogic style from him,” but,
Zhirinovsky’s “insanity is purely for public consumption,” as opposed to Vasilyev’s
authentic madness.35 He finished third place in the 1991 Russian presidential
elections, and during the 1990s the LPDR at one time held a quarter of the seats in
the Duma, making it, according to Clover, “one of the most successful of several
joint Communist Party-KGB political projects to anticipate and attempt to control
political reform.”36 Presently, the LPDR remains an important controlled
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opposition party. Some of these political projects, like the LPDR, were designed to
win elections; others were designed to avoid them.”37 Political projects helmed by
Dugin were to fall into the latter camp.
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Chapter 3: Bespredel (Lawlessness) 1989-1999
It is difficult to overstate the crisis that struck Russian society during this
period. Svetlana Stephenson notes that “Russian society went through some of the
most drastic poverty and welfare reversals in the world.”38 GDP fell by over 40
percent and industrial production was halved in the five years following the
beginning of privatization.39 A vivid indicator of the scale of this crisis is how it
affected the most vulnerable—between 1992 and 1995 62 percent of Russian
children were living below poverty line.40 Hyperinflation ran rampant, destroying
the savings of many Russians. The almost complete absence of state governance
and erosion of societal norms created an atmosphere that allowed criminal groups
to expand and flourish. Competition between groups was fierce and the lack of an
effective or independent police force created circumstances where violence
spiraled out of control. Acts that once would have been assaults escalated into
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murders and firearms became widely available due to the breakdown of the Soviet
military.
The crisis was exacerbated by bad American advice and a lack of real
assistance. Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard economist often blamed for many of the
economic reforms known as “shock therapy” which crippled governance in Russia
and led to vast inequality, noted “that market reforms could not, by themselves,
solve deep structural and societal problems, and that large-scale help would be
needed from the West.”41 This help would not be forthcoming, although to his
credit at least Sachs recommended it. Writing in 2012, Sachs argued:
My estimate, which became somewhat notorious at the time [Summer
1991], was that the Soviet Union (and later the successor republics) would
need an infusion of Western aid (envisioned as grants and highly
concessional loans) of around $30 billion per year over five years, or $150
billion in total. That is still a number that I would endorse. Alas, nothing
like that ever materialized.42
The Soviet political and economic system was stagnant and ideologically
moribund, but at least it provided a strong social safety net for population. Still, in
an article he wrote for The Economist January 13, 1990, Sachs writes:
Eastern countries must reject any lingering ideas about a "third way", such
as a chimerical "market socialism" based on public ownership or worker
self-management, and go straight for a western-style market economy. Two,
Western Europe, for its part, must be ready and eager to work with them,
providing debt relief and finances for restructuring, to bring their reformed
economies in as part of a unified European market.43
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This clearly illustrates Sach’s lack of thought, at best, regarding what would
happen if radical economic reforms removing all trace of the previous system went
ahead without any significant help from Western European countries and the
United States.
Stephen Kotkin makes a case that even if substantial American assistance
had been forthcoming, it would not have been able to make a significant difference
due to the crumbling of Soviet institutions and the atmosphere of near universal
corruption combined with the pervasiveness of organized crime. According to
Kotkin: “the self-assigned role of the West in ‘promoting’ but not financing with
direct investments Russia’s ‘transition’ had the effect of empowering anti-Western
sentiment inside Russia, and anti-Russian sentiment in the West.”44 The result, per
Kotkin, was that “raising expectations wildly proved to be a self-defeating
endeavor. Ultimately it was ‘reform,’ rather than the Soviet inheritance, that took
the blame for the country’s lingering woes.”45 This has helped foster Soviet
nostalgia in Russia, particularly amongst pensioners and anti-American feelings.
Regardless of the economic realities or the potential impossibility of reform of
Soviet institutions in a free market system, the perception—created through
American hubris—was that “reform,” and by extension the West was at fault for
the deprivations of the bespredel era.
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Seymour Hersh wrote about this presciently in 1994, quoting an anonymous
senior administration official involved in denuclearization efforts, “there is little to
be optimistic about in Russia." He adds:
Hopefully, we will not repeat the 1930s in Germany…You have a contracting
empire. The bulk of people are doing worse under freedom than ever
before. People forget how primitive Russia is—it's Third World. Russians
are dreaming about indoor plumbing, having a little car, not living with
their parents. They can now travel. But they have no money. They can now
vote. But for whom? They can now say what they want. But so what?
They're not better off.46
The slow, gradual, but incremental increases in standard of living that citizens
enjoyed under the Soviet Union had not just ended, but they had been definitively
reversed.
In the absence of governance, street gangs and criminal organizations
stepped into the void. Several key aspects mark the second transformation of these
quasi-entrepreneurial gangs into true autonomous-ruling regimes, as they had still
not become sufficiently enmeshed in national and regional power structures. The
entrance of gang leaders into the oligarch class shifted that. Signaling a trend
across Russia as a whole, gang membership became increasingly stratified. In a
gang, a percentage of all profits were deposited in the gang’s general fund, known
as an obschak. As obschaks grew in size, gang leadership began to invest in
legitimate and semi-legitimate businesses, often at cut-rate levels due the lack of
existing wealth during privatization. Leaders and their lieutenants obtained
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positions at all levels of all political office and in different branches in the civil
service. These positions were obtained through blat (Russian slang for reciprocal
favors) and bribery—one member of the 29th Kompleks, a powerful gang in Kazan,
recounted that roughly 30 percent of obschak spending outside of investment,
went into bribes and “public relations,” 30 percent went towards assisting
imprisoned members, 30 percent was spent on pay for civilian employees or
contracts for non-gang criminal work, such as contract killings, and the final 10
percent was spent on assets like cars, phones, and guns.47 This system allowed
gang leadership to enter elite society and accumulate political power, wealth, and
prestige, while rank and file gang members at the street level received fewer
opportunities for advancement as the privatization window closed. Unlike the vory
(professional criminals who abided by a code dating back decades), who shunned
contact with non-criminals, these groups became entangled in their local
communities and provided some employment, protection, and social services
(charitable giving that was accounted for under “public relations”) and in return
they were tolerated by residents, who viewed them as a “necessary evil” and
preferable to bespredel.48
Because of the lack of governance from national or local institutions, across
Russia gruppirovki (organized criminal groups) stepped in to provide a variety of

47

Stephenson, Svetlana, Gangs of Russia : From the Streets to the Corridors of Power (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2015), ProQuest Ebook Central,
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/du/detail.action?docID=3426001, 98.
48

Ibid, 155.

24

forms of extralegal governance, albeit often in a predatory fashion. Unlike in other
societies where organized crime became comparatively pervasive, for example the
mafia throughout much of the modern history of Calabria and Sicily or the cartels
in 1980s Colombia and contemporary Mexico, in Russia organized crime
organizations infiltrated structures and institutions originating in state socialism.
This is significant, because the organs of state socialism influenced life at
every level of social activity and had a great impact on daily life through the
provision of social services, direction of the economy, and control of the military.
When these structures were debilitated by the Soviet Union’s collapse and
privatization, the public lost trust in them and contracts became impossible to
enforce. In this vacuum, the gruppirovki emerged as defenders of the legitimacy of
certain contracts due to their participation in more legitimate business activity.
Businesses accepted kryshy with gangs to protect themselves both from the gang
offering protection and that gang’s rivals. The gangs also provided loans to
businesses and individuals, but all these services came with the cost of increased
dependency on the gang for dispute resolution and other matters. Stephenson
asserts that in these circumstances, “generally, the capacity of organized gangs to
appropriate resources derives less from demand for their protection than from
their ability to establish their own systems of domination.”49 In many cases, these
“systems of domination” were the only form of governance in the bespredel of the

49

Ibid, 73.

25

1990s and in some areas, they were indistinguishable from state systems or more
powerful than them locally, especially in some smaller regional municipalities.
Similarly, in accordance with the ideas of Helmke and Levitsky, the influence of
the “substitutive informal institutions” of the gangs waned as formal institutions
grew in strength.50 As organized crime groups became more enmeshed in state
power structures, they grew less visible at the street level; however, they had a
strong influence on how law enforcement organizations and legal institutions
operated and often infiltrated these institutions themselves.
This combination of norms and strategies coalesced into a nebulous code of
conduct referred to as poniatiia (understanding). As the translation implies,
poniatiia is not a formal written code, but rather is socially learned and is taken for
granted by those who abide by it. Poniatiia promotes a set of norms, many of
which overlap with those of the earlier street level territorial elites and the vory.
Self-control, in-group loyalty, obedience to the leader and avtorietity (senior gang
leadership), misogyny, xenophobia, and the right to a private life outside of the
group are some of the most prominent of these norms. For gang members and
their dependents, poniatiia promotes a “Weberian patrimonial alliance,” where,

50

Gretchen Helmke, and Steven Levitsky. Informal Institutions And Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006),
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/du/reader.action?ppg=27&docID=3318293&tm=154152691894
0, 16.

26

“like ancient and early medieval warrior coalitions, the gang is a male militant
tribal alliance that is cement by quasi-kinship obligations and loyalties.”51
The norms of poniatiia have a great deal of overlap with ‘traditionalist’
values that Dugin would set out in Foundations of Geopolitics. Indeed, many of his
sponsors and patrons throughout this decade have close ties to these organized
crime groups, as do many Russian oligarchs and senior politicians. Close ties were
curated by intelligence agents and the leaders of the gruppirovki. Pamyat was the
first organization to publicly appeal to ‘us vs. them’ sentiments and it easy to see
how this mentality climbs geopolitical levels. Poniatiia relies on this mentality, as
does, at the international level, racist ultra-nationalism, and at the global level, the
planetary dualism of Eurasianism reflects this mindset as well. It should be no
surprise that the ideology of Pamyat shared many of its characteristics with street
gangs, although with an emphasis on overt fascism and anti-Semitism, and many
of its members came from that section of society. Similarly, misogyny and a
rejection of tolerance towards homosexuality is a core aspect of this ideology.
These experiences have made many Russian more willing to sacrifice
individual freedoms for stability—the appeal of authoritarianism. This is borne out
in public opinion data. Today, popular Russian nationalism shares many normative
values with poniatiia. In a Levada survey on attitudes towards migrants 67 percent
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of respondents felt the government should do more to limit immigration.52 Views
differed regarding specific migrants, with 48 percent of respondents stating they
were neutral towards migrants from the Central Asian Republics and 38 percent
felt negatively, with only ten percent responding that they sympathized with
them.53 There were similar responses for migrants from Transcaucasia and the
North Caucasus Republics, but attitudes were much more positive towards from
ethnically Russian regions.54 Patriotism has risen under Putin, with 77 percent
agreeing that they were definitely or probably proud of Russia in April, 2017.55 This
is in stark contrast to the 48 percent who indicated the same responses in March,
2006.56 Relatedly, 75 percent responded that they were very proud or somewhat
proud to be a Russian citizen, in comparison with the 60 percent who responded
in that fashion in August, 2004.57 Of course, such patriotic sentiments do not
necessarily mean support for fascism or racist ultra-nationalism, but do reflect a
general resurgence in national pride that was missing in the 1990s. As this
resurgence has taken place under an authoritarian government that promotes a
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worldview that often aligns with the norms of poniatiia, it provides fertile soil for
militaristic, fascist ideologies like Eurasianism.
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Chapter 4: Biography of Dugin after the Collapse of the Soviet
Union
With the KGB and elements within the central committee sponsoring
organizations for ideological renewal of the Communist Party and authoritarian
alternatives across the political spectrum, it is important to note Dugin’s activities
during this period and the extant of possible support from state elements. For
Dugin, this period of time was full of opportunities, but he bitterly regretted the
destruction of the Soviet Union. Dugin reflected to Clover on his participation in
the crowd supporting the attempted coup in 1991 against Yeltsin, who had become
the President of the Russian Federative Socialist Republic, “I understood that for
the first time I am for the Soviet Union, just as it was about to die, I loved it.”58 The
works of Lev Gumilyev, who would also be an influence on Foundations of
Geopolitics, enjoyed incredible popularity during this period and the term
‘Eurasianism’ was pervasive in Russian political discourse. Dugin explained the
zeitgeist of the time: “The model of Soviet self-knowledge had broken…The society
had lost its orientation. Everyone understood the necessity of change, but this
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feeling was vague and no one knew what direction it would come from.”59 In 1990,
Clover reports that the central committee funded a journal known as Continent
Russia, with Dugin and Igor Dudinsky, his old friend from his bohemian Nazi days,
as the editors.60 However, Continent Russia failed to reach a wide audience and the
central committee lost interest in it. More successful were two books published
with suspiciously large runs of 100,000 each: The Way of the Absolute, devoted to
the traditionalist theories of Julius Evola and The Metaphysics of the Gospel, in
which according to Clover, Dugin “called for a restoration of a medieval Byzantine
social hierarchy, served by elite priest and warrior castes,” which mimics Evola’s
spiritual racism.61 With the money earned, Dugin travelled to Europe to meet with
far-right intellectuals and activists. Clover speculates on who provided the
patronage for Dugin’s travels:
Perhaps it was the project of a solitary romantic…more likely it was done
with help from elements of the state that had an established track record, at
precisely this time, of sponsoring right-wing ideological experiments.62
In Europe, the first thinker he met with was Alain de Benoist, a French
writer who was a leading figure of the Nouvelle Droite. The Nouvelle Droite has
been categorized as an attempt at keeping the flame of fascism alive on the
continent, but also as for its anti-capitalist ideology that seeks to preserve
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‘traditionalism,’ the rejection of modernism and materialism, and a plurality of
cultures in the face of cultural homogenization as a result of globalization.
Another facet of its ideology is the advocacy for empire as the alternative to the
nation state. These sentiments would be reflected in Foundations of Geopolitics.
Clover writes that, “among the thinkers most quoted by the New Right are quite a
few ex-Nazis: philosopher Martin Heidegger, legal theorist Carl Schmitt, esoteric
author Julius Evola, and scholar of ‘geopolitics’ Karl Haushofer.”63 All of these Nazi
intellectuals (none were truly “ex” Nazis in their worldviews) are huge influences
in Foundations of Geopolitics as well. Dugin met with other extreme figures like
Robert Steuckers, the Belgian publisher Vouloir magazine, which supported
apartheid and a ‘Greater Serbia.’64 The defense of ‘Greater Serbia’ against NATO
would become a cause célèbre for Dugin and other Slavophilic Russians in the
coming years. Jean-Francois Thiriart, a National Bolshevist who advocated for a
European empire stretching from Vladivostok to Dublin was another extremist
who Dugin sought out to meet.65 Dugin would include this theory in Foundations
of Geopolitics and attribute it to Thiriart. In Paris, he also finally met in person his
literary idol Yury Mamleev, the founder of the Yuzhinsky group that Dugin had
flamboyantly participated in, and through him was introduced to Alexander
Prokhanov, a writer and propagandist who was nicknamed ‘The Nightingale of the
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General Staff,’ due to his close friendship with top Red Army Generals.66
Prokhanov was deeply involved in the military’s efforts to cultivate deeper ties to
nationalist, racist ultranationalist, and fascist groups.
According to Clover, following the series of retreats and missteps that
marked the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the lesson learned by the army was that
they could not trust their political masters.”67 They began casting for new allies
and Prokhanov helped them forge closer links to reactionary groups. These groups
had failed rather disastrously in open elections, for the most part, and per Clover,
“the lesson the nationalists drew was that, faced with inevitable democratic
political reforms, the only way they could triumph was through non-democratic
means.”68 ‘Nationalist’ is too soft a descriptor for many of these groups, as some
were overtly racist and expressed a fascist ideology and worldview. One of the
more immediate results of these forces converging during a time of state weakness
was the attempted coup of August 1991, which failed rather ridiculously due to the
incompetence of the plotters and prompted Dugin’s belated paean to the USSR.
This coup was led by Soviet hardliners, the same ‘Yesterday Forever’ forces
mentioned by Yakovlev and potentially orchestrated, and certainly supported by
Prokhanov.
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Here Dugin’s conspiratorial worldview and actual American skullduggery
intersect. Seymour Hersh wrote in the Atlantic in the 1994 that:
In early spring of 1991, well before the August coup attempt, the Bush
Administration learned of the plotting against Mikhail Gorbachev and
turned to Yeltsin as a possible alternative leader. Over the next few months
U.S. intelligence agencies were assigned to help Yeltsin, then the President
of Russia, improve his personal and communications security. When the
coup finally took place, President Bush ordered that essential
communications intelligence be provided to Yeltsin—over the bitter
protests of the National Security Agency, which is responsible for such topsecret intercepts. This help enabled Yeltsin to emerge from the crisis a
triumphant hero. The transfer of intelligence was conducted under
stringent secrecy and the House and Senate intelligence committees were
not formally notified—as is required by law.69
Similarly, Clover notes Yeltsin, “seemed to have been informed in real time of all
communications the GKChP plotters had passed between one another.”70
Following the coup’s failure, which likely would have occurred anyways do
the amateurishness of the plot, Dugin was appointed to a lectureship of the Soviet
Academy of the General Staff (now the Russian Academy of the General Staff) in
1992. It was led by General Igor Rodionov, and Clover notes, “the Academy was the
premier officer-training establishment for the Soviet (now Russian) army, but for
Rodionov it had been a humiliating demotion.”71 Rodionov, a decorated soldier,
had been shuffled off to the Academy after an incident in Tbilisi where troops
under his command killed 21 pro-democracy protestors in 1989, one of the
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bloodiest events during the USSR’s collapse. Embittered by his demotion,
Rodionov began to favor nationalist, far-right sentiments, and Clover asserts that
as a result the academy: “became a hive of opposition to the government of Boris
Yeltsin and liberal reformers—a bastion of hardcore reactionary zeal that
supported Dugin’s work and nourished him with strategic insights,” while Dugin,
“fed generals with the new thinking of the European extreme right.”72 Dugin’s
rapid transformation from outsider to insider had now begun in earnest, and
Clover argues “within the space of a vertiginous three years he had gone from
being a maladjusted fringe radical and member of a banned political organization
to lecturing at the heart of the former USSR’s security establishment.”73 As Dugin
had ingratiated himself with Rodionov, he was well positioned to take advantage
when Rodionov was named defense minister in 1996 and served until 1997 as part
of a resurgence in fortunes for the old guard of the Soviet defense establishment.
According to Clover, Rodionov was “the hardliner’s hardliner.”74 Dunlop observes
that, “it may be significant that Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics was written
during the time that Rodionov was serving as defense minister.”75
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Dugin, a political parvenu, was himself amazed by the swiftness of the
changes to his fortunes during this period, reflecting that, “I had no social status, it
was incredible to think they saw me as an equal, or could learn something for me,”
but he realized, “they were utterly lost, they had no concept of the enemy, they
needed to know who the enemy was.”76 If there is one thing consistent in Dugin’s
writings it is the identification of the enemy—the Atlanticists. This would be the
focus of his first major work, ostensibly co-written with General Klokotov of the
Academy of the General Staff, Foundations of Geopolitics. On its release, it became
somewhat of a national phenomenon with a wide print run and achieved a status
as “one of the more influential works of the post-communist period.”77 Clover
reports it “sold out in four editions.”78 More importantly, Foundations of
Geopolitics reached the people most likely to shape and implement Russian
strategy—Russia’s officer corps and senior military leadership. Clover reported in
2016 that Foundations of Geopolitics continued to be taught at the General Staff
Academy and other military universities in Russia.79 For his hardliner patrons,
Foundations of Geopolitics provided intellectual justification for their statist and
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expansionary tendencies, and Dugin’s ideas were eagerly received by the ‘yesterday
forever’ forces.
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Chapter 5: Eurasianists versus Atlanticists
A rather obscure English politician and academic from the first half of the
twentieth century, Halford Mackinder, provided an ideological basis for Dugin’s
worldview. In The Geopolitical Axis of History, Mackinder, divides the world into
civilizational types categorized by their location in the Heartland, the Inner
Crescent, or the Outer Crescent. The Outer Crescent is best represented by Great
Britain and later the United States, nations that have relied on their navies and are
defined by their coastal characteristics. These nations economically rely on
commerce. The Heartland, which according to Mackinder, stretches from Moscow
to Paris, is continental, and economic activity is reliant upon the land and a close
connection to the soil. The Heartland is location of the ‘geographical pivot of
history.’ The Inner Crescent generally is composed of the lands that lie between
the Outer Crescent and the Heartland and include Western and Southern Europe,
the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent. According to Dugin, government
type is determined by location:
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The ‘outer crescent’ is liberal democracy; ‘the geographical pivot of history’
is non-democratic authoritarianism; the inner crescent is an intermediate
model—a combination of both ideological systems.80
According to Dugin, the qualities of Heartland civilization are incarnate in
the Russian territory and people. The result is a Manichean dualism, in which the
Atlanticist mission throughout history has been to keep down Eurasia. Dugin
writes:
It is not hard to understand why exactly Mackinder established in AngloSaxon geopolitics, which in half a century would be the United States and
NATO, this essential tendency: to impede in any way capable the very
possibility of the creation of a Eurasian Bloc—established through a union
of Russia and Germany—a geopolitical reinforcing of the heartland and its
expansion. The West’s sustained Russophobia in the twentieth century is
not just ideological, but also geopolitical in character. Still, taking into
account Mackinder’s connection between civilizational types and these
geopolitical characteristics, or other forces, one could acquire a formula for
which geopolitical terminology is easily translated into ideological
terminology.81
Here, it is also important to note Dugin’s belief in the translatability between
ideology and geopolitics, effectively resulting in no separation between the two.
For him, ideology is determined by geopolitics, and geopolitics are determined by
ideology.
Lebensraum and Raumsinn
This deterministic approach is especially evident in Dugin’s embrace of the
concept of Lebensraum. Lebensraum or “Living Space,” was conceptualized by
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Friedrich Ratzel, who Dugin celebrates as the “father of geopolitics.”82 Dugin writes
that in his work, Anthro-Geography, Ratzel elucidated his fundamental idea:
“There is a connection between the evolution of peoples and demographics with
physical geographic data; the influence that physical terrain has on a people’s
culture, political development, and so on.”83 Ratzel considers states to function
similarly to biological organisms, growing, living, and dying according to their
natural merits in a manner similar to survival of the fittest in Darwinian evolution.
Accordingly, Dugin writes:
Ratzel’s ‘organic’ approach is in relation to its space (Raum). This ‘space’
brings over a cardinal material category in a new quality, becoming the
‘Living Sphere,’ ‘Living Space’ (Lebensraum), in a ‘Geobiological
Environment.’” A state gains Lebensraum by naturally obeying what Ratzel
terms the ‘laws of expansion,’ the most significant of which is that ‘the state
expands by consuming and absorbing units of lesser political significance.’84
This removes any notion of ethics from international relations, with all states
simply striving to achieve maximal Lebensraum. This term would be taught to
Hitler by Karl Haushofer personally during his visits to Hitler and his student Hess
while they were imprisoned in Landsberg. Haushofer is also a major influence on
Dugin and will be discussed in more detail later.
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In tandem with Lebensraum is the concept of Raumsinn. A more nebulous
concept, Raumsinn is related to a special connection between people and land.
Dugin observes:
For him [Ratzel], it was important to establish a conceptual instrument for
advocating awareness of the history of the state and nation and their
relationship to the land. In practice, he sought the awakening of ‘Raumsinn’
(the spirit of the land), among the leaders of Germany, who regarded
geopolitics as a dry academic discipline merely representing abstraction.85
Dugin views as necessary the awakening of Raumsinn in the Eurasian
peoples, particularly the ‘Holy Rus,’ and his personal goal is to provoke this latent
Raumsinn. Ratzel would die long before the rise of the Third Reich, but his ideas—
and their continuation under his student Rudolf Kjellen—would have great
influence over two of its more famous geopoliticians—Karl Haushofer and Carl
Schmitt.
Conservative Revolutionaries
For Dugin, conservative has the connotation of allegiance to absolute power
and the defense of religion at the expense of individual rights, rather than the
traditional American conservatism of small government and respect for habeas
corpus, the rule of law, and property and individual rights. The works of Friedrich
Ratzel and his student Rudolf Kjellen, as well as Mackinder’s heartland theory,
were the primary influences on the geopolitical writings and worldview of Karl
Haushofer. Haushofer was an army officer who served as the military attaché to
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Japan from 1908-1910 and was a capable officer on both the Western and Eastern
fronts in World War I. Afterwards he became the director of the institute for
geopolitics at the University of Munich, where Rudolf Hess became his disciple.
Dugin does reference this connection, remarking:
Through his student Rudolf Hess, he met Hitler right after he was
imprisoned following his failed putsch. It is an unconfirmed historical
opinion that Haushofer played a part in writing sections of “Mein Kampf”
relating to geopolitics. But, a conceptual analysis shows a significant
difference between Haushofer’s geopolitical outlook and Hitler’s simplistic,
racist and propagandistic passages.86
However, it is a fact that, after the Beer Hall Putsch, Haushofer regularly visited
Hess and Hitler in Landsberg Prison. During summer and fall 1924, Haushofer
spent many Wednesdays conducting seminars for the two failed putschists. Hitler
later claimed that: “Landsberg was my university [education] at state expense.”87
Given the timing, and Hitler’s respect for Haushofer, it is unlikely that Haushofer’s
lessons had no impact on the content of Mein Kampf. Haushofer had a deep
respect for Japanese culture and did not share Nazi racism against Asian peoples,
but, despite his wife’s Jewish heritage, which would cause problems for his career
as Nazi racial policies deepened, and his refusal to divorce her, he was an avowed
anti-Semite.
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Dugin offers an apologetic description of Haushofer’s life and works to
sugarcoat them to a Russian public and military justifiably proud of their defeat of
Germany in the Great Patriotic War and cognizant of the horrific sacrifices that
were made to achieve it. He tries to distinguish Haushofer’s geopolitics from the
genocidal geopolitics of Hitler and Himmler. Dugin glosses over Haushofer’s role
in popularizing the term Lebensraum and does not mention Haushofer’s own
racist beliefs (or his wife’s ancestry). Instead, he emphasizes Haushofer’s advocacy
for a “New Eurasian Order,” which would be led by a “joint civilizational effort of
two continental powers—Russia and Germany” to “structure continental space
around the World Island so as to completely remove itself from under the
influence of ‘Sea Powers.’”88 Haushofer did indeed promote a Berlin-RomeMoscow-Tokyo axis; however, this is belied somewhat by his star pupil Hess’s
quixotic attempt to secure a peace with the United Kingdom via parachute.
Dugin rationalizes Haushofer’s employment of the term Lebensraum as not
necessitating an expansion into Russian lands, but rather offers an explanation
that: “the expansion of German Lebensraum was planned by Haushofer, not for the
sake of colonizing Russian lands, but for the taming of gigantic unsettled Asiatic
spaces and the reorganization of the land of eastern Europe.”89 He explains that
despite Haushofer’s theoretical support for a Moscow-Berlin alliance:
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In practice, everything did not wash out so cleanly. The purely scientific
logic of Haushofer, logically led to the necessity of a ‘continental bloc’ with
Moscow, collided with the majority of other tendencies and qualities
inherent in the German national establishment. It was the strictly racist
outlook of history, which infected Hitler himself. This outlook considered
racial affinities to be the most important factors, not geographical or
geopolitical qualities. The Anglo-Saxon peoples—England and the USA—
were viewed in this case as the natural allies of the Germans because they
were closer ethnically. Slavs and especially non-white Eurasian peoples
were turned into racial enemies.90
As a result, Nazi Germany missed an opportunity for creating the continental bloc,
per Dugin, because “National-Socialist racism fell into direct contradiction with
geopolitics, or more precisely, implicitly nudging Germans to their inverse, antiEurasian, talassocratic strategy.”91
Despite Haushofer’s preference for a continental bloc led by Germany, but
with a friendly orientation towards Japan and the Soviet Union, he acquiesced to
and endorsed the prevailing Nazi ideology. Although not the founder of the SS and
creator of the Thule society he has alleged to have been, he is guilty of actively
participating and aiding the Nazi regime as his ideas of imperial conquest based on
deterministic geopolitics were a pillar of Nazi foreign policy and ideology.
Haushofer’s own family became a victim of the Nazi regime—his son
Albrecht was executed for participation in a plot against Hitler’s life in 1944,
Haushofer was imprisoned, and in 1946 he and his wife committed suicide. In the
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last words of his suicide note Haushofer confessed: “I want to be forgotten and
forgotten.”92 Alas, with his resurrection by Dugin his wish remains not granted.
The Chief Counsel for the American Government at the Nuremberg Trials, Sidney
Alderman alleged:
Haushofer was Hitler’s intellectual godfather… his was a driving dynamic
plan for the conquest of the heartland of Eurasia and for domination of the
world by the conquest of that heartland…Really, Hitler was largely only a
symbol and rabble-rousing mouthpiece. The intellectual content of which
he was the symbol was the doctrine of Haushofer.93
Alderman overstated Haushofer’s personal role in the Nazi regime and many of his
ideas were rooted in the work of earlier writers on geopolitics, but his writings
were indeed influential and provided intellectual support for the Nazi regime and
Hitler himself. Additionally, they were a key part of Hitler’s doctrine that justified
the slaughter of millions in their expansionary drives for Lebensraum.
In his book Today’s World (1934), Haushofer urged his fellow Germans to
“set their course” after that of their “God-given fuhrer.”94 Herbert Holwig, a recent
biographer of Haushofer’s, summarizes Haushofer’s role in the creation of Nazi
ideology as, “the ultimate tragedy of Karl Haushofer’s life was that, in the words of
Albrecht, he ‘broke away the seal’ to the Aladdin’s lamp of geopolitics for Hess and
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Hitler and then ‘let the demon soar into the world.’”95 The suffering inflicted on
the world based on Haushofer’s theories far exceeded that of Haushofer and his
family. Dugin shares Haushofer’s vision of a world determined by Raum composed
of large states, while also purportedly emphasizing that this worldview is based on
geographical, rather than racial principles. Despite Dugin’s pretense of a Eurasian
empire with room for different ethnic groups and religions, his desire to “kill, kill,
kill” in Ukraine suggests that not all will really be welcome.
It can be reasonably inferred that Dugin would have, until the attack on the
Soviet Union, like Haushofer, “lauded every move that Hitler made, celebrated
every triumph,” especially the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which briefly provided a
culmination of his proposed continental bloc.96 Illustrating this, Dugin argues that:
Naturally, Hitler’s Austrian Catholic, anti-communist, slavophobia—despite
attempts by some of the more historically responsible conservative
revolutionaries and geopoliticians [likely referring to Haushofer and
Schmitt]—caused Germany to lose its historical place as a result of its
nightmarish defeat, inflicted by the forces of the ‘eternal union.’97
Dugin attempts similar intellectual gymnastics to produce cognitive
dissonance to quarantine what he views as the positive ideas of Nazi thinkers from
the realities of the Nazi campaign against the Soviet Union. Carl Schmitt (18881985) was a legal scholar who had a long, prolific body of work that was often
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devoted to justifying statist authoritarianism and expansionist geopolitics. Dugin
excuses his deep ties to the Nazi regime by explaining:
Like many conservative revolutionaries, he had a double-natured
relationship with the National Socialist regime. In one sense, there is no
doubt his theories appear in Nazi ideology, his books “Political Theology”
and “Political Concepts” were used especially successfully, in them Schmitt
openly criticized liberal rights and ‘the rule of law.’98
These so-called conservative revolutionaries like Schmitt inevitably became
Nazis upon Hitler’s rise to power or helped him on his way beforehand. Schmitt’s
writings often functioned as legal rationalizations for Nazi policymaking. Dugin
seeks to obscure the Nazi roots of Schmitt’s reasoning in a summation of Schmit’s
work:
All of Schmitt’s concepts were based on the fundamental idea of ‘peoples’
rights’ (volksrechte), which he distinguished from ‘human rights’ under
liberal theory. His understanding emphasized that a people have rights to
cultural sovereignty so as to preserve its spiritual, historical, and political
identity.99
Dugin continues this positive interpretation, submitting that:
Such an approach was characteristic of some National Socialists,
considering this ideology universal and applicable to all the peoples of the
Earth. But, the dominant line of thought was Pan-Germanism, rooted in a
chauvinistic and narrow nationalistic outlook. Therefore, with his theory of
‘peoples’ rights,’ Schmitt was subjected to harsh criticisms, especially by the
ideologues of the SS.100
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Although it is true that Schmitt was “virulently attacked by the SS for his
relative distance from volkish ideology,” Schmitt’s involvement in the Nazi regime
was much deeper than Dugin makes it out to be and his views on geographical
space were not strictly distinct from racist Nazi ideology.101 A World War I veteran
who was a professor of law at the University of Bonn, Schmitt curried favor with
the Nazi regime after he joined the party in May 1933 and he followed the advice
he was given by Martin Heidegger, who told him to “join the revolution.”102 By
November, he was serving as the President of the National Socialist Jurists
Association and became a favorite of Herman Goehring.103 Although purportedly
concerned with grossraum (great spaces), Schmitt justified the racism
underpinning Nazism in his writings during this period and enthusiastically
embraced its racist ideology. Barnes and Minca note:
According to Schmitt, racial homogeneity (Artgleichheit) ‘made judicial
decision determinate,’ as both judges and the people were part of an overall
‘concrete order’ preserved by the Führer. There was complete identification
of the people with the leader because they were of the same substance.
‘Species sameness’ was “a substitute for the categories of identity and
representation.104
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After the Night of the Long Knives he published an article defending Hitler titled
“The Leader Protects the Law,” and he ended a 1936 speech at a conference, which
he convened, on Judaism in Jurisprudence “(Das Judentum in der
Rechtswissenschaft) in Berlin with the words: “By fending off the Jew, I struggle for
the work of the Lord.”105 So Dugin’s assertion that Schmitt’s beliefs were
inconsistent with mainstream Nazi racism is simply false.
Dugin particularly admires Schmitt’s conception of grossraum. Barnes and
Minca describe how Schmitt advocated for “the new international legal order
based on Großraum…to replace the principle of the equality of sovereign states
with a hierarchy of Reichs, or empires, based on culture, space, and ideology.”106
“Schmitt's Reich would in practice include German-speaking peoples, and
therefore linked to the substantial presence of a Volk, it was not necessarily
dependent on the Blut und Boden elements of mainstream racialized discourses;”
however, like similar apologies made for Haushofer, this rationale advocated for
empire building and was certainly not mutually exclusive with volkish notions.
After the war, an unrepentant Schmitt (he refused denazification and was
considered for trial at Nuremberg), expanded on his grossraum concept through
his development of “nomoses.” The nomos “a fundamental ‘unity of space and law,
order and orientation” and is the “original spatial order” and he sets the nomos of
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the earth, based on traditionalism, Christian eschatology, and continentalism
against the nomos of the sea, rooted in capitalism, materialism, liberalism, and the
secular.107 Dugin endorses these theories, as they perfectly fit his view of a dualistic
world. Particularly consistent with Dugin’s fascist Neo-Eurasianism is Schmitt’s
notion of “Großraum as the elementary building block for an anti-cosmopolitan,
anti-universal organization of the international order based on a plurality of
coexisting Großräume, each one under the leadership of one imperial nation.”108
This is identical to Dugin’s characterization of Eurasia as an empire of many
empires. For Schmitt:
Pan-regions are meant to provide guarantees against the homogenization of
the world into a liberal flatland—essential for the maintenance of difference
and pluralism, indeed, essential for the very possibility of the political, the
friend/enemy distinction, encased in mutually exclusive regional blocs.109
This dichotomy of friend/enemy is essential in Dugin’s ideology. Dugin repeatedly
emphasizes these aspects of Schmitt’s oeuvre, while omitting his anti-Slavic racism
and unflinching support for Nazi policies, including the invasion of the Soviet
Union, for the purpose of resettling and reordering empty space to expand the
German Reich.
Petr Savitsky and Original Eurasianism
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A final major inspiration for Dugin among the men he considers to be the
founders of geopolitics is Petr Savitsky, an aristocrat, although from the landed
gentry of Chernigov, in what is now Ukraine, rather than one of the great noble
families of Imperial Russia. He studied geography and soil sciences at St.
Petersburg Polytechnic University and became the star pupil of Petr Struve.
During the Russian Civil War, Struve briefly served as foreign minister for
Wrangel’s government, with Savitsky as his deputy, and they fled to Bulgaria
following the collapse of White Russian forces. He corresponded with Prince
Nikolai Trubetskoy and the two became leaders in the first Eurasianist movement.
Clover writes that the pair were motivated to symbolically rehabilitate the time
period of Mongol conquest as a necessary and positive step for Russia to develop
its own distinct identity, for Savitsky, “there was no contradiction in celebrating
both Mongol heritage and the Orthodox Church as unique essences of Russian
civilization.”110 Similarly, Savitsky came to appreciate the importance of the Russia
Revolution and viewed it as a key moment in history. In a 1921 letter to Struve
which ended their relationship, he wrote: “Changing the economic policy of
Bolshevism is a condition for the life of Russia. Keeping its political apparatus is
the condition for the strength of the country.”111 Internal disputes within the
Eurasianist movement led to it fading away, with some of the more enthusiastic
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proponents returning to the Soviet Union only to be caught up in Stalin’s purges,
while Trubetskoy grew tired of the movement and devoted himself to work in
linguistics. Many in the movement had actually worked covertly for the Soviet
government, although they too, for the most part, were killed when they returned
to the USSR.
Savitsky supported the Soviet Union during the war, despite his
reservations about the Bolsheviks, but was relatively unaffected by the war despite
living in Prague under Nazi occupation. However, once Soviet troops occupied
Prague he was taken to Moscow, interrogated in the notorious Lubyanka, and then
sent to work camp in Central Russia. He returned to Prague in 1955 having been
released as a result of Khrushchev’s ascent to power. Despite living mostly in
obscurity and suffering from poor health, he would inspire another former gulag
prisoner, a man who would eventually introduce Dugin to Eurasianism and receive
a degree of fame and influence only as the Soviet Union was breaking apart—the
son of Anna Akhmatova (although he despised living in her shadow), Lev
Gumilyev. He adopted Savitsky’s ideas to his own work of inventing historical
narratives for ancient nomadic tribes like the Scythians and the Xiongnu to form a
Eurasianist ideology similar to Savitsky’s Turanism. He believed that Eurasia is
dependent on a natural alliance and affinity between Slavic and Turkic peoples.
Gumilyev also crafted some rather fantastic ideas on the influence of cosmic rays
in creating civilizations and motivating their expansion. He termed this notion
metaphysical notion ‘passionarity’, which Dugin has adapted. Dugin calls
52

Gumilyev “one of the great modern Russian historians and ethnographers” in
Foundations.112
For Dugin, Savitsky follows in the tradition of the German Organicist school
of geopolitics. As evidence, he cites Savitsky writing in “The Geopolitical
Organization of Russia” that “the social-political environment and its territory
should merge into a single whole of geographical individualism or landscape.”113
However, there were stark differences between the German geopolitical writers
and Savitsky. For one, Savitsky was not interested in union with Germany and
considered the Teutonic Knights one of the great enemies of historical Eurasian
people. Savitsky’s Eurasianism was not explicitly militaristic either, for instance, in
“The Geographical and the Geopolitical,” Savitsky writes:
The purpose of the Eurasian peoples is to, by their example, carry the other
peoples of the world down this path. Then will the ethnographic ties by
which a number of Eurasian peoples are connected to some non-Eurasian
nations become useful for ecumenical affairs. These include the IndoEuropean connections of the Russians, the Persian and Iranian relations of
the Eurasian Turks, and those points of contact existing between the
Eurasian Mongols and the peoples of East Asia. All of these will come to
benefit the construction of a new, organic culture for the ‘Old’ World,
which is (we believe) still young and carries in its womb a grand future.114
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Thus, for Savitsky Eurasianism is an internal goal for those living in Russian
territory to achieve and that “Modern Russia, absorbing this tradition, must
resolutely and irrevocably abandon violence and war, the old methods of
unification belonging to gone and overcome epochs.”115 Savitsky argues that rather
than conquest, “in the modern period, the cause is one of cultural creativity,
inspiration, insight, and cooperation.”116 This is a stark difference in tone from
Haushofer’s militaristic ideas. However, it must be noted that Savitsky’s ideas were
highly illiberal and he was opposed to democratic forms of government, but he
was not as explicitly expansionist as Schmitt and Haushofer. Savitsky’s ideal form
of governance, according to Dugin, was an “ideocracy,” which he defines as:
Ideocracy—a term which unites all forms of undemocratic illiberal forms of
rule, based in non-materialists and non-utilitarian motivations. Savitsky
consciously avoided refining this notion, which is incarnate in a theocratic
sobornost, and in populist monarchs, and in nationalist dictators, and in
states of the Soviet type. The breadth of the term corresponds to the purely
geopolitical horizon of Eurasia, which covers vast historical and
geographical expanse. This was an attempt to more closely describe the
continent’s intuitive will.117
Dugin includes Savitsky’s ideas of cultural synthesis, writing that in
“Savitsky’s geopolitical ideas, Russia is understood not as a national state, but as a
special type of civilization, established on the basis of several factors—Slavic-Aryan
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Culture, Turkic nomadism, and the Orthodox tradition.”118 Dugin argues that
Savitsky’s concepts indicate “the intuitive feeling of all inhabitants of the
‘geographical pivot of history’ towards geopolitical unity,” which, “acquires a new
language, “’syntheticism,’ not able to be reduced to inadequate, fragmented,
analytical concerns, of Western rationalism” and that “in this way Savitsky carried
on the Russian-intellectual tradition always gravitating towards ideas of
‘wholeness,’ ‘sobornost,’ ‘unity,’ and etc.”119 This urge to create a holistic, unified
theory for geopolitics is Dugin’s motivation in Foundations of Geopolitics. To
bridge the cognitive dissonance produced by his admiration for Nazi thinkers and
the original Eurasianists, Dugin proposes a maxim that:
The closer the viewpoint of the German continentalists is to the Russian
Eurasianists, the greater the Ostorietierung [openness to the East, a term of
Haushofer’s], the more logical and consistent are their doctrines,
effectiveness in political projects, and their establishment on a geopolitical
basis.120
The Neo-Eurasianism of Alexander Dugin can similarly be viewed as a
fusion between the statist, imperial, determinative, expansionist, mystical, and
racist notions of Schmitt and Haushofer and the symbolic, spiritual, unifying,
illiberal, and theocratic concepts of Savistky and other conservative Eurasianists.
These seemingly paradoxical schools of thought are united in their repudiation of
materialism, liberalism, democratic government, rationalism, and capitalism.
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Chapter 6: Pan-Slavism and the Origins of Eurasianism
The ideological forebears of contemporary mystical Russian nationalism
and Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism were offshoots of the Romantic branch of European
thought in the nineteenth century. In the Russian Empire, and throughout Eastern
and Southeastern European, regions with large populations of practitioners of
Eastern Orthodox Christianity, the Romantic nationalist impulses—exhibited
elsewhere in Europe through pan-Germanism or Italian irredentism—were
manifested in Slavophilia and pan-Slavism. Broadly, Slavophiles mirrored other
European Romantic movements by asserting a distinct cultural identity,
undertaking a self-conscious examination of national character, believing that they
were in the process of fulfilling a unique historical destiny, and hearkening back to
an earlier, more ‘pure’ time.
For Slavophiles, this was the Muscovite Era, which took place after several
Russian city states had shrugged off the “Mongol yoke” and the residence of the
Russian Orthodox Church was moved to Moscow, of course this is diametrically
opposed to Savitsky’s Turanism. A fascination with early versions of Orthodox
Christianity and loathing of the reforms undertaken by Peter the Great within the
Church, an animus shared by Dugin, distinguished pan-Slavism from the religious
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preoccupations by other European Nationalist Romantics, who often admired
Pagan religions, but they shared an interest in mysticism. A consequence of this
was that, “a great deal of nineteenth-century Russian religious thought was
characterized by its reluctance to make clear distinctions between theology and
philosophy.”121 This blurring of disciplines, present in Dugin’s works as well, was
accompanied by a rejection of Western European rationalism and a loathing of
Westernizers emulating the fashions, culture, and ideals of what was perceived as
the decadent West. Three figures, Ivan Kireevsky, Ivan Aksakov, and particularly
Nikolay Danilevsky, were, in different ways, important in establishing and
popularizing pan-Slavism and remain influential among contemporary Russian
nationalists in the mystical tradition.
Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856) studied in Germany as a young man, where his
philosophical basis was set by his rejection of Hegel’s rationalism and embrace of
Friedrich Schelling’s romanticism. He worked with Monastic elders of the Russian
Orthodox Church to translate ancient texts written by Greek monks and his
interest in early Orthodoxy led him to suggest that, “the patterns of Russia’s
development has been determined by the fact that it had received its religion and
its culture from Byzantium rather Rome.”122 He derived many of his philosophical
ideals from early Greek Fathers and believed only through Orthodoxy was it
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possible to launch a true spiritual search for truth. He rejected Western
rationalism in his writings and argued that Orthodoxy and Catholicism fostered
different philosophical methods, writing that “Eastern thinkers were primarily
concerned with the proper inner condition of the thinking sprit, while Westerners
were more interested in the external coherence of concepts.”123 This preference for
a mystical, non-empirical understanding permeates Dugin’s worldview.
Like many other Slavophiles, including Kireevsky, Aksakov was university
educated and was born into the gentry. Not, much of an original ideologue
himself, he was heavily influenced by Kireevsky, Danilevsky, and other thinkers,
but he was notable for his long career as a journalist and promoter of Slavophilia
and pan-Slavism. A modern analogue would be Prokhanov. His efforts to aid
various Slavic peoples in fights against the Ottoman empire represented panSlavism in action and he was instrumental in whipping up sympathy for Bulgarians
that led to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Although a difficult and bloody
campaign, the Russians were successful in securing the independence of a Greater
Bulgaria, based on medieval boundaries, and were on the verge of taking Istanbul,
which was once Constantinople, the ancient capital of the Byzantine Empire. This
would have been hugely symbolic due to the deep connection Slavophiles felt to
Byzantium and the Eastern Roman Empire. These hopes were dashed when
Austria-Hungary and Britain, alarmed at Russia’s gains, called for the Congress of
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Berlin, which eliminated most of Russia’s gains and even expanded AustriaHungary’s influence and territorial holdings in the Balkans at the expense of
Russia. Infuriated at what he perceived as a betrayal, Aksakov, alleged “a
conspiracy against the Russian people, a conspiracy carried out with the
representatives of Russia.”124
For many Slavophiles, these treacherous representatives were Jews or other
“non-Rus.” The assassination of Tsar Alexander II prompted his successor
Alexander III to enact reactionary counter reforms, which enjoyed the support of
many Slavophiles. in the wake of the Congress of Berlin and the assassination. PanSlavic sentiments became increasingly indistinguishable from anti-Semitism, as
well as anti-Polish, Turkish, and Finnish sentiments, and the Black Hundreds
gained momentum during this period by paralleling pan-Slavic organizations and
by becoming unmistakably menacing towards non-Slavs. Slavophilia morphed into
a form of “Russian Exceptionalism.”125 Many pogroms were carried out in the
decades following the assassination of Alexander II and government support for
the Black Hundreds deepened, with Nicholas II and some Orthodox clergy
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accepting membership in the organization.126 These accusations of internal
enemies and a conspiracy against Russia are an integral facet of Dugin’s writings.
Nikolai Danilevsky represented a more radical wing of pan-Slavism and he
advanced a deeply influential, distinctive form of socialism. Influenced by Fourier,
he believed that the Russian peasant commune, or obschina, was a model,
uniquely Russian version of socialism and was strongly against the institution of
serfdom. He believed the Russian people have a unique connection to the land and
he advocated for a return to this connection between people and soil, which he
termed pochvennichestvo. Danilevsky also admired the zemski sabors, or
democratic assemblies of Muscovite Russia. His views were inspired by some of the
more radical Slavophiles, like Dostoevsky, and they were both were arrested as a
result. He also shared the foreign policy views of pan-Slavism and supported the
independence efforts of Balkan Slavs and viewed the Polish as the “old traitor to
Slavdom.”127 He remains deeply influential today, and Alexander Dugin asserted
that his own “Theory of a Multipolar World seriously and axiomatically adopts
Samuel Huntington’s thesis about the plurality of civilizations,” but “Russia has its
own author, who claimed the same thing more than a hundred years ago: Nikolai
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Danilevsky and then the Eurasianists.”128 Dugin asserts that, “Savitsky’s worldview,
like the majority of his fellow Eurasianists, was shaped by the works of Slavophile
writers like Danilevsky” and that there was “a strain of revolutionary Slavophilia
linking the singular historical identity of ‘Greater Russia,’ not reducible to religion,
or ethnic Slavic qualities.”129 This is blatantly contradictory, as the Slavophiles and
Savitsky held opposite views regarding Mongol and Turkic influences on Russia.
Dugin attempts to bridge this chasm, by arguing:
The fundamental duality of the Russian landscape—its division between
forest and steppe—was noticed more by the Slavophiles. Savitsky presented
the geopolitical idea of Russia-Eurasia as a synthesis of these two aspects—
the European forest and the Asiatic steppe.
And he asserts that the Eurasianists:
In this respect they were closer to Konstantin Leontiev, who formulated a
most important thesis—‘Slavdom yes, Slavism No,’ meaning that the ‘ethnic
and linguistic closeness of the Slavic peoples is not a sufficient basis for
describing its uniform cultural character.’130
Leontiev was a curious figure in his own right, who, according to historian
Walter Laqueur:
Was no nationalist in the customary sense, because nationalism, as he saw
it, was Western in inspiration, modernist, and even liberal—and thus in
contradiction to the religious and autocratic Russian tradition…Toward the
end of his life he seems to have reached the conclusion that since Western
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capitalism and liberalism had no future in Russia and since Eastern
Orthodox (Byzantine) civilization could not be revived either, the only
future for Russia was in some form of state socialism.131
Dugin moved from a narrow Pan-Slavism to a more inclusive Neo-Eurasianism,
with far more in common with Leontiev than Danilevsky, realizing, according to
Walter Laquer, that “the Old Right has needlessly limited its appeal because of its
xenophobia.”132 Historian Robert A. Saunders similarly claims, a Eurasianism that
provides for “the delinking of the russki ethnos from the name of the state would
have made more political space for the various faith groups that are native to the
lands that constitute cotemporary Russia.”133 “In this dichotomy, “Our People” (as
seen by Dugin) “are not only Russians, but also the traditionalists among the
smaller nations who recognize the fate of separatism on one hand and
‘mondialism’ on the other.”134 The purpose behind such a strategy is to foster the
reestablishment, hopefully through willing participation, rather than conquest, of
the Soviet Empire and the Tsarist Empires, but with an avowedly authoritarian,
traditionalist government. This explains the cloak of an inclusive empire of
empires to disguise the beating heart of fascism at the core of his ideology and the
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implicit status of Russia as the ‘center’ and the highest level of civilization within a
hypothetical Eurasian empire.
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Chapter 7: “A Path to the North,” The Frontier Thesis, and
Lessons from the Talassocracy
For Dugin, a great deal of Russian Lebensraum is already under Russian
sovereignty—The Arctic lands and Siberia. Russia has more coastline on the Arctic
Ocean and population living north of the Arctic Circle than any other state and
historically Russians have played a leading role in exploring and developing the
Arctic Region. At the site of modern Archangelsk, Russians have been using the
White Sea, an inlet of the Barents Sea, which itself is a marginal sea of the Arctic
Ocean, for trade and fishing since at least the 10th century. Russian exploration of
the Arctic would not begin in earnest until the 16th and 17th centuries because
Russians first needed to overcome external threats posed by the Poles,
Lithuanians, Mongols, and other invaders, before they could expand and colonize
the vast, but often inhospitable, swathes of land to the east, especially those along
the Arctic Ocean. Dugin’s thinking towards the Artic and Asian stretches of its
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empire mimics the German attempt to tame the “Wild East” by cleansing it of its
Slavic inhabitants, which in itself was inspired by American manifest destiny.135
Frederick Jackson Turner expresses several ideas which would not be out of
place in the German Organicist school. He offers a connection between soil and
national character, noting:
From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual traits of profound
importance. The works of travelers along each frontier from colonial days
onward describe certain common traits, and these traits have, while
softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place of their origin, even
when a higher social organization succeeded. The result is that to the
frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics.136
And in this passage, Turner, in a fashion similar to Ratzel, likens the American
state to an organism:
Thus, civilization in America has followed the arteries made by geology,
pouring an ever-richer tide through them, until at last the slender paths of
aboriginal intercourse have been broadened and interwoven into the
complex mazes of modern commercial lines; the wilderness has been
interpenetrated by lines of civilization growing ever more numerous. It is
like the steady growth of a complex nervous system for the originally
simple, inert continent. If one would understand why we are to-day one
nation, rather than a collection of isolated states, he must study this
economic and social consolidation of the country. In this progress from
savage conditions lie topics for the evolutionist.137
Turner, considering the continent to be ‘simple, inert’ before the arrival of
frontiersmen and women, glosses over the millennia of indigenous civilizations
that existed in the Americas and ignores the centuries of genocide and exploitation
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that resulted from colonization. The demise of indigenous peoples in Turner’s view
is simply the result of an evolutionary drive towards ‘economic and social
consolidation.’
Turner was both aware and approving of Ratzel’s scholarship. Turner
quoted Ratzel at length in 1896. In 1905, Turner paid tribute to Ratzel, writing that,
his “recent death is lamented by American scholars. He was a forerunner in the
path that American historians must follow who view their problems as those
arising from the study of the evolution of society in the American environment.”138
Turner’s thinking was clearly influenced by Ratzel, but Ratzel was also inspired by
America’s colonial history in his writings.
Jens-Uwe Guettel notes that the American experience fueled Ratzel’s desire
for a comparable German Empire, while Ratzel’s ideas to that effect were eagerly
received in America at the highest political and intellectual levels. He asserts:
Ratzel’s work was inextricably linked to German imperialism and his
American admirer Turner was not only aware of this fact, but also approved
of the German geographer’s colonial agitation in part because he felt that
German colonialism was modeled after the best possible example. Turner
observed that ‘American colonization has become the mother of German
colonial policy.’139
Early German colonial policy, which Nazi ideology draws from via the well of
Ratzel’s geopolitics, amongst other sources, was responsible for the first major
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genocide of the twentieth century, in the form of a large scale campaign of mass
extermination against the Herero and Nama peoples in what is now Namibia, as
many as 75 percent of the Herero and as many as half of the Nama were murdered
in the ruthless campaign, resulting in as many as 100,000 total victims.140 Like
Turner, Dugin pays no heed to the fate of Russia’s own indigenous people. There
are some 270,000 of them across Russia’s North, Siberia, and Far East. Based on the
example set by Dugin’s geopolitical idols, it is unlikely they would benefit from any
expansionary drive for Lebensraum taking place under the aegis of a Eurasian
empire. It is curious that Dugin does not feature Turner in Foundations, but he
does include Admiral Alfred Mahan as one of the founders of geopolitics. Mahan,
had a similar notion of inevitable American expansion, but applied it on the global
level and emphasizing the use of naval power to achieve an ocean spanning
American empire.
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Chapter 8: Dugin on “The Jewish Question”
It is perhaps surprising that a traditionalist, devout, self-proclaimed
conservative would explicitly claim to draw inspiration from Marx, but Dugin
makes several, generally sympathetic references to Marx in his writings; however,
these are solely to draw from Marx’s legitimacy in Russian academic thought and
are not usually rooted in any real overlap in content. In a chapter from the second
volume of Foundations of Geopolitics, dedicated to the ‘Khazarian’ question (after
the ancient Jewish state that existed north of the Black Sea from roughly the 7th
through the 10th century), Dugin depicts Marx as a Eurasianist revolutionary,
striving to overturn the Atlanticist capitalist order. But this chapter, rather than
revealing any genuine overlap between Dugin’s ideology and Marx’s viewpoint,
serves only to expose the racism that lies under the surface of Dugin’s thinking,
which is usually more carefully concealed.
He believes that Marx represents the ‘Orientalist Jew,’ naturally sympathetic
to mystical, traditional Eurasianist values and locked in an immortal struggle with
Talmudist Westernizing Jews. The Eurasianist Jew in religion is Kabbalist or
Hasidic and socialist revolutionary in secular values, while Westernizing Jews are
Talmudist in religion and liberal and humanistic in the secular realm. Dugin
68

further elaborates on this dichotomy, which is clearly just another application of
his Eurasianist/Atlanticist dualism:
Many Jews saw bolshevism as a possibility to finally merge with a large
nation, abandoning the ghetto and the Pale of Settlement, to bridge
eschatologically the messianic Russian with the messianic Jew under the
general aegis of Eurasian revolution. The destruction of the alienating laws
of capital and exploitation. Thus, extremist circles of Eastern European Jews
of a mystical orientation (from Hasidim to Sabbateanists) themselves
presented a growth medium for Bolshevism, SR and Marxism, and not
accidentally the majority of leaders of the Reds came from families of
Hasidim and mystics, taking on a mystical eschatological messianic pathos,
despite the external paradox, this convergence of typological and
psychological relations between Hasidic types of Jewish fundamentalists
and the ardent atheist builders of Bolshevist society was intimate, since
they both belonged to the ‘Eurasianism,’ ‘orientalism,’ and the irrationalmystical sects of Judaism.141
Dugin draws from Marx’s “On the Jewish Question,” in his discussion of a
place for the Jews in Eurasia, and uses his writing to justify his own anti-Semitic
typology. He claims to translate Marx as asking:
What is the secular basis of the Jewry? Material consumption and selfinterest. What are the Jews’ earthly ideals? Trading. What is their earthly
god? Money…Money is the fervent deity of the Israelites. Empirically, the
being of the Jew is trading.142
This quotation, like others he creates, are not featured in the English translation of
Marx’s response to Bruno Brauer and are quite contrary to Marx’s sentiment in the
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essay.143 This fabricated statement is a clear indication of Dugin’s own anti-Semitic
beliefs. Further illustrating Dugin’s barely concealed prejudices is a reference to
“(a partially justified) anti-Semitism of the Russian patriots,” in regard to Jewish
liberals.144
Further, any responsible analysis will demonstrate that Eurasianism and
Marxism are incompatible. Both loathe commodity fetishism and abhor the
capitalist system and seek its replacement; however, for Dugin it is to be replaced
by an “empire of many empires,” of ‘nationalist’, traditionalist peoples under the
direction of Moscow. Rather than a workers’ revolution, Dugin really advocates for
a nativist, fascist revolution. For Dugin, Russians and other nations could
supposedly overcome past hatreds through an ‘internationalism’ based on a
common traditionalist point of view rooted in mystical contemplation,
authoritarian leadership, and the country’s historical ethnic character. Thus, the
“empire of many empires,” would resemble a confederacy of states dominated by a
single ethnic group, with a Russian leader, and looking back to mythic history for
guidance.
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Marx’s internationalism is based on shared oppressive economic conditions
inherent in the capitalist system. He uses English and Irish workers as an example
to illustrate how prejudices and racism benefit a ruling class:
The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who
lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he regards himself
as a member of the ruling nation and consequently he becomes a tool of the
English aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening their
domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national
prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the
same as that of the “poor whites” to the Negroes in the former slave states
of the U.S.A. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money.
He sees in the English worker both the accomplice and the stupid tool of
the English rulers in Ireland.145
Thus, for Marx ethnic identity stand in the way of internationalization,
which is also largely the point of his essay “On the Jewish Question,” and the
destruction of the capitalist system in favor of internationalism. For Marx, fighting
racism is an important part of achieving this goal. While for Dugin embracing and
accentuating ethnic and religious identity is the way to achieve this goal. This
worldview holds diversity to be a weakness and opposes multiculturalism. Dugin
hopes to establish a Eurasian empire through the creation of an alliance of
subservient xenophobic, authoritarian rulers obedient to Moscow and backed by
domestic elites, the complete opposite of Marx’s internationalism.
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Chapter 9: Dugin’s Road to Influence
Under Putin, Dugin has never held a government position of any power,
although he has acted as an informal agent of the Kremlin at times, and served as a
mid-level academic until he was fired for making comments on Ukraine that went
too far for the Kremlin. Politically he has never had any electoral success. The
National Bolshevist Party he founded with Eduard Limonov failed miserably in
1993 and the two split acrimoniously in 1998. Dugin’s Eurasia party, founded in
2001, performed even more poorly. The ‘red-browns’, a nickname for National
Bolsheviks, based on their contradictory fusion of brown shirt Nazism and Red
Army symbology, have come nowhere near the levers of power. By all responsible
accounts he has no personal influence over Vladimir Putin and they do not orbit
the same circles of power. Dugin is “not even a member of the Public Chamber—a
consultative institution created by Putin to foster a regime-friendly civil society.”146
Putin’s political record has largely been marked by pragmatism, with any
ideological shifts being calculated to maintain domestic support. Dugin’s personal
behavior has often been dramatic and his Neo-Eurasianist fantasies on the grand
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continental level are impractical; to say the least. Dugin’s professed Old Believer
faith runs counter to the rehabilitation and active promotion of official Russian
Orthodoxy by the Kremlin.
A more palatable, Russian Orthodox version of Eurasianism espoused by
Ivan Ilyin has been employed more overtly by the Kremlin and he has been cited
on numerous occasions by Vladimir Putin. Ilyin, like Savitsky, fled Russia following
the defeat of the white forces by the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution, but
was more overtly friendly to fascism. He even worked for a time in Goebbel’s
propaganda ministry and “regarded fascism as a positive force, criticizing it only
for being insufficiently religious in inspiration.”147 Timothy Snyder asserts Dugin
and Schmitt are similar in that: “Dugin shared with Ilyin a debt to Carl Schmitt. It
was Schmitt who had formulated a vision of world politics without laws and states,
grounded instead in the subjective desires of cultural groups for ever more land”
and that “maritime powers such as Great Britain and the United States were
bearers of abstract, Jewish notions of law.”148 Intellectually, Snyder dismisses
Dugin, arguing “much of Dugin’s writing reads like a parody of Ilyin,” but this is
fundamentally incorrect and ignores the many other ideological sources that have
shaped Dugin’s worldview, particularly in regard to strategy and geopolitics.149
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Although Dugin’s spiritual and mystical writings and attacks on the ‘decadent
West’ certainly are similar to Ilyin’s, his geopolitical postulations owe much more
of a debt to the Nazi geopoliticians he so admires, while Ilyin’s fall more in line
with conservative slavophiles like Kireevsky. Snyder does concede that:
Concepts from the three interflowing currents of Russian fascism—Ilyin’s
Christian totalitarianism, Gumilev’s Eurasianism, and Dugin’s ‘Eurasian’
Nazism—appeared in Putin’s discourse as he sought an exit from the
dilemma he created for his country in 2012.150
Dugin’s ideas are not cited so overtly, due to his personal eccentricities and more
controversial statements. His unstable personality makes power brokers in the
Kremlin wary of making him the public face of the regime’s ideology, for instance,
Sergei Markov, a political consultant on Putin’s staff has said, “he’s seen as a
brilliant philosopher, but brilliance and madness are very close to each other.”151
But this does not mean his ideas have been entirely eclipsed by Ilyin’s when it
comes to influence over policymaking and strategy.
Any comparisons of Dugin to a sort of Rasputin or references to him being
“Putin’s Brain,” are sensationalist; however, the influence of his ideas and
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terminology are another matter.152153 Published at a crucial time in Russian history
and taught to many senior military leaders in the Russian Armed Forces at the
General Staff Academy Dugin’s ideas—or perhaps more accurately—the montage
of ideas he’s stitched together from disparate, authoritarian intellectual materials,
have been influential, or at least superficially appropriated by the Kremlin and the
Russian armed forces. His vocabulary has become mainstream in not just Russian
political discourse, but internationally as well. The Kremlin is not a monolith and
Putin, although an autocrat, does not actually operate on the basis of one man rule
where he is personally responsible for every decision made. A substantial amount
of leeway is afforded to military leadership to plan and implement their own
operations. In Foundations of Geopolitics, Dugin moves beyond his earlier, more
crude conspiracies to more nuanced ones, arguing the Council of Foreign Relations
the Bilderburger Group, and the Trilateral Commission are part of the globalist
project working:
To transition to a single world system under the strategic domination of the
West and ‘progressive,’ ‘humanistic,’ and ‘democratic’ values. For this they
have worked out parallel structures—consisting of politicians, journalists,
intellectuals, financiers, analysts and so on who were supposed to prepare
the ground before the globalist project of World Government could be
widely organized.154
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This claim mimics contemporary allegations of conspiracies launched by deep
states and globalists (usually personified in George Soros).
Dugin blames Atlanticists and Gorbachev for the collapse of the Soviet
Union, arguing:
The voluntary concession of the Heartland was not accompanied by
relevant concessions in maritime power and the West has not arrived at a
compromise—neither geopolitically, nor ideologically—with a selfliquidating Eurasia. NATO has not dissolved, nor left Europe or Asia.155
This matches Putin’s language on the subject very closely.
Nato’s unilateral action in the Balkans against the Serbs, although ultimately
successful in protecting Bosnian Muslims from further genocidal violence,
provided additional fuel for those who view it as the implacable enemy of Russia.
Putin abhorred NATO’s intervention, arguing “that sort of behavior cannot be
justified, even for so-called humanitarian reasons,” and adding, “I believe that the
operation itself was a major mistake in international relations and a violation of
the founding principles of international law.”156 Similarly, Putin has at times
adopted rhetoric not unlike Dugin’s in projecting the West as a perennial,
existential threat to Russia. He asserted that the Second Chechen War and the
Russian campaign in the North Caucasus against fighters in Dagestan and
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Ingushetia was undertaken because “I was convinced that if we didn’t stop the
extremists right away, we’d be facing a second Yugoslavia on the entire territory of
the Russian Federation—the Yugoslavization of Russia.”157 He also states that
NATO’s “means of resolving the problem in Yugoslavia was predetermined after
the fall of the USSR.”158 Relatedly, he referred to the Chechen separatist movement
as, “a continuation of the collapse of the USSR.”159
Tellingly, during the same in-depth interview very early during his rule,
Putin is asked about his relationship with Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the
Soviet KGB and a ringleader of the 1991 attempted coup, during his time in
government before being designated Yeltsin’s successor. He is asked “Is it true that
as director of the FSB [the KGB’s successor], you used to run into Vladimir
Kryuchkov?” and Putin replies, “It’s true,” the interviewer responds “Accidentally?”
allowing Putin a chance to distance himself from the controversial figure, but
Putin does not, answering: “No, not accidentally. I worked rather actively with the
longtime veterans.”160 He also offers his opinion that “Kryuchkov was a true believe
in Communism, who sided with the coup-plotters. But he was also a very decent
man. To this day I have the greatest respect for him.”161 According to Alexander
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Yakovlev, a reformist member of the Politburo, Kryuchkov was the leader of the
“yesterday forever” forces who worked frantically to avert the collapse of the Soviet
Union through the promotion of political projects.162 These projects straddled the
nationalist, democratic reformer, and communist camps and Clover reports, that
in a “detailed after-the-fact examination of these projects, one name keeps
popping up in documents, in conversations with those involved, and in anecdotes:
that of Vladimir Kryuchkov.”163 It is reasonable to believe that during their active
working relationship, Putin was familiarized with these political projects and their
potential usefulness by Kryuchkov and his fellow “veterans” of the KGB, the
“yesterday forever” forces.
An indirect connection to Dugin’s ideas can also be made through Putin’s
relationship with Gennady Seleznyov, a leader in the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation (KPRF), a vestige of the Soviet Communist Party, who served
as Speaker of the Russian State Duma from 1996 until 2003, when he left the party
for the Party of Russian Revival—a more explicitly xenophobic party—after a
losing a power struggle with his longtime rival Gennady Zyuganov.164 Dugin served
as an adviser to Seleznyov beginning in 1998, a relationship that began as a result
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of Seleznyov’s rivalry with Zyuganov. Clover explains that Zyuganov was
introduced to De Benoist as a result of Dugin’s efforts and that under Zyuganov,
the KPRF only superficially retained its Marxist ideology. Instead Zyuganov
“proceeded to retool the party with new nationalist messages that had little in
common with an orthodox socialist message” and that this nationalist messaging,
was “strikingly similar to the ‘radical centre’ theories that Dugin says he imbibed
from the European New Right.”165 This appropriation of Soviet, communist,
symbology and superficial embrace of its ideology combined with xenophobic,
imperial expansionism has been a key plank of Dugin’s ideological platform.
Dugin himself notes “at the critical moment of ideological choice, Zyuganov
placed a bet on Neo-Eurasian populism, the main contours of which were
described and formulated by myself and my colleagues at The Day newspaper.”166
Annoyed at Zyuganov’s theft and popularization of his own mostly stolen ideas,
Dugin and Seleznyov hoped to outmaneuver Zyuganov by moving farther to the
right. Seleznyov was entirely receptive to Dugin’s ideas, having previously tried,
quixotically, to have the Duma annul the 1991 agreement ending the Soviet
Union.167 In his post as speaker Selezynov met personally with Putin while Putin
was President in 2002 and in the First Person interviews Putin notes that when he
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was announced as Yeltsin’s successor Selezynov remarked to him, “why did they do
that to you? They’ve buried you.”168 This anecdote implies at least some kind of
personal, familiar relationship between the two men. One of the reasons why
Selezynov was ultimately forced out of the KPRF was because party officials felt he
had become “increasingly reluctant to disrupt his good relations with the Kremlin”
and he refused “to resign in protest over a reshuffle of Duma committee chairs that
stripped the Communists of eight of their 10 leadership posts,” according to
Moscow Times reporter Simon Saradzhyan.169
Through Selezynov, Dugin achieved his closest orbit to actual power in the
Russian Federation. His brand of fascism was promoted as a type of “political
technology” by the famed spin doctor of the Kremlin, Gleb Pavlovsky, who
reflected on this time to Clover: “He [Dugin] suggested some political projects,
some of which I sent forward, because I thought it was important to widen the
political front so to speak, that the regime should represent a wide spectrum.”170 In
the fall of 2000, Clover reports that “Dugin was introduced to Putin. Dugin refuses
to discuss the meeting, but it would change his career. Soon there were sponsors,
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contacts and open doors.”171 It is hard to believe that this meeting had no impact
on Vladimir Putin, still very early in his tenure as President, as a short time later,
he delivered a speech in Kazakhstan on November 13 of that year where he stated
that “Russia has always perceived itself as a Eurasian country.”172 As an aside,
Kazakhstan has proven to be fertile ground for Eurasianism, an embodiment of
Savitsky’s Turanism with a population descended from Russians, Turkic tribes, and
Mongolians. It was a founding member of the Eurasian Union and the L.N.
Gumilyov Eurasian National University is the premiere institute of higher learning
in that country and was formed as a result of a merger between two other
universities in Astana and renamed in 2001.
Possibly through Selezynov (although Selezynov denied it), Dugin became
close with Petr Suslov, a twenty-year veteran of the KGB, who admired
Foundations of Geopolitics and together they set up the Eurasia Party in March
2001. Clover reports that a month later an article appeared in the respected
Russian paper Novaya Gazeta by investigative journalist and parliamentarian Yuri
Shchekochikhin that alleged Suslov and Vladimir Revsky (Head of the Honor and
Dignity KGB Veterans’ society) were part of a “splinter cell within the KGB that
was working behind the scenes to bring back the USSR.”173 The following year
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Shchekochikhin wound up dead, with symptoms entirely consistent with radiation
poisoning.174 Suslov operated at the nexus of organized crime and the shadowy
elements of the Russian state—at the intersection of poniatiaa and NeoEurasianism. He has been accused of hiring Max Lazovsky to organize a bombing
campaign in Moscow to generate public support for the campaign in Chechnya, by
pinning the blame on Chechen extremists, an accusation that was prominently put
forward by Alexander Litvinenko in 2002, who was killed by radiation poisoning in
London in 2002.175 Clover references the Umberto Eco novel Foucault’s Pendulum
in describing Dugin’s partnership with Suslov, “in which the protagonists who
make money by peddling phony conspiracy theories to the gullible, suddenly have
to contend with the appearance of the actual secret society” and that “Dugin,
having spent the last decade peddling the Eurasia conspiracy, suddenly [was]
slightly blindsided by the overture from one of its minions.”176 Dugin did not deny
any of this to Clover, reflecting that Suslov described himself as “a sort of state
envoy to the organized crime world” and cynically observed: “Who are our political
leaders after all? We are ruled by no one but bandits. They all have their own Max
[Lazovsky]. You think Putin and Medvedev are any different?”177
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At the Eurasia party’s founding conference, held in April 2001, Dugin made
it clear that “our aim is not to reach power and to fight for power; our aim is to
fight for influence over the regime,” and indeed the Eurasia Party never met the
five percent threshold to win a seat in the Duma. However, influence over the
regime was certainly achieved. The first, and to date probably the most concrete
proof of his influence over Kremlin strategy, was its awarding Akhmat Kadyrov and
his Kadyrovtsy militia the fiefdom of Chechnya. Suslov and his handlers connected
Dugin with Khoj Akhmed Nukhaev a prominent member of the Russian criminal
underworld who moved back to Chechnya in 1994 to fight for Chechen
independence. Anna Politkvskaya, a Russian journalist assassinated in 2006 who
covered the second Chechen war, described him as a man who like Dugin
represented himself “as a philosopher, which he was not.”178 Nukhaev developed a
keen interest in Eurasianism and he is quoted in his biography (his biographer
Paul Khlebnikov was murdered the year after it was released and Nukhaev remains
a suspect) as believing “Eurasianism means the alliance of Orthodoxy and Islam on
the grounds of confrontation against the West.”179 Nukhaev served as a conduit
between the Kremlin and Kadyrov, formerly an independence fighter who had
changed sides in 1999. Suslov told Clover that:
The people I worked with were interested in Eurasianism from a pragmatic
point of view. They were looking for something that would work in
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Chechnya, something that would be a legitimate reason not to secede, an
idea we could build a regime around…We wanted to show the Chechens
that national minorities could by nature be nationalists but also have an
idea of what the motherland is. That is Eurasianism.180
The Kremlin’s end goal was to divide the Chechen resistance further
between the foreign born or generally foreign educated Islamic fundamentalists
and the Chechens who practiced Sufism and adhered to a traditional North
Caucasus clan based identity. To arrange this, a conference was held in July 2001 at
the President Hotel in Moscow, whose security was directly under the control of
Putin’s bodyguards, and Nukhaev flew in from Turkey to attend and flew back
after the conference ended, despite being the subject of a police manhunt. The
conference opened with an address from Selezynov, who hosted the event along
with the Eurasia party and then Nukhaev gave the keynote address. Per Clover:
His speech was the first time that a Chechen official had condemned radical
‘Wahhabism’ in public; and Nukhaev was also the first high-level Chechen
politician to reject separatism and embrace cultural autonomy in the name
of common civilizational bonds with fellow ‘Eurasians.’181
In his speech Nukhaev asserted:
An application of the value and effectiveness of this ideology you can see in
the fact that I, convinced supporter of Chechen independence, today appear
at this conference in the capital of a state at war with my people.
Eurasianism creates that level of dialogue between Chechens and Russians
on which, for the first time in our history, we have a real basis for mutual
understanding, for peace, and for union against the common enemy.182

180

Ibid, 262.

181

Ibid, 264.

182

Ibid.

84

Weeks later Kadyrov issued a decree banning Islamic extremism and the Chechen
resistance became hopelessly divided, heralding victory for Russia. Nukhaev
himself returned to mountains of the Caucasus and engaged in shadowy activities,
he was reported killed in 2004, but some sources believe him to be in hiding.183
Ultimately, any ‘mutual understanding’ would be illusory, the Kremlin
simply funneled resources to the Kadyrovtsy and allowed Akhmat, and following
his assassination in 2004, his son Ramzan, a free hand to rule Chechnya as they
pleased. But, as Clover notes, “the Eurasianist philosophy had at last managed to
be useful to the Kremlin in a practical matter.”184
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Putin believed he could make
common cause with the West against Islamic extremists and sought better
relationships with America and NATO, relegating Dugin and Eurasianism to the
sidelines once again, although the Eurasian Economic Community and later
Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan represent a soft and scaled down version of Dugin’s imperial Eurasian
goals. Strictly economic in nature for now, the use of ‘Eurasian’ branding does
imply some ideological debt to Dugin, but his personal involvement has been
minimal. He “sought to attach himself to Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Union,
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by boldly proclaiming that he could become its de-facto theoretician and inject the
project with the ideology that it lacked,” but Dugin was overshadowed by other
figures.185
Yet ideas are not so easily consigned to the dustbin of history, and once
tensions flared between Russian and NATO over Georgia in 2008, Dugin and his
worldview made a comeback and he became personally useful to the Kremlin once
again. He and the youth wing of his Eurasia party even decamped to the frontlines
and may have participated in the fighting, which was foolishly started by the
President of Georgia, Mikhail Sashkavilii, in the mistaken belief that he would
receive NATO support.186 The Georgian offensive was legal under international
law, as the breakaway regions he attempted to bring under government control are
recognized as Georgian territory, but he broke a delicate status quo and provoked
Russia to respond overwhelmingly.187 Providing evidence for the view that Putin
does not personally share Dugin’s beliefs to the fullest, Russian troops withdrew
from Georgian territory after securing the borders of the breakaway regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If it were up to Dugin, they would have permanently
occupied Tbilisi.
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A similar divergence would also be the case in Eastern Ukraine. On Russia’s
military intervention in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, Gessen writes:
It had been over five years since Dugin declared his intention to become his
country’s lead ideologue and it was happening…Back in 2009, Dugin had
prophesized the division of Ukraine into two separate states: the eastern
portion would be allied with Russia and the west would be forever looking
toward Europe…Dugin had spent years waiting for Russia to claim its place
as the leader of the anti-modern world.”188
This has happened as a result of Russia’s intervention following the overthrow of
the Russian backed kleptocrat Viktor Yanukovych. Dugin’s participation in the
conflict has not just been rhetorical, his Eurasian Union of Youth have mobilized
“dozens” of volunteers to fight there.189 He was placed on the U.S. Treasury
sanctions list on March 11, 2015 as a result190. However, Putin has exercised more
restraint than Dugin would care for However, Putin has exercised more restraint
by annexing Crimea and providing assistance and military forces to the Kremlin
puppet states of Donetsk and Luhansk, but not through overt annexation, and
these actions were likely in reaction to developing events, rather than a preplanned strategy. There are also significant areas of Eastern Ukraine with a
majority population of Russian speakers that remain outside the control of these
Russian proxies.
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Chapter 10: Blowback and Neo-Eurasianism
Chalmers Johnson, a former consultant for the CIA who became a
renowned political scientist, defined blowback as:
A CIA term first used in March 1954 in a recently declassified report on the
1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in
Iran. It is a metaphor for the unintended consequences of the US
government’s international activities that have been kept secret from the
American people.”191
In many ways the Russian attacks on Western democracies through
disinformation, spreading of divisive ideologies, and attacks on elections is
blowback for American activities throughout the Cold War, but probably most
emotionally relevant for Dugin given his personal history, was its covert support
given to the Yeltsin administration during the 1991 coup. Dugin refers to these
activities, arguing that:
Every geopolitical level of the USA should be involved simultaneously,
similar to the anti-Eurasianism of the Atlanticists: ‘sponsoring’ the
disintegration of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), governmental unity
(USSR), and furthering ethno-territorial problems under the guise of
regionalism, Russia accomplished its progressive disintegration up to its
complete destruction…The Heartland will force the Sea Power to pay in the
same coin. This is basic symmetrical politics.192
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The similarities between Dugin’s proposals and the actions that were taken by
Russian state actors cannot be denied.
For the purposes of putting together a new empire, Dugin writes that the
“chief ‘scapegoat’ will namely be the USA—undermining of whose power which
(up to the complete destruction of its geopolitical constructs) will be realized
systematically and uncompromisingly by participants of the New Empire.”193 He
advocated for the new Eurasian empire to “provoke every kind of destabilization
and separatism within the borders of the USA (it might be possible to rely on the
political forces of African American racists).”194 Developing new projects to divide
the Atlanticists, is “the geopolitical problem of the West in its wider sense for
Russia is the disintegration in two—the West of America and the West of
Europe.”195 Russian involvement in the Brexit campaign, the Trump
administrations ambivalent attitude towards NATO, and the rise of Eurosceptic
governments in EU nations, often led by parties friendly towards Moscow, as in
Italy, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic, and especially Hungary fit this
description. Finally, although Dugin could never have anticipated the
pervasiveness of social media and the internet in 1996, these new mediums have
created opportunities to destabilize and divide the citizenry of Western
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democracies. Reflecting his belief that diversity is a weakness, Dugin advocates
that:
It is generally important to introduce geopolitical chaos within the
American daily experience by encouraging all manner of separatism, ethnic
diversity, social and racial conflict, actively supporting every extremist
dissident movement, racist sectarian groups, and to destabilize the political
processes within America.196
The FBI investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016 elections has
revealed that Russian hackers successfully broke into the Democratic National
Conventions cyber systems and also attacked state and county level election
systems in key districts and battleground states.197 It is difficult to know if any
votes were actually changed, and government reports have insisted they were not,
but a successful hack would reveal no evidence. Experts have shown it is relatively
easy to change the outcome of elections through hacking some voting machine
hardware.198 Russian sponsored ads and disinformation promoted through
Facebook and other social media sites were targeted at many different groups
across the political spectrum, but with the intention of causing Hilary Clinton to
lose the election through reducing the turnout of those that would support her
and motivating her opposition to vote through misinformation and outright lies.
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Here are just a few examples, fitting Dugin’s advice to “provoke destabilization and
every kind of separatism”:199

Figure 2

Figure 4
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Figure 5
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Figure 6

Figure 7

There are 1000s such ads, targeting every community conceivable in the
United States and designed to drive wedges between groups. Some are extremely
homophobic, while others are seemingly pro-LGBT. Some emphasize the very real
racism engrained in American society, while others, denigrate the Black Lives
Matter movement and seek to appeal to Americans holding racist or xenophobic
attitudes, six such ads are included above. For example, in the ad purportedly
describing “another gruesome attack on police by a BLM movement activist,” the
story is a blatant lie and the attack never happened. Ultimately, according to an
analysis by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Lab of a trove of tweets sent by
Russian troll accounts:
92

One main purpose was to interfere in the U.S. presidential election and
prevent Hillary Clinton’s victory, but it was also aimed at dividing polarized
online communities in the U.S., unifying support for Russia’s international
interests, and breaking down trust in U.S. institutions.200
Again, this matches Dugin’s stated goals and strategy for conquering the
Atlanticists perfectly. Mark Galeotti observes that regardless of whether they are
called “information warfare” or “active measures” by the Western press, “these
tactics have a broad political objective — to distract, divide, and demoralize,” they
are “largely opportunistic, fragmented, even sometimes contradictory.”201
Although these ads, tweets, posts, and messages target all sorts of different
political groups and ethnic communities, Dugin himself has attracted followers
from far-right movements in several countries, including the United States. This
raises a possibility that Dugin had not even considered in Foundations of
Geopolitics—that the United States itself could become ‘Eurasianist’ in spirit.
However, an ideology like Dugin’s had preceded Eurasianism by many decades in
the United States. Manifest Destiny, the Monroe Doctrine, are examples of
supposedly inclusive imperial ideologies and these ideas have been prominently
articulated by Frederick Jackson Turner and Alfred Mahan. Indeed, Dugin
explicitly holds up the Monroe Doctrine as an example for Eurasian empire.
Imperial American expansionism and white supremacist are not new innovations
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and its so-called alt-right proponents have simply popularized old ideas,
emboldened by the current political climate. A divisive and directionless political
climate exists in the United States not unlike Russia’s during bespredel, although
certainly without anywhere near the degree of economic deprivation and social
chaos that Russia suffered from then. Probably the most influential proponent of a
traditionalist worldview geopolitically aligned with Russia has been Steve Bannon,
Donald Trump’s CEO for his campaign and chief White House strategist for almost
a year following Trump’s election.
Steve Bannon, who refers to himself as an “economic nationalist,” has
espoused views entirely consistent with Dugin’s. Bannon has cited and referenced
Dugin, approvingly.202 In a speech delivered to a conference at the Vatican in 2014,
Dugin clearly references Dugin, albeit without naming him, and shows his
understanding of Dugin’s ideology and its domestic and international appeal:
When Vladimir Putin, when you really look at some of the underpinnings of
some of his beliefs today, a lot of those come from what I call Eurasianism;
he's got an adviser who harkens back to Julius Evola and different writers of
the early 20th century who are really the supporters of what's called the
traditionalist movement, which really eventually metastasized into Italian
fascism. A lot of people that are traditionalists are attracted to that. One of
the reasons is that they believe that at least Putin is standing up for
traditional institutions, and he's trying to do it in a form of nationalism —
and I think that people, particularly in certain countries, want to see the
sovereignty for their country, they want to see nationalism for their
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country. They don't believe in this kind of pan-European Union or they
don't believe in the centralized government in the United States.203
The reference to Julius Evola also makes it clear that Bannon is at the very least
familiar with the ideals of his strain of fascist, racist, traditionalism.204 Bannon’s
website, Breitbart, published an article co-written by Milos Yiannopolous, which
claimed that Evola’s writings are part of the “origins of the alt-right.”205 Although it
is laughable that Bannon makes it sound as if he’s coined the term Eurasianism, a
term that has been in existence for nearly a hundred years, it is clear he is very
familiar with its tenets.
The admiration between the two men has been mutual, so has their
fawning admiration for Trump. Dugin told The Daily Beast that:
I connect with Bannon’s focus of the entire presidential campaign: the
denial of globalism, rejection of America’s hegemony, the return of religious
and national interests, his criticism of liberals and respect for traditional
values…Bannon is a bright personality, his team published my books in the
United States, including The Fourth Political Theory.206
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This connection has been noted in Russia as well. An article in the critical
Svobodnaya Pressa notes that:
The key element in this war is the former advisor to Donald Trump on
strategic questions, Steve Bannon. The journalist and producer, previously
the director of a site for the ultra-right, he is well-known for sharing the
views of the Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, openly speaking out
against Muslims and invoking the battle for ‘Judeo-Christian values.’207
In an interview broadcast on Tsargrad TV, where he is a commentator and
chief editor, Dugin lavished praise on Trump: “He can become an American
Eurasianist, an American Putin.”208 Dugin has even drawn a direct line between his
ideology and Trump’s slogan and call to action to “drain the swamp.” In a
Facebook post (quoted by Richard Spencer on Twitter), Dugin makes a case that:
“The Swamp is to become [a] new name for globalist sect, open society adepts, lgbt
maniacs, Soros army, posthumanists and so on. Drain the Swamp is not only
American categorical imperative. It is [a] global challenge for all of us.”209
Bannon has noted the resurgence in right-wing nationalist, anti-globalist
movements across the world that have coincided with Russia exporting its political
technology: “you see a nationalist movement in Egypt, India, the Philippines, in
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South Korea, and now Abe in Japan. I’d say Putin and Xii in China are nationalists.
Look at Le Pen in France, Orban in Hungary, and the nationalists in Poland.” In
Dugin’s words, these are “states not willing to dissolve their originality into a
planetary melting pot.”210 Relatedly, as Russia’s alliance with China has deepened,
familiarity with Carl Schmitt has very much become in vogue for Chinese
intellectuals and government personnel, although it should be noted that Dugin
viewed China more as a threat to Russia in Foundations than a potential ally,
instead suggesting a Moscow-Berlin-Tokyo axis, imitating the Third Reich.211
However, he has changed his thinking in line with Kremlin foreign policy.
Bannon asserts that Trump himself shares this worldview. Bannon has said:
“Look, I’ve been studying this for a while, and it’s amazing that Trump has been
talking about these ideas for 25 years.”212 Perhaps the most vivid example of the
elevation of Dugin’s vocabulary to the greatest heights of American political
discourse was President Trump’s declaration that he is a “nationalist” at a rally for
Ted Cruz in Texas on October 23, 2018. After proudly declaring himself a
nationalist he set off on an attack against “globalists”:
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You know what a globalist is, right? You know what a globalist is? A
globalist is a person that wants the globe to do well, frankly, not caring
about our country so much. And you know what? We can’t have that.213
Since leaving his position at the White House, Bannon himself has been an
apostle of the traditionalist, ultranationalist worldview, preaching to movements
that are already established, and in some cases already sharing power in Europe.214
He has also taken a role as adviser to the recently elected President of Brazil, Jair
Bolsonaro, who represents an even more extreme version of Trumpian
xenophobia, misogyny, and homophobia.215
Dugin is also friendly with the conspiracy theorist Alex Jones and has
interviewed him on Russian television. In an interview with Alex Jones on October
2, 2017 on Infowars Dugin remarks that he “supports Trump with all my heart,”
and rejects the label of either a fascist or a communist instead accepting the label
of traditionalist, arguing:
We defend the same position, we share the same concerns, we are lobbying
our people and I am making that at the level of ideas and Mr. Putin is doing
that at the level of great politics…what Alex Jones and what I hope Mr.
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Trump shares the same position, the unity of the same position, and the
same ideas.216
Alex Jones’ conspiracy theories, rhetoric about “white genocide” in South
Africa, and vilifying of Soros mirror those peddled by Dugin, and as in the Russian
case, they have circulated at the highest levels, although it is more plausible to
think Trump genuinely believes these tendentious conspiracy theories than Putin.
Trump has appeared on Jones’ programs during the campaign telling Jones, “Your
reputation is amazing. I will not let you down.”217 Trump even called to thank him
after his election victory for his support.218 Putin uses these dog whistle conspiracy
theories as a signal to generate support domestically, while simultaneously
employing them abroad to destabilize rivals and unfriendly nations. Trump’s chief
of staff John Kelly has reportedly even forbidden Trump’s aides from delivering
him ‘news’ from Alex Jones and Breitbart.219 Although Dugin and Jones’ support for
Trump is not unequivocal—they both criticized him for allowing strikes against
Syrian chemical weapon facilities.
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More flamboyantly racist figures have also followed suit and have cultivated
personal ties with Dugin. Richard Spencer, a white supremacist who heads the
National Policy Institute, has openly praised Dugin. Spencer’s views are vile and
eugenicist, in an interview he offered: “’Race is something between a breed and an
actual species,’ he says, likening the differences between whites and people of
color to those between golden retrievers and basset hounds. ‘It’s that powerful.’”220
Following Trump’s victory in the election, he crowed “hail Trump, hail our people,
hail victory” at conference, where he was met with Nazi salutes and cheers by the
crowed of white nationalists.221 His estranged Russian wife Nina Kuprianova, who
writes under the pen name Nina Byzantina, has translated some of Dugin’s articles
into English.222 Spencer and his National Policy Institute tried to organize a
conference for “racial realists” and other racist ultranationalists, neo-Nazis, and
far-right movements from across Europe and America in Hungary, to be sponsored
by the extreme right Jobbik party. Although this was a bridge too far for the
Hungarian government of Viktor Orban in 2014, who denied a visa to Dugin and
forced Jobbik to cancel the conference.223 Jobbik went along with this, despite its
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chairman Gabor Vona having lectured at Lomonosov University at Dugin’s
invitation.224 He was responsible for organizing the rally in Charlottesville from
August 11-12, 2007 to ‘Unite the Right’ where activist Heather Heyer was murdered
by a man who shares Spencer’s views, illustrating the very real threat of violence at
the heart of his repugnant ideology. Illustrating the high regard they hold Russia
in, when Spencer and his fellow travelers returned to Charlottesville two months
later to demonstrate they chanted “Russia is our friend” as one of their slogans.225
Matthew Heimbach, a ‘white nationalist’ who leads the Traditionalist
Workers Party, another attendee at the Charlottesville rally, has called Russia the
“axis of nationalists,” and invited Dugin to speak via Skype at a conference in
California.226 Preston Wigington, who sublets an apartment from David Duke in
Moscow when he visits Russia, had Dugin speak via Skype to a poorly attended
conference at Texas A&M.227 Wigington has written: he has "best friends" in Russia
— "the only nation that understands RAHOWA [Racial Holy War]" and that
Russians are "leading skinheads."228 David Duke himself has met Dugin in Russia,
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but Dugin’s appeal to white supremacists is limited for the most racist white
supremacists in the United States. Anton Shekovtsov, an expert on the Russian farright and the rebirth of fascism makes the case that:
Dugin was not well perceived in the States for one simple reason, because
he considered that empire—it always has multiculturalism, and they need a
pure white society, to be not Muslim, nor Jewish, whatsoever.229
This has not stopped Dugin from attempting to foster ties with them, the Kremlin
from trying to use them to exacerbate divides in American society, or for white
supremacists from adopting ideas from Dugin that they find useful.

229

Danila Galperovich, “Russian Social Media Sites Have Become Meeting Places for the American
Ultra-Right,” VOA Russia, August 26, 2017, https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/4002082.html.

102

Chapter 11: Inspiration Worldwide and Kremlin Grand
Strategy
The strategy outlined by Dugin in Foundations of Geopolitics does not call
for a military occupation of Europe, which even Dugin concedes is unrealistic, and
as especially so in 1996, but through the ideological realignment of European states
toward Russia and away from the United States fueled by their resentment of
American cultural hegemony. Dugin acknowledges this sentiment, arguing
“Europe does not want to be Russia or America” and:
Therefore, Russia has two paths—a military occupation of Europe, or a
strategic reorganization of the European space, which will be made in the
geopolitical sector by a secure strategic alliance with Moscow –preserving
its sovereignty, autonomy, and its autarky. The first variant is so unrealistic
it cannot be discussed seriously. The second variant—complex, but
feasible—has been carried out on in Europe’s transition to a colony over the
past half century, having left the track of serious European consciousness.230
Since the canceled conference in Budapest, Orban and his Fidesz party have
moved farther to the right and openly embraced a Eurasianist ideology and
defended Russia against EU sanctions, becoming the first European Union nation
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to align ideologically with Russia. Hungary has been at the forefront of the antirefugee movement, as well as popularizing anti-Soros rhetoric, generally with antiSemitic connotations. Dugin writes very approvingly of the Visegrad group, an
informal bloc of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary which have
been at the forefront of reactionary European anti-refugee sentiment. He refers
back to Carl Schmitt when describing it, arguing that: “the Eastern
European Grossraum could be a pole by itself in the broader context of
multipolarity.”231 He repeats his anti-globalist talking points by remarking:
Every member of the Visegrad Group is trying to defend its traditional
identity. But the mainstream political line and essential ideology of the EU
is trying to dissolve these identities. The so-called ideology of human rights
inherently refuses to recognize any kind of collective identity, including
that of nationality and citizenship. Hence, we see provoked and
uncontrolled migration, refugees, European self-hatred, and so on.
Multiculturalism destroys society from within.232
Of course, for Dugin, “Russia is now the natural ally for the Visegrad Group” and in
line with his geopolitical formulations in Foundations he argues:
Russia is also interested in reinforcing the Visegrad Group – not because
Russia wishes to retake its traditional zone of influence (it’s not possible,
anyway), but because we’re interested in it as something that could be
independent of Brussels, and which could weaken the presence of globalist
structures in Europe.233
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This seemingly goes against his imperial worldview, but Dugin is aware enough to
know, for the most part, that it is necessary to cloak his geopolitical intentions to
make them palatable to potential subservient regions of a Eurasian empire, similar
to how he obscures the Nazism of many of his geopolitical role models. Elsewhere
in Eastern Europe, Russia has promoted an anti-Soros narrative in Macedonia and
apparently successfully convinced enough Macedonians to boycott a vote on a
name change to ‘North Macedonia’ that would have allowed it to join NATO.234
This move to prevent a Slavic national group from joining the ‘Atlanticist’ bloc fits
perfectly with Dugin’s geopolitics. In many respects Soros has become the ultimate
bogeyman for the far-right across the globe, a narrative originally promoted by
Russia, and his status as the ultimate globalist stems from his Jewish heritage;
often the term ‘globalist’ has become a dog whistle synonym for Jew, much as
terms like ‘cosmopolitan’ have in the past.235 This definition of globalist is distinct
from a person or organization that has benefited from or supports neo-liberal
globalization.
Another project aimed at weakening the “globalist structures in Europe” has
been support for Marine Le Pen’s National Front. Dugin wrote after the French

234

Gordana Knezevic, “Macedonian Witch Hunt Targets George Soros,” RadioFreeEurope
RadioLiberty, January 19, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/george-soros-macedonia-witchhunt/28243738.html.
235

Allison Kaplan Sommer, “How Did the Term ‘Globalist’ Become an Anti-Semitic Slur? Blame
Bannon,” Haaretz, May 13, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-how-did-the-termglobalist-became-an-anti-semitic-slur-blame-bannon-1.5895925.

105

Presidential elections: “France is split according to the geopolitical principles.
There is a Eurasian France, voting for Marine Le Pen... In these areas…residence of
the Eurasian French ... This can be called ‘French Novorossiya.’"236 Russian
financial and ideological support for Le Pen has been well documented.237 Russian
actors also hacked Macron’s campaign and launched cyberattacks on French
election infrastructure, although these were unsuccessful in swaying public
opinion and countered by French officials.238
Across the English Channel, there is evidence that the British vote to leave
the European Union was also influenced by Russian misinformation and the Leave
campaign benefitted from Russian funding. Dugin lauded the event:
Now the EU cycle has passed its noon, sunset begins. This does not mean
that it has already occurred. People who understand the trend are definitely
not calmed by the reassurance that nothing bad is happening - it can still be
fixed. But those who understand the trends, they know that it happened
and are already thinking on this basis. For analysts that are forecasting on a
global scale, the EU is over. And it is irreversible. The British cannot revote. The critical point of Europe’s decay has passed.”239
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This perfectly fits with Dugin’s geopolitics of the dividing the West of America and
the West of Europe. With the removal of ‘Atlanticist’ Britain from the EU, the
process of splitting the European Union and creating alliances with nationalist,
authoritarian governments of individual European states can begin in earnest.
Russian state media English language outlets like Sputnik News and Russia Today
(RT) provided one-sided coverage of the vote, hoping to influence Britons.240
While Russian funding, through Arron Banks, the biggest bankroller of the Leave
campaign, aided the Brexiteers.241242 Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence
Party, personal friend of Donald Trump, and the main cheerleader for Brexit, may
even have served as an intermediary between Russia, the Trump Campaign, and
Julian Assange and this possibility has been investigated as part of the Mueller
Investigation.243
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The crown jewel for Dugin would be concluding a geopolitical alliance with
Germany, fulfilling his longed-for Moscow-Berlin axis, and allowing expansion to
“French Novorossiya” and elsewhere. The political project aimed at achieving this
has been the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), a reactionary anti-migrant party
that has achieved significant electoral gains over the past several years. Alexander
Gauland, now the head of the party after its previous leader Frauke Petry left the
party due to its growing extremism,244 has said he would have “no problem
whatsoever” with an alliance between the youth wing of his party and the Putin
youth.245 He travelled to St. Petersburg in 2015 and according to Der Spiegel
reporters Melania Amman and Pavel Lokshin:
[The] trip [was] paid for by the St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation,
which is financially backed by a Putin-loyal oligarch. In St. Petersburg,
Gauland met with members of the Duma, a personal advisor to Putin and
Alexander Dugin…Gauland says Dugin is a pleasant conversation partner.246
Constanze Stelzenmüller, an expert at the Brookings Institute, testified to the
United States Senate Intelligence Committee that Russia has targeted the German
electorate with “active measures” aimed at manipulating public opinion; however,
as Germany uses only paper ballots, any hacking of the election infrastructure is
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not possible.247 She notes, like Dugin, that “For a Russia that is clearly bent on
destabilizing Europe and the transatlantic alliance, Germany is the prize: Weaken
Germany, and you diminish the EU and the European project.”248 Dugin agrees in
Foundations of Geopolitics, asserting “the alliance of France and German…is the
spine around which its altogether logical to build a new Europe.”249
Italy, the birthplace of Evola, has proven to be the major European country
most sympathetic to Dugin’s ideology at the current moment and here Dugin has
created and maintained personal relationships with politicians that have concrete
policymaking power. Italians turned to the upstart, anti-corruption Five-Star
Movement founded by comedian Beppo Grillo in the most recent elections; in
many respects, this was a protest vote against the stagnant economic policy and
cronyism of successive Europhile center-left and center-right coalition
governments, rather than a vote for a cohesive political platform, as the Five-Star
Movement lacked one. But to achieve a coalition the Five-Star Movement joined
forces with the ultranationalist, reactionary Northern League and named its leader
Matteo Salvini as Interior Minister. Salvini is friendly with Dugin, having traveled
to Moscow in 2015 to be interviewed by him. In the interview Salvini made his
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opposition to the European Union clear: “The EU, being an unnatural structure,
has already started crumbling. The European Union is a cell, the opposite of
democracy, the opposite of the culture of labor.”250 In response to a question about
EU sanctions against Russia due to the war in Eastern Ukraine he opined:
I hope that they will soon be lifted. This is madness, just like the absent
recognition of Crimea, a subject which identified itself as part of Russia. It is
incredible that international bodies decide who can vote for selfdetermination and who doesn't have this right.251
In March 2017, Salvini signed an agreement of cooperation between the Northern
League and Putin’s United Russia party.252
A similar agreement was signed between United Russia and the Austrian
Freedom Party, which is also in coalition government in Austria and shares similar
anti-refugee principles.253 Steve King, an American congressman who has endorsed
an openly white supremacist candidate for Toronto’s mayor, spouts Great
Replacement conspiracy theory ideas adopted from the European far-right and
shared by Alex Jones, writing on Twitter: “cultural suicide by demographic
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transformation must end,” has also met with the leaders of the Austrian Freedom
Party and the AFD.254
Salvini’s advisor, Gianluca Savioni has known Dugin for twenty years and
has close links to Orazio Marie Gnerre, who has been accused of recruiting
mercenaries in Italy to fight for Russian-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine.255
Gnerre formerly helmed an obscure Italian political party “Millenivm,” which is an
analogue to Dugin’s Eurasia Party in Italy, and was endorsed warmly by Dugin.256
Dugin approves wholeheartedly of the Italian coalition government and visited
Italy in July 2018, when he gave an interview supporting it: “Matteo Salvini and
Luigi Di Maio [current leader of the Five Star Movement] represent the fulfillment
of Trump's ideas.”257
Despite his anti-Semitism, Dugin became close with Avigdor Eskin, a
Russian Kabbalist Jew (the good kind of Jew according to Dugin in On the Jewish
Question) and member of the extremist, racist, and now banned Kach movement,
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in the late 1990s after Eskin was released from Israeli prison following a fourmonth jail sentence for incitement due to him pronouncing a kabbalist death
curse on Yitzhak Rabin as punishment for his support for the Oslo Accords.258
According to Clover, Eskin believes that Dugin needed “him as shield against being
called anti-Semitic.”259 But, Eskin gravitated towards Dugin’s worldview and
admittedly shared much of it before their meeting. In 2010, Eskin toured South
African with Dr. Dan Roodt, who has associated with Neo-Nazi organizations in
Europe and is the leader of the Pro-Afrikaans Action Group, which supports a
whites only state in South Africa and a return to Apartheid.260 Eskin said in an
interview with Haaretz after returning:
We're talking about a broad coalition of right-wing parties with common
interests. Today the struggle is no longer between countries or parties, but
between civilizations. I will support any movement that shares my ideas,
and is opposed to the process of globalization - whether involving ideas,
goods or people. Right now, I have no ties with right-wing parties in
Europe. Their worldview only relates to opposition to immigration and that
doesn't interest me. I'd have no problem cooperating even with [French
nationalist extremist Jean-Marie] Le Pen, or with Belgian nationalists, on
condition that they disassociated themselves from their anti-Semitic
statements. In certain situations, I definitely see them as natural partners.261
This sentiment, with language about civilizational clashes and opposition to
globalization and immigration parrots Dugin perfectly and the growth of parties
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worldwide sharing this worldview, lauded by Steve Bannon, has benefited from
Russian encouragement and the export of Dugin’s ideological and strategic
precepts.
Sensing a divisive issue, Russian information warriors have seized on this
narrative of the victimization of Afrikaners in South Africa, against evidence to the
contrary. Afrikaners today maintain a privileged place in the South African
economy and control a disproportionate share of wealth and land. Russian officials
have offered to help move Afrikaner families to Russia where they can live with
“traditional Christian values” and have promoted a narrative of “white genocide” in
South Africa.262 This rhetoric has been peddled in the USA by the Afriforum group,
whose leaders spoke at the Cato Institute and were interviewed by Tucker Carlson.
Their talking points were then inevitably repeated by President Trump, who
tweeted: “I have asked Secretary of State to closely study the South Africa land and
farm seizures and expropriations and the large scale killing of farmers. South
African Government is now seizing land from white farmers.”263 The tweet was
hailed by David Duke, who has his own connections to Russia.264
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One of the most chilling examples of the influence of fascist, far-right
ideology and movements similar to those promoted by Dugin and the various
political technologies of the Kremlin was the despicable terrorist attack carried out
by Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011. Breivik planted a bomb in Oslo which killed
eight and ruthlessly gunned down sixty-nine young people at a camp operated by
the center-left Norwegien Labor Party on Utøya Island. In his rambling manifesto,
much of it plagiarized from other sources, such as the radical traditionalist aspects
of Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski’s manifesto (while omitting his
environmentalist ideas), Breivik articulates many of Dugin’s and his ideological
allies’ points regarding militant resistance towards ‘multiculturalism.’ In his
loathsome manifesto 2083: A European Declaration of Impendence, he writes:
Multiculturalism (cultural Marxism/political correctness), as you might
know, is the root cause of the ongoing Islamisation of Europe which has
resulted in the ongoing Islamic colonisation of Europe through
demographic warfare (facilitated by our own leaders). This compendium
presents the solutions and explains exactly what is required of each.265
Without naming Dugin, Breivik even offers a sympathetic critique of his
Eurasianist ideology, but ultimately unacceptable to Breivik due to its lack of
Islamophobia, noting:
A subtler basis for sympathy is the so-called traditionalist current, which
was represented by the converts René Guénon and Frithjof Schuon, and still
has a following: it has been idealising Islam and esp. Sufism as the preserver
of the age-old philosophia pernnis against modernity. In Russia, some
265
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Slavophile anti-Western groups now seek an alliance with Islam against the
impending Americanisation of their society. In the U.S., Christian
fundamentalists and Islamic organisations are increasingly creating
common platforms to speak out against trends of moral decay (abortion,
pornography, etc.). Some of these phenomena of traditionalist alliancebuilding are quite respectable, but they are nevertheless conducive to Islam
negationism.266
He also states that his alleged “Knights Templar” groups (no evidence was
found of co-conspirators for his attack, but he was very active on far-right, neoNazi message boards) have a “hostile stance towards any and all Marxist
organisations (the only possible exception being the rare case of nationalBolshevik organization).”267 Furthermore, he refers to himself and likeminded
figures as “conservative revolutionaries.”268 Although he does not cite any of
Dugin’s works, it is clear he is familiar with the Neo-Eurasianist ideology and the
Nouvelle Droit figures who helped inspire it.
He mentions Dugin by name in reference to the Ergenekon Case,
illustrating a familiarity with Dugin himself. The Ergenekon Case was, possibly still
is, or maybe never was a murky plot by ultranationalist Kemalist officers in the
Turkish military to seize power from Recip Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP Party in 2008.
Breivik is sympathetic to the plot and refers to Dugin as the movement’s “chief
advocate.” He observes:
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When the Russian newspaper Kommersant declared Dugin to be the brains
behind Ergenekon, Dugin responded that he had no part in illegal activities,
but that he saw no crime in sharing their vision of Turkey's future—free
from the influence of NATO and the United States.269
Dugin probably had no active role in the plot, but in an interview with a Greek
journalist he mentions the “Ergenekon Case and repressions by Erdogan against
the Eurasian and nationalist chiefs of Turkish military forces.”270 After the
massacre on Utoya, Dugin made no attempt to condemn it, rather, according to
Johannes Due Enstad, for Dugin:
Breivik is just another symptom of European decay. Dugin did not discuss
ideology or why Breivik did what he did, but expressed a desire to see more
Breiviks in the West, as this would further the inevitable collapse: ‘The end
is coming to Europe…. Let there be multiculturalism, Freemasonry, gay
pride, and Breiviks. Let all this European filth destroy itself…. The more
Breiviks… the better.’271
This modern fascism outlook fixated on the destruction of multiculturalism has
already inspired a great act of evil and Dugin’s reaction to it reveals his inner
darkness and the means he finds acceptable for achieving his Neo-Eurasianist
fantasies.
Even at the level of grand strategy, Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism can be seen as
somewhat influential. Russia’s cautious embrace of Turkey echoes Savitsky’s
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Turanism and has been thoroughly advocated for by Dugin, who has become
somewhat of a media darling for the pro-regime press in Turkey, which is now the
only press in Turkey.272 Dugin may even have been instrumental in mending ties
between Turkey and Russia when a Russian jet was shot down over Turkey in
2015.273 He was reportedly approached by two of the supposed ringleaders of the
Ergenekon conspiracy, politician Dogu Perincek and Lt. Gen. Ismail Hakki Pekin,
the former head of the Turkish Armed Forces’ Military Intelligence, to “help
improve ties with Russia,” and Dugin recommended an apology, which was
provided by Erdogan himself.274 His visit to Ankara in support of this initiative was
heavily publicized by Dugin’s think tank Katehon, which is a reference to an
apocalyptic transformation coined by Schmitt.275 Notably, in 2016, with relations
between NATO and Turkey deteriorating and the Erdogan regime displaying more
authoritarian tendencies, “the Supreme Court of Appeals overturned convictions
in the Ergenekon trials, ruling that the “Ergenekon terror organization” did not
exist at all and that evidence had been collected illegally.”276 Dugin has also
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advocated for a close alliance with Iran due to their shared anti-atlanticism in
Foundations, and this has also come to pass.277 Dugin has claimed that aside from
Turkey, “only two countries really pay attention to me-Iran and the U.S.”278
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Chapter 12: Conclusion and What Comes After Putin?
The multiple components involved in Eurasianism weaken its consistency,
but broaden its appeal. In many respects, it is a Rorschach test for far-right
movements around the world—seeing in it what they would like to see. However,
its general principles are clear: authoritarianism, precedence of the state over the
individual, a vocabulary of war, and deterministic geopolitics rooted in the ethnos.
These are the principles of fascism, and Eurasianism is just its threadbare cloak.
Vladimir Putin may personally sympathize with Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist ideology
or he may simply use it as a political tool to keep his most militaristic, fascistminded subjects and those with delusions of grandeur under the big tent of his
United Russia Party and its allies in the controlled opposition. However, regardless
of Putin’s intentions, the result has been the flourishing of Neo-Eurasianist
ideology—or worse, a narrow ethnic Russian supremacism that even Dugin claims
to find repellant. The terminology of Duin’s ideology has proliferated, as well as his
Manichean worldview. The clumsy terms of Eurasianist and Atlanticist and
tallassocracy and tellulocracy have largely been replaced by traditionalist and
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globalist, or nationalism and multiculturalism, but the essential dichotomy and
meaning remains the same.
The Kremlin’s adventurism abroad, cronyism, and outright theft of state
resources has drained the coffers of the Russian Federation and led Putin to raise
the pension age for both men and women. This has provoked protests across the
country—from St. Petersburg to Eastern Siberia—and triggered a sharp decline in
Putin’s popularity.279 Not only that, but the opposition—such as it is—gained
broadly across the country in the recent elections. However, the beneficiaries were
not the tolerated liberal parties such as the Union of Right Forces, but rather the
LPDR and the KPFR, both helmed by the same ultranationalists, Gennady
Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who have continued to peddle Dugin’s ideas
more brazenly than Putin and his United Russia party. There are no signs that the
end of the Putin regime is anywhere near imminent or that Zhirinovsky or
Zyuganov will really turn against the Kremlin. But this raises the specter that
perhaps whoever comes after Putin will not be a liberal reformer, as many in the
West have blithely concluded is predestined, but a demagogue or a strongman to
the right of Putin. The consequences of such leadership could much more
plausibly bring about Dugin’s fantasies of a transformative purifying eschaton that
forges a traditionalist, fascist empire, which despite Putin’s silencing of dissidents
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and blatant disregard for human rights, seems unlikely to occur during his reign.
Yet, as Anton Shekhovstov, argues, Dugin and Putin remain aligned, because:
The ﬁrst step to Dugin’s new empire is the restoration of the old empire
sought by Putin. In this sense, Putin, even if not directly pursuing Dugin’s
plan, does perform steps which may – in the long run – lead to the
implementation of Dugin’s project.280
As a troubling indication of the Russian public’s potential acceptance for
such a development, Stalin’s popularity is at an all-time high in Post-Soviet
Russia.281 For Dugin, Stalin is the embodiment of the Eurasian tendencies of the
Soviet Union, but an appraisal of Stalin’s reign reveals the hollowness of Dugin’s
ideology. Under Stalin’s leadership, the Soviet Union carried the heaviest burden
of World War II and crushed Nazi Germany ending the Third Reich which Dugin
so admires. Additionally, national groups were often not treated as equals with the
ability to retain cultural autonomy in exchange for loyalty to Moscow, instead
many ethnic groups including the Ingush and Chechens, the Crimean Tatars,
Koreans, Finns, Greeks, Germans, the Baltic peoples, and many smaller groups of
Caucasian ethnicities were the victims of ethnic cleansing, forcibly deported from
their homelands and pressured to lose their traditional identity.
In the United States, in Europe, and elsewhere around the globe variants of
his ideology, promoted by the Kremlin, have achieved notable success. It must not
be overlooked that these nations have been susceptible to such attacks due to
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weaknesses in domestic ideologies and the prevailing, although waning, neoliberal world order. Dugin and traditionalism provide an alternative to stale
political narratives and he recognized this appeal when he was writing in 1996:
Peoples and states which enter that bloc [a hypothetical Eurasian empire],
could expect, at the least, ethnocultural sovereignty for direct participants
in the creations and design of a new macro-ideology; whereas the
geopolitical variant of the “New World Order,” is already fully elaborated
and offering to the Earth’s peoples as in the colonial analogue of the Liberal,
free-market American model.282
Compounding this, the financial crisis of 2008 was a damning indictment of
the weaknesses inherent in a deregulated banking system and the austerity
regimes imposed by many nations in response only poured fuel on a long
simmering flame. In the United States income gains have been vastly skewed
towards the top earners, and the authors of the 2018 World Inequality Report note
that:
This stagnation of incomes of the bottom 50% relative to the upsurge in
incomes experienced by the top 1% has been perhaps the most striking
development in the United states economy over the last four decades…the
groups have seen their shares of total us income reverse between 1980 and
2014.283
This development has been accompanied by a disturbing trend where alone
among demographic groups in the United States, non-college educated white
males—those most likely to support Donald Trump—have had an increase in
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morbidity. Despite advances in medicine resulting in “mortality declines from the
two biggest killers in middle age—cancer and heart disease,” these gains “were
offset by marked increases in drug overdoses, suicides, and alcohol-related liver
mortality in this period.” The rise in these diseases of despair reflect a certain
hopelessness and frustration across this segment of the population. This was
expressed when during the 2016 American elections, “Trump’s margin among
whites without a college degree is the largest among any candidate in exit polls
since 1980.”284 Although this is not Weimar America or comparable to the
conditions of Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Americans
are caught in a downward spiral of relative economic and social deprivation with
few options to escape.
For those caught in this economic and social despair, looking inwards and
backwards to mythic historical narratives with little basis in truth provides pride
and a sense of meaning to some people, as well as providing a strawman to blame
for their problems in the form of immigrants, globalism, and multiculturalism. Of
course, racism and xenophobia are not new features of Western politics and in
many respects the appeal of traditionalism is an appeal to traditional prejudices.
Russian propaganda did not suddenly make many Americans racist, but it has
capitalized on racist attitudes and economic frustration to increase division and
distrust. It is noteworthy that “Republicans who scored highest on racial
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resentment were about 30 percentage points more likely to support Trump than
their more moderate counterparts” during the Republican primaries.285
Racist attitudes dovetail with another factor that causes voters to support
xenophobic politicians—fear. A study from the Public Religion Research Institute
found “besides partisanship, fears about immigrants and cultural displacement
were more powerful factors than economic concerns in predicting support for
Trump among white working-class voters.”286 Other studies have found these fears
are linked to a sense of displacement caused by changing demographics
threatening the status of whites as the majority group and the feeling that
“American global dominance was in danger.”287 Anxiety over cultural displacement
and a perceived threat of losing a privileged place in society appear to have
motivated many during the past election, rather than economic concerns.
Desperation, fear, and the conviction that an ‘other’ is to blame, the
friend/enemy worldview of Schmitt, provides opportunity for these prejudices to
fester. The reality warping nature of immersive social media exacerbates the effects
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of these efforts. Long before social media had been developed Hannah Arendt
warned in On Totalitarianism:
The self-compulsion of ideological thinking ruins all relationships with
reality…The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between
fact and fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer
exist.288
Social media and cable news, alongside intentionally and constantly deceitful
political leadership, only amplify this blurring of true and false and lead to the
possibility of violent radicalization. The appeal of such sentiments should not be
underrated and the popular support for them cannot be dismissed as solely the
product of Russian plotting and propaganda, nor can the public’s susceptibility for
them be separated from historical and ongoing attitudes towards racism and
xenophobia. Racism remains the original sin of the Americas and the Europe and
its stain functions acts as a fertile growing medium for Dugin’s worldview to
flourish far from its roots in Russian soil.
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APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF SECLECTED SECTIONS FROM FOUNDATIONS
OF GEOPOLITICS

Part 1
Section 1: Friedrich Ratzel: The State as a Physical Organism
1.1 Background: The German “Organic School”
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) can be considered “the father” of geopolitics,
although he did not use this term in his own writings. He wrote on “political
geography.” His principal work, published in 1897, was titled “Politische
Geographie.”
Ratzel graduated from Karlsruhe Polytechnic University where he attended
courses in geology, paleontology, and zoology. He completed his education at
Heidelberg, where he became an acolyte of Professor Ernest Haeckel (who was the
first to use the term “ecology’). Ratzel’s ideology was grounded in evolution and
Darwinism and colored by his pronounced interest in Biology.
Ratzel participated in the Franco-Prussian War, where he served as a
volunteer and received the Iron Cross for bravery. In politics, he gradually became
a committed nationalist and in 1890 he joined the “Pan-German League” of Karl
Peters. His lengthy travels in America and Europe added to his own scientific
interest in Ethnological research. He became a lecture of geography at the Munich
Technical Institute and in 1886 he moved to a similar position in Leipzig.
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In 1876 Ratzel defended his dissertation “The Chinese Immigration,” and in
Stuttgart, he came out with his fundamental work in 1882, “Anthro-Geography”
(“Anthropogeographie”) in which he formulates his basic idea: That there is a
connection between the evolution of peoples and demographics with physical
geographic data; the influence that physical terrain has on a people’s culture,
political development, and so on.
But his most fundamental book was “Political Geography.”
1.2 The State as a Living Organism
Ratzel showed in his work that land is a fundamental, fixed constant around
which the interests of a people rotate. The movement of history is predetermined
by earth and territories. Further followed by an evolutionary inference that the
“state constitutes a living organism,” but one that is “rooted in the ground.” The
state develops based on its territorial topography, size and its comprehension by
the people. Thus, the state reflects the objective geographic principle and
subjective national comprehension of this principle, and this is expressed
politically. Ratzel considered a “normal” state, one which most organically
combined geography, demographics, and ethnological national parameters.
He writes:
The state in all stages in its development as an organism contends with the
necessity of preserving its connection with the terrain and therefore they
should be studied from a geographical point of view. As shown in ethnology
and history, a state develops on a spatial basis--conjugating and merging
more and more--and extracting from it more and more energy. Thus, a state
turns out to consist spatially, maintained and animated by this space, and
should be managed, described, and measured through geography. A state is
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described in a series of phenomena, with the expansionary principle being
the most prominent. (Political Geography 1)
It is clearly visible that from such an organic approach, Ratzel understood
territorial expansion to be a natural, living process, similar to the growth of living
organisms.
Ratzel’s “organic” approach is in relation to its space (Raum). This “space”
brings over a cardinal material category in a new quality, becoming the “Living
Sphere,” “Living Space” (Lebensraum), in a “Geobioylogical Environment.” From
this concept arises two different, important terms of Ratzel’s: “Sense of Space”
(Raumsinn) and “Living Energy (Lebensenergie). These terms are closely related to
each other and denote some special quality, inherent in geographical systems and
predetermining political figuration in the history of the people and state.
All these theses comprise the fundamental principles of geopolitics, in that
form, which would be developed somewhat later by followers of Ratzel.
Furthermore, the relationship to the state is similar to a “living, physical organism,
rooted in the soil;” this is the chief principle and axis of geopolitical
methodologies. That approach is oriented in synthetic analysis of the entire
complex of phenomena, regardless of whether they belong to the human sphere or
non-human sphere. The land is a concrete expression of nature, the surrounding
environment, and is not regarded as a continuous living body of the ethnos--it is
the land being inhabited. The material structure itself dictates the proportions of
the final cultural products.
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In this idea Ratzel is the founder of the entire German School of “organic”
sociology, of which Ferdinand Tönnies is the most notable representative.
1.3 Raum - Political Organization of the Land
Ratzel’s observation was that there is a correlation between ethnos and
space--as seen in the following excerpt from “Political Geography:”
The state develops like an organism, tethered to certain parts of the earth’s
surface, and its characteristics developing from the characteristics of the
people and land. The most important characteristics are its size, location,
and borders. Followed by types of soil, along with vegetation levels,
irrigation, and finally, correlates in relation to the rest of the
conglomerations of the earth’s surface, and in the first place, with
neighboring seas and uninhabited lands, which, at first glance, does not
represent especial political interest. The aggregate of these characteristics
constitutes the Land (das Land). But adding to this, when speaking about
‘our country,’ is that created by man--memories connected to the earth. So,
an initially pure understanding of geography transformed into the spiritual
and emotional bonds of the inhabitants of a land and their history.
A nation is an organism not only because it articulates the lives of the
people in fixed soil, but due to its intertwining bond, becoming something
unified--unthinkable without one of two components. Desolate land,
incapable of nurturing government, are barren fields in history. On the
contrary, habitable land promotes state development--particularly if the
state is surrounded by natural boundaries. People may feel themselves to be
natural in their territory, but they are actually constantly mimicking one
and the same characteristics, which proceeding forth from the terrain, will
be inscribed in it. (2)
1.4 The Law of Expansion
The relationship of the state to a living organism implies the refusal of the
concept of “borderlessness.” The state is born, grows, and dies like a living being.
Consequently, a state’s spatial expansion and contraction are natural processes
connected to an intrinsic life cycle. Ratzel, in his book “On the Law of Spatial
Growth of the State” (1901), laid out the seven laws of expansion:
139

1. The state expands in relation to the development of its culture
2. The physical growth of the state is accompanied by other manifestations of its
development: in the spheres of ideology, production, commercial activities, and
a mighty, attractive proselytizing power.
3. The state expands by consuming and absorbing units of lesser political
significance.
4. The border is an organ located on the state’s periphery (understood as in an
organism).
5. Carrying out its territorial expansion, the state strives to cover important
regions for its development: coastlines, river basins, valleys, and in general, the
richest territories.
6. The initial impulse for expansions comes from outside—that is in its expansion
the state provokes states (or territories) with clearly inferior civilizations.
7. The general tendencies of assimilation or absorption the weakest nations are
reinforced by an even greater increase in self-perpetuating momentum.
Unsurprisingly, many critics have rebuked Ratzel for his writings because they
have been a “catechism for imperialists.” While he himself by no means pressed for
the favorite methods for justifying German imperialism, still he did not disguise
that he had nationalist convictions. For him, it was important to establish a
conceptual instrument for advocating awareness of the history of the state and
nation and their relationship to the land. In practice, he sought the awakening of
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“Raumsinn” (“the spirit of the land), among the leaders of Germany, whom
regarded geopolitics as a dry academic discipline merely representing abstraction.
1.5 Weltmacht and the Sea
Ratzel was greatly influenced by his experiences in North America, which
he studied thoroughly and published two books on: “Maps of the Cities and
Civilizations of the American South” (1874), and “the Southern United States of
America,” (1878 1880). He noted, having his considerable experience of political
geography in European history, the far greater degree that the “spirit of the land”
had in American expansion because Americans first had the task of mastering the
“empty” expanses. Accordingly, the American people sensibly put into practice
what the Old World had come to intuitively and gradually. So, in Ratzel’s work we
come across the first formulation of another important geopolitical concept—
“world power” (weltmacht). Ratzel observed that large countries have a tendency
in their development to maximize geographical expansion, gradually moving to
the global level.
Therefore, some time or another, geographical growth should arrive at its
continental phase.
Applying this principle—inferred and deduced from the American political
experiment and strategical unification of the continent’s space—to Germany,
Ratzel predicted its destiny to be a continental power.
He also anticipated another important geopolitical topic—the importance
of the seas for civilizational development. In his book “The Seas: The Source of
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Nations’ Power” (1900) (4), he pointed out the particular necessity of each mighty
power to develop its naval forces, especially because full-fledged global expansion
requires it. That some nations and states brought this about spontaneously
(England, Spain, Holland, etc.), land powers (Ratzel, naturally, had Germany in
mind) should do this sensibly: develop a fleet that is necessary under the
conditions for approximating the status of a “world power.”
The sea and “world power” were already connected for Ratzel, although
only later geopoliticians (Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, and especially Schmitt)
gave this topic completeness and centrality. The works of Ratzel are the essential
for all geopolitical research. In a compressed form, his works contain practically
every basic thesis, which would form the basis of this science. Kjellen, a Swede,
and Haushofer, a German, based their concepts on Ratzel’s works. His ideas were
also taken into account by Frenchman Vidal de la Blache, the Englishman
Mackinder, Mahan, an American, and the Russian Eurasianists (P. Savitsky, L.
Gumilev, etc.).
It should be noted that Ratzel’s political sympathies were not accidental.
Practically all geopolitics has been brightly marked by nationalist sentiment,
regardless of whether it wears the cloak of “democratic” geopolitics (Anglo-Saxon
geopolitics of Mackinder and Mahan) or “ideological” forms (Haushofer, Schmitt,
and the Eurasianists).
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Section 2: Rudolf Kjellen and Fredrick Neumann “Middle
Europe”
2.1 Defining a New Science
A Swede, Rudolf Kjellen, was the first to use the term “Geopolitics.”
Kjellen was a professor of history and political science at the University of
Uppsalla and Goteborg University. However, he was an active participant in
politics, he held a seat in parliament, and his politics were distinguished by an
underlying Germanophilic orientation. Kjellen was not a professional geographer,
but he developed the basics of geopolitics as part of political science. His work
originated from Ratzel’s (he considered him to be his mentor).
Kjellen’s geopolitics can be identified in the following passage: “This—the
science of governments (states) as geographical organisms—is incarnate in the
land.”
Apart from “Geopolitics,” Kjellen proposed four more neologisms, which in
his view should be the basis for the partition of political science into separate
sections.
1. Econopolitics: “The study of dynamics impulses, transferred from the
people to the state.”
2. Demopolitics: “The study of dynamic impulses transferred from the people
to the state,” an analogue is Ratzel’s “Anthrogeography.”
3. Sociopolitical: “The study of the social aspect of the state.”
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4. Kratospolitics: “The study of the forms of governments and powers in
relation to the problems of rights and socioeconomic factors.”
But all of these disciplines, which Kjellen cultivated in parallel with geopolitics,
did not receive more widespread recognition aside from the term “Geopolitics,”
which steadily became established in quite varied circles.
2.2 The State as a Life Form and Interests in Germany
In his foundational work “The State as a Life Form” (1916), Kjellen
developed postulations that had been hypothesized by Ratzel in his works. Kjellen,
similar to Ratzel, considered himself a believer in German “Organicism,” rejecting
the mechanistic state and society approach. The rejection of the strict bleaching of
study in terms of “inanimate objects” (background), and “human subjects”
(personalities), is a distinctive feature of geopolitics. In this sense, the very
meaning of geopolitics is displayed in Kjellen’s work.
Kjellen developed Ratzel’s geopolitical principles and applied them to
specific historical situations in his contemporary Europe.
He followed Ratzel’s idea of “a continental state” to its logical conclusion
and applied it to Germany. He showed that in the European context Germany
constitutes that space, which possesses the pivotal dynamism and is intended to
structure itself to become encircled by the remaining European powers. Kjellen
interpreted World War I to be a natural conflict arising between a dynamic,
expanding Germany (Axis nations) opposed by the peripheral European (and nonEuropean) states (the Entente). Differences in the dynamics of geopolitical
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growth—downwards for England and France and upwards for Germany—
predetermined the basic alignment of forces. Wherein, from his point of view, this
is the natural and inevitable geopolitical position for Germany, despite the
temporary defeat in World War I.
Kjellen consolidated Ratzel’s geopolitical maxims that were in the interests
of Germany (= the interests of Europe), in opposition to the interests of the
Western European powers (especially England and France). But Germany, a
“young” state, and the Germans, a “young people” (this idea—of “young peoples,”
which is what Russians and Germans were considered to be—dates back to Fyodor
Dostoevsky, who was quoted more than once by Kjellen). The “young” Germans,
motivated by the “Central European Space,” should move to the level of a
continental state on the global scale at the territorial expense of the “older
peoples”—the French and English. Yet, the ideological aspect of geopolitical
confrontations was considered by Kjellen to be secondary to the spatial aspect.
2.3 Towards the Concept of Middle Europe
Although Swedish himself, Kjellen pressed for political rapprochement
between Germany and Sweden. His own geopolitical representation on the
importance of the unification of German space matches exactly the theory of
“Middle Europe” (Mitteleuropa), developed by Freidrich Naumann.
In his book “Mitteleuropa” (1915), Naumann gave a geopolitical diagnosis
that matches exactly with the concepts of Rudolf Kjellen. From Naumann’s point
of view, to withstand competition from such organized geopolitical formations like
145

England (and its colonies), the USA, and Russia, the peoples inhabiting Central
Europe should unify and organize in new integrative, political-economic ways in
this space. The axis of this space, would of course, naturally, be Germany.
Mitteleuropa differed from pure “Pan-Germanic” projects, since it was not
based on nationalism, but strict geopolitical understanding, which the basic
meaning was not given to ethnic unity, but commonalities in geographical fates.
Naumann’s project involved the integration of Germany, Austria, the Lower
Danube states, and in the wider view—France.
The geopolitical project was also supported by cultural parallels. Germany
itself was the organic formation identified with spiritual notion of “mitellage,” the
middle position. This was more deeply formulated in 1818 by Ernst Arndt: “God has
situated us in the center of Europe: We (the Germans) are the heart of our part of
the world.”
Ratzel’s ideas gradually acquired tangible traits through Kjellen and
Naumann’s “Continental” theory.
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Section 3 Halford Mackinder: The Geographical Pivot of
History

3.1 Scientist and Politician
Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947) is one of the brightest figures amongst
geopolitical scholars.
Having received an education in geography, he taught at Oxford beginning
in 1887, until he was named director of the London School of Economics. From
1910-1992 he was a Member of Parliament and in 1919-1920 he was the interim
British Ambassador in Southern Russia. Mackinder is known for his high esteem in
the world of English politics, and internationally, in which he was very notably
influential, and also, by the fact that he created some of the boldest and most
revolutionary systems for interpreting world political history.
For example, Mackinder most clearly depicted a typical paradox that is
inherent in geopolitics as a discipline. Mackinder’s ideas were not accepted in the
scientific community, despite his high position, not just in politics, but in the
scientific community itself. Even the fact that he had actively and successfully
participated in building English strategy in international questions, based in his
interpretation of political and geographical world history, could not convince
skeptics to accept the value and efficacy of geopolitics as a discipline.
3.2 The Geographical Pivot of History
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The first and boldest of Mackinder’s works was his paper “The Geopolitical
Pivot of History,” published in 1904 in “The Geographical Journal.” In this piece, he
outlined his core views on history and geography that would be developed further
in later works. This text of Mackinder’s might be considered the main geopolitical
text in the discipline’s history, because he not only summarizes previous schools of
thought in “political geography,” but also formulates the type of basic laws present
in the sciences.
Mackinder claims, that for a state, the most advantageous geographical
position would be in the middle, the central position. The concept of centrality is
relative and it might vary in each specific geographical context. But from the
global perspective, the Eurasian Continent lies in the center of the world and in its
center—the “heart of the world,” or the “heartland.” The heartland is concentrated
within the continental mass of Eurasia. It is the most favorable geographical
springboard necessary for control of the whole world.
The heartland is the key territory within the wider context of the World
Island. Mackinder includes three continents—Asia, Africa, and Europe—in this
world island.
Thus, Mackinder hierarchizes global space via a system of concentric
circles. In the very center is “the Geographical Pivot of History” or “pivot area.”
This geographical concept applies equally to Russia. It is the same “axial” reality
known as the heartland, “the heart at the core.”
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Continuing, “the interior or marginal crescent (inner or marginal crescent.”
This belt coincides with the coastal spaces of the Eurasian continent.” According to
Mackinder, the “inner crescent” itself is presented as the zone of the most intense
civilizational development. This corresponds with the historical hypothesis that
civilizations arose initially on the banks of rivers and seas, the so-called “theory of
theories.” It should be noted that the last theory is a significant instance for all
geopolitical constructs. The intersection of aquatic and terrestrial spaces is a key
factor in the history of nations and states. This topic would be developed further as
the specialization of Schmitt and Spykman; however, they were first brought out in
Mackinder’s precise geopolitical formula.
Going further out to the next circle: “the outer or insular crescent” (outer or
insular crescent). This whole outer zone (geographically and culturally is in
reference to mainland masses of the World Island.
Mackinder claims the entire course of history has been determined by the
following processes. From the heartland’s center to its periphery, it is constantly
under tension, from so-called “robbers of land.” Especially starkly and graphically
reflected in the Mongolian invasions. But, they were preceded by the Scythians,
Huns, Alans, and so on. Civilizations arising out of “the Geographical Pivot of
History,” the deepest interior spaces of the heartland have, in Mackinder’s opinion,
“autonomy,” “hierarchy,” “non-democratic” characteristics, and are “non-trading.”
In the ancient world, these traits were embodied in societies like Dorian Sparta
and Ancient Rome.
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Tension is spread from the outside of these regions of the “island crescent,”
to the world island by the so-called “robbers of the sea” or “island inhabitants.”
With their colonial expeditions, springing from outside the non-Eurasian center,
these aspirants counterbalance the terrestrial impulses, arising out of the interior
margins of the continent. For civilizations of the “outer crescent,” characteristics
are a “trading” nature and “democratic forms” or politics. In antiquity, these traits
distinguished the Athenian or Carthaginian governments.
Between these two civilizational poles, geographical impulses are located in
the “outer crescent,” which are dualistic and constantly exerting opposing cultural
influences that have the most mobility thanks to their priority positions in the
development of civilizations.
History, to Mackinder, rotates around the continental axis. This history is
more felt in the area of the “outer crescent,” than in the heartland, where frozen
archaism “reigns” and in the “inner crescent” there is a certain civilizational chaos.
3.3 The Key Position of Russia
Mackinder himself identified his interests with the interests of the AngloSaxon World Island, i.e. of the position in the “outer crescent.” In that station, he
viewed the fundamental geopolitical stance to the “world island” to be the
maximum weakening of the heartland and in extending this influence to the
furthest possible limits of the “external crescent” within the “interior crescent.”
Mackinder stressed the strategic priority of the “Geographical Pivot of History,”
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and he conjectured that that throughout the political world this was the
paramount geographical law.
“The one who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; he who
controls the heartland dominates the World Island; he who dominates the World
Island dominates the world.” (“Democratic Ideas and Realism”) (10)
At the political level this means an admission of Russia’s leading role in
strategic thought. Mackinder wrote:
Russia, as well as Germany, occupies a central strategic position in the
world as a whole, and in Europeans relations. It can carry out attacks in all
directions and be subjected to them as well, except form the North.
Complete development of railway capabilities is a matter of time. (“The
Geographical Pivot of History”) (11)
Proceeding from this, Mackinder considered that the main objective of
English geopolitics is to prevent the organization of a strategic continental union
around “the geographical pivot of history” (Russia). Accordingly, the strategic
power of the “outer crescent” is the ability to pick off the maximum amount of
coastal space from the heartland and place it under the influence of “island
civilization.”
A disturbance in the power equilibrium towards the “pivotal state” (Russia
and others), accompanying its expansion into the peripheral spaces of the
Eurasia, will allow it to use vast continental resources for the creation of a
mighty, seafaring fleet: this brings it closer to world empire. This will be
possible if Russia unites with Germany. The threat of this development will
compel France to enter into an alliance with oversea powers—and France,
Italy, Egypt, India, and Korea will become coastal bases for the mooring of
the Great Powers’ fleets to pulverize the forces from the “pivotal range”
from all directions and thwart their efforts to concentrate forces into a
powerful, naval fleet. (“The Geographical Pivot of History”) (12)
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Most interestingly, Mackinder did not just construct simple theoretical
hypotheses, but actively participated in the international organizations supporting
the Entente’s “White Movement,” which he considered to have Atlanticist
tendencies—directed towards weakening the power of the pro-German minded
Eurasianist-Bolsheviks. He personally consulted with the leaders of the Whites and
tried to gain maximum support from the English government. It seemed he
prophetically foresaw not only the Treaty of Brest, but also the MolotovRibbentrop Pact.289
In his 1919 book “Democratic Ideals and Realism,” Mackinder wrote: “What
will become of the naval forces if one day the great continent is politically unified
to become the foundation of an invincible armada?” (13)
It is not hard to understand why exactly Mackinder established in AngloSaxon geopolitics, which in half a century would be the United States and NATO,
this essential tendency: to impede in any way capable the very possibility of the
creation of a Eurasian Bloc—established through a union of Russia and Germany—
a geopolitical reinforcing of the heartland and its expansion. The West’s sustained
Russophobia in the twentieth century is not just ideological, but also geopolitical
in character. Still, taking into account Mackinder’s connection between
civilizational types and these geopolitical characteristics, or other forces, one could
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Dugin refers to it as only the Treaty of Brest, not Brest-Litovsk. Brest is the Russian name for the
city and Litovsk is the Polish one.
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acquire a formula for which geopolitical terminology is easily translated into
ideological terminology.
The “outer crescent” is liberal democracy; “the geographical pivot of
history” is non-democratic authoritarianism; the inner crescent is an intermediate
model—a combination of both ideological systems.
Mackinder participated in the preparation for the Versailles Treaty, which
would reflect the essence of Mackinder’s views. The treaty was designed to instill a
Western European character in the coastal bases for naval forces (The Pax
Britannica). Together with this, he envisaged the establishment of limitrophe
states, which might divide Germans and Slavs, in every way discouraging a
strategic continental alliance between them that would be so dangerous for the
“island countries,” and accordingly, “Democracy.”
It is very important to trace the geographical bounds of the heartland in
Mackinder’s works. If the years 1904 and 1919 (corresponding with the article “The
Geographical Pivot of History” and the book “Democratic Ideals and Reality”) the
shape of the heartland coincides with the outline of the borders of the Russian
Empire, later the USSR, and in 1943, in his text “The Round World and the
Winning of Peace,” he reevaluated his former views and withdrew the Soviet
territory of Eastern Siberia—located past the Yenisey River—from the heartland.
He named the sparsely populated Soviet territory “Russian Lenaland,” after the
Lena River.
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Russian Lenaland has nine million inhabitants, five million of whom live
along the transcontinental railroad between Irkutsk and Vladivostok. In the
remaining territories, there is less than one person per eight square
kilometers. There are great riches particularly untouched in this
wilderness—lumber, minerals, etc. (“The Round World and the Winning of
Peace”)
The removal of so-called Lenaland from the boundaries of the heartland
meant that he considered that territory’s potential to zones of the “inner crescent,”
such as those coastal spaces, capable of being used by “island” nations in the
struggle against “the geographical pivot of history.” Mackinder actively
participated in organizing interventions by the Entente and “White Forces,”
apparently considering Kolchak to be a historical precedent—resisting the
Eurasian center—considered to be basically sufficient for controlling its territory
by way of potential “coastal zones.”
3.4 Three Geopolitical Periods
Mackinder divides all world geopolitical history into three phases (16):
1. The Pre-Columbian Epoch: In this phase, nations, belonging to the periphery of
the World Island, for instance the Romans, living under constant threat of
invading powers from the “heartlands.” For the Romans, these were the Germans,
Huns, Alans, Parthians, and so on. For the oikumene of Central Europe, it was the
Golden Horde.
2. The Columbian Epoch: In this period, governments of the “inner crescent”
(coastal zones) set off on invasions of little known territories around the globe—
nowhere meeting serious opposition.
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3. The Post-Columbian Epoch: Large unconquered lands no longer exist. Dynamic
civilizational ripples are doomed for a collision—compelling nations into a global
civil war.
Mackinder’s periodization-with the relevant geopolitical transformations—
leads us closer to the newest tendencies in geopolitics, which we discuss in the
next sections of the book.
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Section 4: Alfred Mahan and “Sea Power”
4.1 Sea Power
As a military man, rather than an academic, the American Alfred Mahan
(1840-1914) differed from Ratzel, Kjellen, and Mackinder. He did not use the term
“Geopolitics,” but the methodology of his analysis and basic conclusions directly
correspond to a strictly geopolitical approach.
An officer in the Union Army, beginning in 1885 he taught the history of
naval warfare at “The Naval War College” in Newport (Rhode Island). In 1890, he
published his first book—almost immediately becoming established as a classic
text of military strategy, “Sea Power in History (1660-1783).” This was followed in
short gaps by “The Influence of Sea Power in the French Revolution and Empire
(1793-1812),” “The Interest of American Sea Power Now and in the Future,” “The
Problem of Asia and Its Impact on International Politics” and “Sea Power and Its
Relationship to War.” All his works revolve around one particular theme—that of
“Sea Power.” Mahan’s name is synonymous with this term.
Not only was Mahan only a theorist of military strategy, but he was also an
active participant in politics. In particular he hid powerful influence over
politicians like Henry Cabot Lodge and Teddy Roosevelt. Moreover, if in a
retrospective look at American military strategy throughout the entire 20th century
we see that it was constructed in direct accordance with Mahan’s ideas. And, if in
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World War I this strategy did not bring the USA tangible success, in World War II
it’s effect was considerable, and the Cold War finally secured the success of “Sea
Power” strategy.
4.2 Sea Civilizations = Commercial Civilizations
The main instrument of politics for Mahan is commerce. Military activity
should only provide more favorable conditions for the establishment of a planter
trading civilization. Mahan regarded the economic cycle as having three moments:
1. Production/Manufacturing/Exchange of goods and services across
waterways
2. Navigation (which implements this exchange)
3. Colonies (which produce an exchange of goods civilization at global levels)
Mahan believe an analysis of the position and geopolitical status of the state
falls within six basic criteria:
1. The geographic position of the state: its openness to the seas, the possibility
of naval interaction with other countries, the spread of terrestrial borders,
the ability to control important strategic regions, and the ability to threaten
enemy territories with its fleets.
2. The “physical configuration” of the state—that is, the configuration of
maritime coasts and number of ports and their locations. Commercial
prosperity and strategic security depends on this.
3. The expanse of territory: Its extension along coastal lines.
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4. The population: It’s important for assessment of the ability of the state to
build and maintain ships.
5. National character: The ability of a people to study trade so that naval
power will be based on wide ranging and peaceful trade.
6. The political character of the government: The reorientation of the best
human and natural resources towards the creation of powerful naval forces
depends on this.
From this review, it is already clear that Mahan proceeded to construct his
geopolitical theory exclusively from “Sea Power” and its interests. For Mahan, an
example of “Sea Power” was ancient Carthage and more recently to us
historically—England from the 17th to the 19th centuries.
An understanding of “Sea Power” is based on the freedom of “Maritime Trade,”
and naval fleets serve only to ensure the guarantee of this trade. Mahan goes
further, considering “Sea Power” the basis for a type a civilization (anticipating
Carl Schmitt’s ideas)—the most optimal and effective and therefore destined for
world dominance.
4.3 The USA’s Conquest of the World—Manifest Destiny
Mahan’s idea was received around the world and influenced many
European strategists. Event land-based, continental Germany—in the period of
Tirpitz—applied Mahan’s methods in his thesis and was active in developing its
own fleet. In 1940 and 1941, two of Mahan’s books were published in the USSR.
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But, first of all, it was intended for America and Americans. Mahan was a staunch
supporter of President Monroe’s (1758-1831) Doctrine, which was declared in 1812
on the principle of mutual non-interference between the countries of the Americas
and Europe and also made the growth of the USA’s power dependent on its
territorial expansion to neighboring lands. Mahan believed America has a
“maritime fate” and that “manifest destiny” represented the first step in the
strategic integration of the entire American continent, and then the established of
global dominance.
It’s necessary to pay tribute to Mahan’s almost prophetic vision. During his
time, the USA still had not moved into the category of great powers, and
moreover; its “maritime civilization type” was not even obvious. Even Mackinder
in his article “The Geopolitical Axis of History,” referred to the USA as a “land
power,” including it in the “outer crescent” only as a semi-colonial extension of
maritime England. Mackinder wrote: “The USA will become only an Eastern
power. They will have no direct influence on the balance of power in Europe, only
through Russia.”
Admiral Mahan had already accurately predicted America’s planetary
destiny in becoming the primary Sea Power, directly influencing the fate of the
world, ten years prior to the publication of Mackinder’s article.
In his book “The Interests of America in Sea Power,” Mahan asserted that for
America to become a world power it should implement the following points:
1. Actively cooperate with British Naval Powers
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2. Discourage German naval pretensions
3. Keep a vigilant watch on Japanese expansion in the Pacific Ocean and
actively oppose it.
4. Coordinate with Europeans in joint activities against Asian peoples.
Mahan saw the USA’s destiny as not being a passive participant in the general
context of a state in the “outer crescent,” but to achieve a leading position in
economic, strategic, and even ideological relations.
Mackinder and Mahan independently arrived at the same conclusion regarding
the dangers for “Seafaring Civilizations.” This danger is a continental, Eurasian
state, chiefly Russia and China, and secondarily Germany. A battle with Russia—
with this “continuous mass of the Russian Empire—stretching from Western Asia
Minor to the Japanese Meridian in the East,” was for the Sea Powers the main longterm strategic task.
Mahan transferred this to a global level—the “Anaconda Principle”—applied by
American General McClellan in the American Civil War (1861-1865). This principle
consists of blockading every territory at sea and along coastlines to gradually wear
out the adversary through exhaustion. Thus, Mahan considered that the power of
the state is determined by its potential to become a Sea Power and in the event of
strategic confrontations, the primary task is preventing the enemy camp from
becoming established. Accordingly, America’s task in this historical confrontation
is to strengthen its position via the six fundamental points (listed earlier) and
weakening the adversary by these points. Vast coastal spaces should be placed
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under its control and it is necessary to try and pick off the corresponding enemy
zones (by any means from the continental mass). And furthermore, as with the
Monroe Doctrine (in its section of territorial integration), the state’s power should
be strengthened and should not permit the creation of analogous integrative
formation by the enemy. The enemy or rival—in Mahan’s case, Eurasian powers
(Russia, China, Germany) will be suffocated in the “Anaconda’s” coils, crushing
them and taking control of the resources derived from its control of coastal zones,
and blocking, if able, the outlets to maritime spaces.
In World War I this strategy was implemented in support of the White Entente
Movement on the Eurasian periphery (as a response to the Bolsheviks making
peace with Germany). In World War II it was also employed against middle
Europe and in particular through naval military operations against the axis nations
and Japan. But, it can be seen especially clearly during the Cold War, when the
confrontation between the USA and the USSR extended globally to planetary
proportions, in which at the theoretical level, it had already been geopolitically
operation since the close of the 19th century.
It is a fact that the basic strategic line of thinking for NATO and also other
blocs, is directed towards containing the USSR (the concept of “containment” is
strategically and geopolitically identical to the “anaconda” concept)—ASEAN,
ANZUS, CENTO—are directly developed from the foundational theses of Admiral
Mahan, who may be considered the intellectual father of all cotemporary
Atlanticism.
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Section 5: Vidal de la Blache— “France vs. Germany”
5.1 An Overview of French Geography
Vidal de la Blache is considered the founder of the French school of
geography. A professional geographer, he was animated by Ratzel’s “Political
Geography” and constructed his own theory based on it as a source, although he
harshly criticized many aspects of the German geopolitical school.
In his book “A Geographical Picture of France” (1903), he referred to the soil
theories, so import for German geopoliticians:
The relationship between soil and people in France is marked by its original
character in antiquity, a continuity…in our country can often be observed in
that people have lived in the same places since time immemorial. Starting
at places with calciferous rocks that attracted people due to their usefulness
for residence and defence. Our people—are true disciples of the soil. The
study of soil will help determine the character, morals, and preferences of
the population.
But, despite this—altogether quite German—relationship between
geographic factors and their influence on culture, Vidal de la Blache believed that
Ratzel and his followers grossly overestimated that strictly topographical factors
were geopolitically defining. People, according to de la Blache, are also “the most
important geographical factor,” but there is also an “initial endowment.” It is not
only a fragment of the scenery, but the main performer in the spectacle.
5.2 Possiblism
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This criticism of Ratzel’s elevation of spatial factors led Vidal de la Blache to
elaborate the basic geographical concept of “possibilism,” according to this
concept, political history has two aspects—spatial (geographic) and temporal
(historical). Geographical factors are reflected in the surrounding environment,
historically in in its people (mediums of initiative). Vidal de la Blache considered
the German “political geographers’” mistake to have been that they considered
landscape the determinative factor in the political history of the state. Thereby
belittling factors of human freedom and historicity. He proposed referring to
geographical spatial position as “potentiality,” “possibility,” which could actualize
and become active political factors or might not. The majority of this depends on
subjective factors from the people who inhabit a given space.
This approach took into account the German geopolitical school of
Haushofer, who thought de la Blache’s criticism was quite important and justified.
In this case, the role of ethnicity and the racial factor was clearly increased by
revising the political history of the state ad this resonated deeply during Germany’s
racial problems of the 20s.
De la Blache’s possibilism was perceived by the majority of geopolitical
schools to be a correction to the strict geographical determinism of earlier
geopolitical writers.
5.3 France for “Sea Power”
Vidal de la Blache paid special attention to Germany, which was France’s
chief political opponent at the time. He considered Germany to be a mighty,
163

united European state whose geopolitical expansion is intentionally being blocked
by other developed European powers. If England and France have their extensive
colonies in Africa and around the world, if the USA has almost complete freedom
of movement to the North and South, if Russia has Asia, then Germany is squeezed
from all sides with no outlet for its energy. De la Blache observed that this is the
main threat to peace in Europe and he considered it absolutely necessary to
weaken the development of this dangerous neighbor.
This relationship with Germany logically entailed the geopolitical
determination of France to generally side with the “Sea Powers,” oriented against
the continental powers. De la Blache’s position was not shared by all French
geopoliticians because there was a parallel and opposite Germanophilic movement
represented by Admiral Laval and General de Gaulle.
In 1919 Vidal de la Blache published his book “Eastern France,” in which he
asserts that the region of Alsace-Lorraine is predominantly a part of France and
German aspirations to the regions are illegitimate. He appeals to the French
Revolution to support this, considering the Jacobin dimension to be expressed
through the geopolitical tendencies of the French people, themselves stringing for
a unique and centralized state through geographical integration. Political
liberalism can also be explained through the people’s attachment to the soil and a
natural desire to receive property in return for its resources. Vidal de la Blache, in
his own way, connected geopolitical properties with ideological aspects. The
political space of Western Europe (France) is inseparably linked to “democracy”
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and “liberalism.” With this, it is possible to assemble a geopolitical equation of the
views of de la Blache, Mackinder, and Mahan.
De la Blache’s selection of a “maritime orientation” perfectly fits this
pattern.

165

Section 6: Nicholas Spykman “A Revision of Mackinder, the
Rimland’s Centrality”
6.1 In American Service
An American of Dutch origin, Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943) is part of a
direct line of thought originating with Mahan. Spykman was a professor of
international relations and later director of the institute of international relations
at Yale. Different from earlier geopoliticians, for him geography itself was not the
majority of its interests, and was even less excited by problems of people and soil,
the influence of landscape on national characters, and so forth. Spykman discussed
geopolitics as an important, concrete instrument of international politics, like the
Atlanticists’ method and system of formulas, to allow for more effective strategy to
be made. On this topic, he had harsh criticism for the German geopolitical school
(especially the book “Geography of the World”), considering the representation of
“just and unjust borders to be metaphysical nonsense.” Like Mahan, Spykman had
the characteristics of a utilitarian approach to producing more effective
geopolitical formulae which build could aid the USA in quickly achieving the
position of “world dominance.” This pragmatism shaped his thinking.
6.2 Correcting Mackinder
Spykman attentively studied Mackinder’s works and proposed his own
variant of basic geopolitical systems that were somewhat different from
Mackinder’s models. Spykman’s basic idea was that Mackinder was mistaken in
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overestimating the geopolitical importance of the Heartland. This mistake
impacted not only the actual position of forces on the world map—particularly the
USSR’s—but also the initial historical plans. Like Mackinder, Spykman asserted
that in the geographical history of the “inner crescent,” rimland, “coastal zones,”
they were not subjected to pressure from “Nomadic Groups.” In his opinion, the
heartland is only a potential space, receiving every cultural impulse from the
coastal zones and not possessing any independently formed geopolitical mission or
historical impulse. The rimland, not the heartland, is the key to world dominance.
Mackinder’s geopolitical formulation: “Whoever controls Eastern Europe
dominates the heartland…whoever dominates Eurasia…holds the fate of the world
in their hands.”
In principle, Spykman is not discussing anything new on this, as for both
him and Mackinder the “coastal zones,” “outer crescent,” and rimland were key
strategic positions for controlling the continent. But Mackinder understood these
zones as spaces torn between two impulses—“maritime” and “terrestrial,” not as
self-sufficient, independently thinking entities and he never understood Russia’s
control over the heartland and its adjacent continental masses. Eastern Europe is
the intermediate space between the “geographical pivot of history” and the
rimland, so it follows that the exact ratio of forces in the heartland to the periphery
is the key variable for the problem of world dominance. But Spykman introduced
his geopolitics as a radically new shift relative to Mackinder’s. Really, they only
diverged on some nuanced concepts.
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6.3 Defining the Balance of Power
In his books “American Strategy in World Politics” and “Geography of the
World,” Spykman delineated ten criteria for the purpose of determining state
geopolitical power. He followed Mahan in developing these criteria. They are:
1. Territorial area
2. Natural boundaries
3. Population
4. Abundance or lack of usable mineral resources
5. Economic and technological development
6. Financial might
7. Ethnic uniformity
8. Level of social integration
9. Political stability
10. National spirit
If the summary of the results based on these criteria are low, then due to the
geopolitical capabilities of the state it will be forced to enter into a strategic
alliance, sacrificing part of its sovereignty for global strategic geopolitical
protection.
6.4 The Midland Ocean
In addition to reevaluating the significance of the Rimland, Spykman
contributed one more addition to the geopolitical picture of the world, discernible
in the positioning of the sea powers. He introduced the extremely important
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concept of the “Midland Ocean.” The fundamentals of this geopolitical depiction
lie in its emphasis on the analogy of the history of the Near East, Europe, and
Northern Africa and the Mediterranean in antiquity to the Atlantic Ocean and the
recent history of western civilization. Because Spykman believed “the coastal
zones,” and Rimland to be the fundamental historical territories for civilizations,
as the Mediterranean area was in antiquity forming its cultures and subsequently
spreading them to the interior of the continent (acculturating barbarian tribes)
and to remote territories, and this was achieved only with the aid of seas routes
(acculturating the barbarians of the sea). Similar to the Mediterranean model, in
recent times this has increased to a planetary scale proceeding through the
Atlantic Ocean, both coastal areas—American and European—being the most
technologically and economically developed areas in western civilization.
The Midland Ocean has become, in this perspective, not a dividing, but a
unifying factor, a “mare internum.” Accordingly, Spykman outlined a specific
geopolitical reality, which might provisionally be called “The Atlanticist
Continent,” at the center of which, like a lake in a land-locked region, the Atlantic
is located. This theoretical “continent,” a “New Atlantis,” connected by common
cultures of Western European origin, liberal-capitalist democratic ideology,
political solidarity, ethics, and technology.
Spykman especially pressed the idea of the role of intellectual factors in this
“Atlanticist Continent.” Western Europe and the belt of coastline along North
America’s Eastern Seaboard (especially New York City) would become the brain of
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this new Atlanticist Networks.” The central nervous system and musculature its
trade and military-industrial complex. Europe will prove to be an intellectual
appendage of the USA, whose geopolitical interests and strategic line have become
unified and prevalent for all western powers. This should gradually shrink
European stares’ political sovereignty and power transferring to specific
institutions unifying governments of the entire “Atlanticist” spaces and
subordinating them to the primacy of the United States.
Spykman anticipated important political processes—the power of NATO,
diminishing sovereignty of European powers postwar, USA hegemony, etc.
6.5 The Architect of the American Victory
Spykman’s doctrine is based not only on the idea that the USA is positioned
to be a “Sea Power”—powers because it had already become fact—it was also
necessary to control the coastal territories of Eurasia—European, Arabian States,
Indo-China, and so on—for final victory in the duel of maritime and continental
forces. If in Mackinder’s portrayal the planetary reality is discussed as something
“eternal” and “unfaltering,” Spykman considered complete control over the
Rimland through the methods of “seas forces” would lead to a final and
unconditional victory over the terrestrial powers and from then on would be in
total control.
Actually, it was the development of “anaconda tactics” that were critical
which had already been explicated by Mahan.
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The victory in the cold war of the “Sea Power” USA demonstrated the
geopolitical correctness of Spykman, who can be called the architect of world
victory for the liberal-democratic countries” over Eurasia.
At the moment, Spykman’s theses apropos the strategic supremacy of the
Rimland and the importance of the “Midland Ocean” has been proven by history,
but he discarded entirely too quickly Mackinder’s theories on the persistent
political reorientation of the Eurasian center towards continental expansion
In other ways, some of his ideas (notably his follower Kirk, who developed
still further a detailed Rimland theory) were supported by some European
geopoliticians, highly regarding the points on the importance of “coastal
territories,” who saw a chance for European countries to once again decided the
World’s fate. But, for this the “Midland Ocean” concept must be tossed aside.
Despite this geopolitical approach some European geopoliticians (the rest,
however, were very ambiguous), Spykman belongs, without any doubts, to the
Atlanticist geopolitical school. Moreover, he, together with Mahan, can be called
“the father of Atlanticism,” and the “ideological inspiration of NATO.”
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Section 7: Karl Haushofer— “the Continental Bloc”
7.1 War and Thought
It is with special thanks to the Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) that geopolitics
have been discussed not simply as a “pseudo-science,” but a “misanthropic,”
“fascistic,” and “anthropophagic” theory.
Karl Haushofer was born in Munich to a family of professionals. He decided
to become have a military career and served in the army as an officer for more than
twenty years. From 1908-1910 he was the German military attaché in Japan and
Manchuria. Here he met with the Japanese emperor and the upper nobility. Failing
health forced Haushofer to leave his rather successful military career ad in 1911 he
returned to Germany, where he resided until the end of his life. He studied the
sciences and received an “doctorate” from the University of Munich. During this
time, Haushofer regularly published books on geopolitics in general, and with a
special emphasis on the geopolitics of the pacific region. The first of his books was
“The Gift of Japan,” covering Japanese geopolitics. Through his student Rudolf
Hess, he met Hitler right after he was imprisoned following his failed Putsch. It is
an unconfirmed historical opinion that Haushofer played a part in writing sections
of “Mein Kampf” relating to geopolitics. But, a conceptual analysis shows a
significant difference between Haushofer’s geopolitical outlook and Hitler’s
simplistic, racists, and propagandistic passages.
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For twenty years, beginning in 1924, Haushofer published the most
important geopolitical journal, possessing huge influence—“Geopolitik,” later
changed to “Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik.”
Most of the articles were published in this journal. Haushofer’s relationship
with the Nazis was very complicated. On some issues, he saw eye-to-eye with the
Nazis, on others they diverged radically. Due to a dependence on the Nazi regime
and from personal relations, Haushofer’s positions changed with the Third Reich.
Until 1936 he was favored (especially enjoying the protection of his younger
friend Hess), later these feelings began to cool. After Hess parachuted into
England, Haushofer slipped into disgrace and after his son was executed for
participating in an attempt on Hitler’s life in 1944, he was considered almost an
enemy of the people. Still, despite the ambiguity in his views, he shared the “Nazi
viewpoint.” He could not endure the blows of fate and the loss of all his hopes, and
in 1946, Haushofer, along with his wife, committed suicide.
7.2 A New European Order
Haushofer attentively studied the works of Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder, Vidal
de la Blache, Mahan, and other geopoliticians. The picture of “maritime
civilization” versus “continental civilizations” or Talassocracies (the powers of the
Midland Ocean) against “Tellulocracies” (“the powers of the Midland”), is key for
him and behind it are those who are responsible for all secret international
politics, and are implicated in all its direct actions. (In Japan, for example, he had
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to deal with these forces who were most responsible for deciding the picture of
spatial relations.) Indicative of this is that the term “New Order,” which was
actively used by the Nazis and in our time in the form of the “New World Order’ of
the Americans, was first used exactly in Japan. It applied to a geopolitical scheme
for redistributing influence in the Pacific region which was proposed to be put into
practice for Japanese geopolitics.
The planetary dualism of “sea powers” and “land powers” was self-identified
by Germany as being above all other problems. Supporters of the national idea,
and Haushofer belonged to them without a doubt, strove to strengthen the
German state, which meant industrial development, a cultural uplift and
geopolitical expansion. But, Germany’s position, spatially and culturally mitellage,
has united its western enemies, sea powers—England, France, and in this
perspective, the USA. The “talassocracies” themselves did not hide their
orientation regarding Germany and considered it (along with Russia) the
geopolitical opponents of the Maritime West.
In such a situation, it was not easy for the Germans to count on a strong
alliance with powers from the “outer crescent;” moreover, for Germany, England
and France had historically had pretensions to controlling the territorial order.
Accordingly, a future Greater German nation (as in the geopolitical confrontation
with the West, and especially the Anglo-Saxon world, with which the sea powers
generally identified.
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The entirety of Karl Haushofer’s geopolitical doctrine and that of his
followers is based on this analysis. This doctrine concludes it is necessary to
establish a “continental bloc” on a Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo Axis. This bloc cannot be
formed haphazardly—it was the only full-fledged and adequate strategic response
to the opposing camp who did not conceal that its greatest danger was the
formation of an analogical Eurasian alliance. He wrote in his article “The
Continental Bloc”: “Eurasia cannot be suffocated if two of the largest peoples—
Germans and Russians—in every way seek to avoid internecine conflicts, like the
Crimean War or 1914: This is the axiom of European politics.”
He then quotes American Homer Lee—“The last hour for Anglo-Saxon
politics will be when the Germans, Japanese, and Russians unite.”
This line of thought showed in various ways in Haushofer’s articles and
books. It received the named “ostorientierung,” meaning “orientation to the East,”
due to the assumed self-identification of Germany, its people, and its culture as a
Western extension of the Eurasian, Asiatic traditions. It was not by chance that the
English gave the Germans in World War I the derogatory nickname of “Huns.” For
geopoliticians of the Haushofer school, this was perfectly agreeable.
In this regard, it should be emphasized that Haushofer’s concept of
“openness to the East” has a completely different meaning than “the occupation of
Slavic lands.” His notion was about a joint civilizational effort of two continental
powers—Russia and Germany—who would establish a “New Eurasian Order,” and
structure continental space around the World Island so as to completely remove
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itself from under the influence of “Sea powers.” The expansion of Germany
lebensraum was planned by Haushofer, not for the sake of colonizing Russian
lands, but for the taming of the gigantic unsettled Asiatic spaces and reorganizing
the land of eastern Europe.
7.3 Compromise with the Tallassocracies
However, in practice everything did not wash out so cleanly. The purely
scientific logic of Haushofer, logically led to the necessity of a “continental bloc”
with Moscow, collided with the majority of the other tendencies and qualities
inherent in the German national establishment. It was the strictly racist outlook of
history, which infected Hitler himself. This outlook considered racial affinities to
be the most important factors, not geographical or geopolitical specifications. The
Anglo-Saxon peoples—England and the USA—were viewed in this case as the
natural allies of the Germans because they were closer ethnically. Slavs and
especially non-white Eurasian peoples were turned into racial enemies. Adding to
this was the ideology of anti-communism, which itself involved a racial principle—
Marx and many communists were Jews, which signified, through the anti-Semitic
viewpoint that communism itself was an anti-Germanic ideology.
National-Socialist racism fell into direct contradiction with geopolitics or,
more precisely, implicitly nudging Germans to their inverse, anti-Eurasian,
talassocratic strategy. From the point of view of racist followers, Germany should
have been concluding alliances with England and the USA to join forces against
the USSR. But, in other ways the humiliation experienced at Versailles was still all
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too fresh. All the ambiguous international politics of the Third Reich spring from
this duality. These politics were constantly balancing between the talassocratic,
outwardly justifying its racism and anti-communism (the anti-Slavic attitude,
attacking the USSR, encouraging Catholic Croats in the Balkans, etc.) and the
tellulocratic based in pure, geopolitical principles (the war with England and
France, Molotov and Ribbentrop Pact, etc.).
Because Karl Haushofer was partaking, to some extent, in the decision
making of concrete political problems, he was forced to alter his theories in line
with politics. In this position, he had contacts with the upper echelons of England.
Besides, there was the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the creation of a
Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, Haushofer outwardly hailed the move, welcoming it as a
preliminary step on the path towards establishing a total “Eurasian bloc.” He could
not understand the appearance that his anti-communist direction would have on
the heartland’s center (Moscow), or secondary perimeter powers belonging to the
Rimland, and having an opposite character to an authentic “continental bloc.”
But all of these steps were dictated by political conformity and are not
representative of all of the aggregate of Haushofer’s geopolitics. His name and
ideas are personified at a high level in the concept of the “Eastern destiny” of
Germany, based in a strong and long-term Eurasian union.
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Section 8: Carl Schmitt—“The Behemoth versus the
Leviathan”
8.1 Conservative Revolutionary
Carl Schmitt, (1888-1985) was a German renowned as an outstanding jurist,
political scientist, philosopher, and historian. But, all his ideas are inseparably
connected with the geopolitical concepts found in his works—“Nomos of the
Earth,” “Land and Sea,” etc., which are devoted to geopolitical factors and their
influence on civilizations and political history.
Carl Schmitt was close to German representatives of the Conservative
Revolutionaries, paradoxically combining in himself national-conservative and
social-revolutionary elements. Schmitt’s fate is the fate of his books and his
juridical-philosophical schools. Like many other conservative revolutionaries, he
had a double-natured relationship with the National Socialist regime. In one sense,
there is no doubt his theories appear in Nazi ideology, his books “Political
Theology” and “Political Concepts” were used especially successfully, in them
Schmitt openly criticized liberal rights and “the rule of law”. In these texts, he had
already given shape to his later intellectual creations—in their noticeable ultimate
political realism, attempting to free problems of political science from
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humanitarian rhetoric, sentimental pathos, social demagoguery. This
corresponded quite well with the National-Socialist spirit.

Joined with this, all of Schmitt’s concepts were based on the fundamental idea of
“people’s rights” (volksrechte), which he distinguished from “human rights” under
liberal theory. His understanding emphasized that a people have rights to cultural
sovereignty so as to preserve its spiritual, historical, and political identity. Such an
approach was characteristic of some National Socialists, considering this ideology
universal and applicable to all the peoples of the Earth. But, the regime’s dominant
line of thought was Pan-Germanism, rooted in a chauvinistic and narrow
nationalistic outlook. Therefore, with his theory of “people’s rights,” Schmitt was
subjected to harsh criticism especially by the ideologues of the SS (in 1936, the SS’s
mouthpiece “Scharze Korps” published an especially threatening article addressed
to him).
The formation of Schmitt’s ideology took place in the same atmosphere of
Ratzel and Kjellen’s ideas regarding “organistic sociology,” but also wherein also
appeared the romantic theory of the “Northern Light” (Nordlicht), according to
which social-political types and governmental organization are rooted in
mythology, the sacred world of “stories and spirits,” not in a mechanistic, identity
of functioning cells combined in mathematical conglomerates. In Schmitt’s
theories, the paradoxical combination of “political romanticism” and “strict
rationalism” is present. A refined mental apparatus expressing spiritual mythology.
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At the Nuremberg Trials, there was an attempt to charge Carl Schmitt with “war
crimes” based on his collaboration with the Nazi regime. Specifically, he was
indicted for “theoretically justifying and legitimizing a war of aggression.” The
charges were withdrawn after the judges were became acquainted with Carl
Schmitt’s works in more detail. Nevertheless, Schmitt—like Heidgegger, Junger,
and other “conservative revolutionaries” became persona non-grata in the global
scientific community and his works were completely ignored.
Only in the 70s, thanks to the colossal influence in juridical through of
some leftist, socialist thinkers that Schmitt’s works gradually became rehabilitated.
In our time, he is recognized as a classical political scientist and jurist.
8.2 The Nomos of the Earth
Schmitt was completely in the spirit of a geopolitical approach that asserted
an original connection between political culture and space. Not only the
government, but all social aspects and rights result from the qualities of spatial
organization.
From here, Schmitt introduced the “nomos” concept. Originating from the
Greek term “nomos” meaning “something taken, formed, ordered, and organized,”
but put in the context of space. This term is close to Ratzel’s concept of “relief” and
the “place of development” of the Russian Eurasianists (Savitzky). Schmitt
displayed how the nomos is the form that organizations in life take, which installs
greater harmony in relationships within the social ensemble and between these
ensembles. “Nomos” expresses this special synthesis combining subjective and
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objective factors organically emerging in the establishment of political and
juridical systems. In “nomos,” there appears natural and cultural features of
humanity working collectively in combination with the surrounding environment.
In his book “The World of Nomos,” Schmitt shows how specific types of
land spaces influenced the development of culture and government. He juxtaposed
various historical “nomoses,” especially highlighting the fundamental dualistic
relationship between nomadic space and sedentary peoples.
But, in an analysis of “The Nomos of the Earth,” the most important
concept is his thoughtful approach to global history and civilizational space
between the land civilizations and the sea civilizations.
Exploring the “nomos” of the earth he collided with the qualitative aspects
of the opposing land and sea “nomoses.” This led him to establish the basic
geopolitical methodology for comprehending the world’s political history.
8.3 The Land and the Sea
In 1942 Schmitt released his most important work—“The Land and the Sea.”
Together with the later text “Planetary Tensions between East and West” and “The
Confrontation of Land and Sea,” these comprise the most important documents
for geopolitical sciences. The significance of Schmitt’s The Confrontation of Land
and Sea can be reduced to the idea that there are two completely different,
antagonistic civilizations, irreconcilable to each other and they are not variants of
a single complex civilization. This division almost entirely coincides with the map
drawn by Mackinder, but Schmitt gives basic elements—talassocracy (Sea Power)
181

and tellulocracy (Land Power)—a thorough philosophical explanation connected
with basic juridical and ethnic systems. Curiously, Schmitt used the names
“Behemoth,” for “land forces” and for the “sea forces”— “Leviathan,” like the names
of the beasts of the Old Testament, e of which had incarnate in itself all land
animals, and the other—all of the aquatic and oceanic.
The “nomos” of the Earth existed without an alternative for the duration of
most of human history. All varieties of this “nomos” are characterized by a strong
and strict legislative (and ethical) forms. Which are reflected immovably and
fixedly in Land and the Sea. This connection to the land, spatially, is easily
supported by structuralism (fixated on borders, stable communicational pathways,
and immutable geographical qualities of the landscape) generating conservatism
in the social, cultural, and technical fields. The concise version of the “The Nomos
of the Earth” is constituted by what is accepted in history under the name of the
“traditional society.”
In the Sea’s situation, Water is the only civilizational influence, not land,
and not extending into the ethnic sphere (or only occasionally). Only with the
opening of the World Ocean at the end of the sixteenth century, bringing about
radical changes. Humanity (and in the first place, the island of England) began to
grow accustomed to their “maritime existence, becoming conscious of itself as an
island in the middle of waters, like a ship.
But aquatic space is considerably different from land, it is unstable, hostile,
isolated, and constantly subject to change. There are no set pathways, nor
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obviously different orientations. The “nomos” of the sea itself entails the
transformation of the global establishment. The social, juridical, and ethical norms
are “fluid”. This birthed a new civilization. Schmitt considered this new time and
technical spurt, opening an era where industrialism must be included amongst
geopolitical phenomenon—a transition for humanity towards a sea “nomos.”
Thus, the geopolitical orientation of the Anglo-Saxon world’s “outer
crescent” acquired for Schmitt a social-political definition. The “nomos” of the seas
has an aspect that is hostile to traditionalist society. The geopolitical confrontation
of land powers against those of the sea acquires a most important historical,
ideological, and philosophical meaning.
8.4 Grossraum
Schmitt developed one more important geopolitical theory—the theory of
“great spaces” (Grossraum). This concept states that the process of state growth is
the ambition to acquire the greatest volume of territory. The principle of imperial
integration is reflected in the logical and natural human aspiration to synthesis.
The stages of a state’s territorial expansion thus, corresponding to the stages of the
human spirit’s movement towards universalism.
This geopolitical law spread in technological and economic spheres.
Schmitt shows that starting at some moment, the technological and economic
growth of the state required (quantitatively and qualitatively) territorial expansion.
He is not necessarily indicating colonization, annexation, and military invasion.
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The acquisition of Grossraum can occur by legal means—based on the acceptance
of several states or peoples of a unifying religious or cultural form.
In his 1940 text “Space and Large Space in People’s Rights,” Schmitt defined
Great Spaces thusly: The area of for the planning and organizing of human activity
correlates with actual and future developmental tendencies.” With the weight of
some of these nebulous formulations, Schmitt indicates as an example of an
intentional construction of a “Great Space,” as the implementation of the
American Monroe Doctrine.
Yet, Grossraum can, in a certain sense, be identified with the state, or
rather, with an Empire (das Reich), this conception goes beyond just the
conventional state. This new form of supranational unity is based on strategic,
geopolitical, and ideological factors.
Differing from Hitler’s Pan-Germanic appeal and Soviet internationalism,
Schmitt’s Grossraum was based in cultural and ethnic pluralism, with strict
autonomy, with centralism limited only to strategy and total loyalty to the highest
power. Schmitt emphasizes that the establishment of a new “Great Space” depends
not on scientific values of its own doctrine, not from cultural competition, nor
from economic development of its constituent parts, or even the ethnic and
territorial center which produces the impulse to integrate. Everything depends
only on the political will of those recognizing the historical necessity of this
geopolitical step.
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Schmitt anticipates in this doctrine the basic lines of thought in modern
integrative politics.

8.5 Total War and the Figure of the “Partisan”
Schmitt’s geopolitical motives are distinguishable in practically all topics of
which he discusses. In particular, he explained the connection between three
concepts— “Total Enemy”, “Total War,” and the “Total State.” From his point of
view the “total state” is the most complete form of government for the
traditionalist type, that is the place of development of the land “nomos.” It exists as
an unchangeable terrestrial land quality, despite the possibility of the state’s
evolution to the scale of Grossraum. The “total state” is a key principle of the “total
enemy” and “total war,” due to the representation of opposing “enemies” (and
Schmitt imparted huge significance when forming the concepts of
“friend”/”enemy”, amicus/hostis) built on the basis of itself, submitting the idea of
“war form,” in which actions of a Jus Bellum and participating only as a natural
contingency for a professional military. The peaceful parts of the population and
territory, in their own fashion are placed under the protection of the law and (at
least theoretically) removed from the path of military activity.
Liberal doctrines, which Schmitt uniquely linked with modern times and
corresponding to the “maritime civilization” and with the “nomos” of the sea,
denies the “total state,” thereby opening a path to “total war” and “total enemy.” In
1941, he wrote in the article “State Sovereignty and the Open Sea”:
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War on land is subject to juridical norms because it will be a war between
states, i.e. between armed forces of warring states. This rationalization
arises from its organically reaching beyond to the peaceful population and
the corresponding territories. War at sea rather, is not strictly between
defined forces and is subordinated tot the strongest adversaries because if
its bases in the concept of Total War.
An overall geopolitical picture, Schmitt wrote, could be reduced to this
civilizational dualism and confrontation of two Grossraums—the Anglo-Saxon
(England and America) and the European-continental, Eurasian. These two “Great
Spaces”—Talassocracy and Tellulocracy—between them lead to a planetary battle,
the last step towards universalism and transferring over to world dominion.
Schmitt persistently regarded any attempt to reduce this conflict to some kind of
strict juridical basis because the civilizational macro-conceptions of both “Great
Spaces” is based in the mutual-exclusivity of the “nomoses”—the “earth nomos”
and the “sea nomos.” The last disruptive element contributing to this was the
advent of aeronautics because “airspace” supports the structuralism of ethics and
rights even less than that of the sea.
At the end of his life Schmitt focused his influence on the figure of the
“Partisan.” Per Schmitt, this figure is the last representation of the “nomos” of the
earth, remaining faithful to his initial cause in spite of the “liquidation of
civilization” and the dissolution of its juridical-cultural base. “The Partisan” is
connected with his homeland through informal ties and the historical character of
this tie dictates the basics of his war, radically differently from more broad and
abstract norms. As to the universalism of the “maritime model” and “commercial
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ethics,” which, naturally covers the sphere of military activity, and the figure of the
“Partisan” acquires, per Schmitt, all the more civilizational significance because the
“Partisan” will carry on the last activity to remain in history, who’s defense (by any
means) of the “land order,” in the face of the talassocracy’s offensive. From here
arise its almost “soteriological” historical function.
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Section 9: Petr Nikolayevich Savitsky—“Eurasia—the Middle
of the Earth”
9.1 Eurasia’s Destiny
Petr Nikolayevich Savitsky (1895-1968)—is perhaps the first (and only)
Russian author who in every sense of the word can be called a geopolitician. He
received an education as an economist, studying as a pupil of V. Vernadsky and P.
Struya. Near the start of the war he was a cadet. He emigrated to Bulgaria after the
Revolution and after moved to Czechoslovakia in 1921. Together with Prince N.S.
Trubetskoi, he helmed the Eurasian movement, in which geopolitical factors
achieved a central role. Savitsky, to a greater degree than all the other Eurasianists,
was interested in geopolitics.
Savitsky’s worldview, like the majority of his fellow Eurasianists, was shaped
by the works of Slavophile writers by Danilevsky and especially Leontiev. This was
a strain of revolutionary Slavophilia linking the singular historical identity of
“Greater Russia,” not reducible to religion, or ethnic Slavic qualities. In this
respect, they were closer to Konstantin Leontiev, who formulated a most
important thesis—“Slavdom Yes, Slavism No,” meaning that the “ethnic and
linguistic closeness of the Slavic peoples is not a sufficient basis for describing it’s
uniform cultural character.” One of the favorite subjects for the Eurasian
movement was surprisingly similar to the German conservative revolutionaries.
Like the conservative revolutionaries, the Eurasianists strove to combine
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faithfulness to origins with the commercial qualities of the future, rooted in
Russian national traditions with social modernism, technological development,
and nontraditional political forms. Based on this, there were cautious, positive
relationships between Eurasianists in the Soviet State and the October Revolution.
Despite sympathy for the Soviets, a feeling which was characteristic not
only of a pro-Soviet wing of the Eurasianists (Parisian circles published the paper
“Eurasia”), whom Savitsky officially broke relations, but also of its most moderate
and “conservative” elements. After Soviet forces took Prague in 1945, Savitsky was
arrested and spent ten years in the camps. In the camps, he met the son of the
poet Nikolai Gumilyev, Lev, who became his student and later one of the great
modern Russian historians and ethnographers.
In 1956, Savitsky was rehabilitated and he returned to Prague, where he
died twelve years later.
9.2 Russia-Eurasia
Savitsky’s fundamental ideas is that Russia itself represents a special
civilizational formation differentiated through its quality of “medianity.” One of
his articles—“The Geographical and Geopolitical Basis of Eurasianism” (1933)—
began with the words “Russia has a much greater basis than China to be named
‘The Middle State.’”
If the “middleness” of Germany, mittelage, is organic in the European
context, and Europe itself is only the “Western Cusp,” of Eurasia, for Russia
occupies the coastal position on the continent. “Middleness” for Savitsky is the
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basis of historical identity—it is not part of Europe, nor an extension of Asia—an
indepent world standing alone and with a special spiritual-historical geopolitical
aspect, which Savitsky called “Eurasia.”
This concept denoted neither the mainland nor the continent, but the idea,
reflected in the Russian space and in Russian culture, was a distinct historical
paradigm for civilization. From the Russian role, Savitsky brought out the concept,
rigidly matching with Mackinder’s maps, only abstracted as “reavers of the land”
who represented “centripetal impulses travelling outwards from the geopolitical
axis of history,” which to Savitsky clearly designated the fate of Russian history,
Russian government, and Russian territory. Savitsky’s Russia-Eurasia can thus be
viewed in the same light as Ratzel’s raum and still closer to Schmitt’s grossraum.
If Mackinder claimed that the Heartland’s path travels through mechanical
impulses the creation of coastal zones (“inner crescents”) of its culture and history,
then Savitsky asserted Russia-Eurasia (=Mackinder’s heartland) possesses a
synthesis of world culture and world history unfolding in space and time. Thus,
Russia’s nature fits its culture.
In Savitsky’s geopolitical ideas, Russia is understood not as a national state,
but as a special type of civilization, established on the basis of several factors—
Slavic—Aryan culture, Turkic nomadism, and the Orthodox tradition. These
qualities together compose some king of unique, “middle” formation, in itself
representing a synthesis of world history.
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Savitsky’s Greater Russia can be considered not just a branch of the Eastern
Slavs, but a distinct empire formed on ethnicity, which possess Turkish and Slavic
substratum. This moment in itself is an important term—Turan.
9.3 Turan
Many Russian nationalists were scandalized by this appeal to a positive
orientation to Turanism. Savitsky indirectly justifies the Mongol-Tatar Yoke,
attributing “Russia’s geopolitical individuality and preservation of its spiritual
independence form the Roman-German world’s aggression.” This relationship to
Turkism was designed to start differentiating Russia-Eurasia from Europe and its
fate, predicated on Russia’s unique ethnicity.
“Without the Tatars there would be no Russia”—this is Savitsky’s thesis in
his article “The Steppe and the Sedentary” and it is key to the Eurasian formula.
From here, he switches to a purely geopolitical assertion:
Stated directly: in the history of the Western European space in the
maritime sense as equally, although polar opposites, in opposing the
natural Mongolian sense of the continent: between the Russian ‘walkers of
the land’ and the sweep of Russian military mastery—this is the spirit, the
sense of the continent.
And furthermore: “Russia—the heir to the Great Khans, continues the work of
Chingiz and Timur, unifiying…in themselves. simultaneously combining the
historical narratives of the ‘steppe’ and the ‘sedentary.’”
The fundamental duality of the Russian landscape—its division between
forest and steppe—was noticed more by the Slavophiles. Savitsky presented the
geopolitical idea of Russia-Eurasia as a synthesis of these two aspects—the
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European forest and the Asiatic steppe. The result is not so much a juxtaposition of
two geopolitical systems to each other, but as some kind of original and whole, due
to its own properties and methodological assessments.
Russia-Eurasia cannot be reduced to Turanism. It is something greater. But
regarding Eurasia, with all “coastal” zones considered “barbarous” Russians
identified “as the heirs to the Mongolian spirit” is provocative, opening the way for
the historical and spiritual supremacy of Russia.
9.4 The Place of Development
In Savitsky’s theories the concept of “development places” is a rule of great
importance. This term is presented as an almost complete analogue for raum as it
is described in Ratzel’s “Political Geography” and German geopolitics in general (+
Kjellen). This concept was reflected in the Eurasianists’ “organicism”—accurately
matching the German “organic” schools and contrasted starkly with Anglo-Saxon
pragmatic geopolitics. If Spykman was familiar with Savitsky’s works than his
indignation over “metaphysical nonsense” would be even more forceful than was
the case with Haushofer. In his text “The Geopolitical Organization of Russia,”
Savitsky writes: “The social-political environment and its territory should merge
into a single whole of geographical individualism or landscape.”
Land has the quality to be a “development place” in which objective and
subjective traits merge in an inseperable unity into something whole. This is a
conceptual synthesis. In the same text Savitsky continues: “Synthesis is necessary.
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To look at the social-historical environment and the study of its territory is
necessary.”
Savitsky is closer, with this, to Vidal de la Blache. The French geopolitician
justified the indivisibility of an independent French type of cultural unity
independent of the racial groups that have lived in Alsace-Lorraine. Savitsky
considered: “Russia-Eurasia to be a “development place,” a unified whole,” having
“geographic individuality,” and “simultaneous geographical, ethnic, economic, and
historic qualities, etc, and so on to landscape.”
Russia-Eurasia is this “development place,” which is integral to producing
the existence of more, smaller, “development places.” In Schmitt’s grossraum this
corresponds to a whole hierarchy of smaller raums.
Through the introduction of “development places” places to the
Eurasianists, they moved away from the positive necessity of analytically dividing
up historical phenomena, unraveling their mechanical systems—applying them
not only to the natural, but also cultural traits. The appeal of “development places”
and geographical individuality” caused the Eurasianists to avoid many of the
resentments from national racial, religious, cultural, linguistic, and ideological
problems. The intuitive feeling of all inhabitants of the “geographical pivot of
history” [towards geopolitical unity] acquires a new language, “syntheticism,” not
able to be reduced to the inadequate, fragmented, analytical concerns of Western
rationalism.
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In this way Savitsky carried on the Russian-intellectual tradition always
gravitating towards ideas of “wholeness” “sobornost,” “unity,” and etc.290
9.5 Ideocracy
The principle of “ideocracy” is very important in Savitsky’s theories. He
imagined that the Eurasian state would be constructed, arising from its initial
spatial impulses, from the top down and it follows that all of these strategies
should be created in accordance with the a priori idea; at the head of the structure
a class of “spiritual chiefs” should be established. This position is very close to
Schmitt’s theories on “volitional” “spiritual” impulses, stemming from their origin
in the grossraum.
Ideocracy assumed a non-pragmatic supremacy not a materialistic and
commercial approach to state building. The merits of “geographical identity,”
according to Savitsky, is the ability to rise above material limitations, organically
including the physical world in union of spiritual-creative impulses of global
historical making.
Ideocracy—a term which unites all forms of undemocratic illiberal forms of
rule, based in non-materialists and non-utilitarian motivations. Savitsky
consciously avoided refining this notion, which is incarnate in a theocratic
sobornost, and in populist monarchs, and in nationalist dictators, and in states of
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A Spiritual community of many jointly living people where the needs of the community
outweigh individualism.
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the Soviet type. The breadth of the term corresponds to the purely geopolitical
horizon of Eurasia, which covers vast historical and geographical expanse. This was
an attempt to more closely describe the continent’s intuitive will.
It is evident that ideocracy directly contradicts the pragmatic-commercial
approach, dominating the doctrines of Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. In this
fashion, the Russian Eurasianists brought to final clarity the ideological term,
which is reflective of the historical conflict between sea and land. The sea is liberal
democracy a “trading regime” of pragmatism. The land—an ideocracy (all
varieties), “hierarchical rule,” dominated by religious ideals.
Savitsky’s views on ideocracy resonated with the ideas of German
sociologists and economist Werner Sombart, who delineated all social models and
types into two classes—“the heroes” and “the merchants;” and the geopolitical
level the terms “hero” and “heroism” lose their pathetic metaphorical meaning and
become technical terms for both juridical and ethical specifications for ideological
rule.
9.6 The USSR and Eurasia
Petr Savitsky and, more widely Russian Eurasianists, played a huge role in
the development of geopolitics as a science. And it is strange how little attention
has been paid to this in western textbooks. In Savitsky’s works, we have a
completely conscious, responsive, and competent geopolitics, which fully and
specifically express the Heartland’s position, from its from its deepest part—
Russia—is its province. Savitsky’s geopolitical doctrine is the direct antithesis of
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the views of Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, Vidal de la Blache, and other
“Talassocrats.” It is only in his works that go as far to completely reveal the outline
of alternative doctrines; describing the ideological, economic, cultural, and ethnic
factors. If we are to use Carl Schmitt’s terminology, then Savitsky and the
Eurasianists are expressions of the “nomos of the land” in historical conditions
consistent with the ideology of “tellulocracy,” grossraum’s true meaning, an
alternative to the Anglo Saxon grossraum.
The Russian Eurasianists’ ideas match with the theories of the German
geopolitician-continentalists (Haushofer, Schmitt, etc.) who also attempted to
construct a geopolitical model that would be the antithesis to the strategy of the
“Sea Powers;” demonstrating that the Germans were only halfway down a path that
the Russians (and in the first place, Savitsky) had completely finished, with totality
and consistency, a complete worldview. This concept can be summarized by this
law:
The closer the viewpoint of the German continentalists is to the Russian
Eurasianists, the greater the Ostorietierung, the more logical and consistent
are their doctrines, effectiveness in political projects, and their
establishment on a geopolitical basis.291
In this line of thought, Savitsky was all the more closely approaching
German National-Bolshevism—especially Ernest Niekisch—who was perfectly
cognizant of the duality of Germany’s geopolitical position, whose “middleness”
was secondary compared to the absolute continental and cultural Russian
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Dugin uses quotation marks here to emphasize his own words.
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“middleness.” From here they conclude, Germans cannot pretend to have a role of
geopolitical synthesis, that is it must choose between a Western-Southern Catholic
slavophobia, of a Germany (together with Austria) in some respects “talassocratic”
(bourgeoisie) and a North-Eastern German-Slavic, socialistic, russophilia, the
protectors of Spartan Prussian. Niekisch belongs to the famous geopolitical
thesis—“Europe from Vladivostok to Fleesing,” and only in this approach can
German ways harmonize and fit in completely with continental Eurasianism.
Naturally, Hitler’s Austrian Catholic, anti-communist, slavophobia—despite the
attempts by some of the more historically responsible conservative revolutionaries
and geopoliticians—caused Germany to lose its historical place as result of its
nightmarish defeat, inflicted by the forces of the “eternal union” with which can
only ensure German participation in the global order of the tellulocracy.
The Soviet aspect of geopolitical thought in many ways coincides with the
concepts of Savitsky and other Eurasianists, although their direct influence on
Soviet leadership was effectively null: in many respects, the Smenovekhovtsy were
close to the National-Bolsheviks—especially Nikolai Ustryalov—had clear
influence on the Bolsheviks, especially Stalin, although never occupying important
posts and their lives often ended in the camps.292293 A group of Eurasianists—
Efron, Karsavin, and others—openly collaborated with the USSR, but received no
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The Smenovekhotsky were Russian emigres after the civil war who eventually supported
reconciliation with the Soviet Union, rather than its destruction.
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Ustryalov was the leader of this movement, and popularized the term National Bolshevik, he was
killed during Stalin’s purges in 1937 after returning to the USSR in 1935.
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gratitude.294 However, an analysis of Soviet foreign policy—until the start of
perestroika—leads to the conclusion that it consistently followed a Eurasianist
course, never deviating from it.
And here we can make an assumption: either there was a kind of
independent organization with in the Soviet regime who were guided by Savitsky’s
ideals, adapting to political realities and cloaking them in official “Marxist” lexicon,
or it’s situation in the objective position of the Heartland compelled the USSR to
take steps which would be made consciously by the continental state—Eurasia.
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Lev Karsavin and Sergei Efron.
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Section 10: Geopolitics as an Instrument of National Politics
10.1 Planetary Dualism—the Basic Law of Geopolitics
A summary of this brief introduction to the foundation of the geopolitical
science can be made with some general conclusions.
Despite the diversity of points of view in these works, we are dealing with a
singular view of the world, which can be termed geopolitics. This world view aims
to include in its analysis historical processes, inter-peoples and interstate reactions
among several disciplinary approaches—geographical, political, ideological,
ethnographical, economic, and etc. This provides the composition for the basic
character of all geopolitical doctrines—striving for interdisciplinary synthesis.
The most broadly shared of all the geopolitical methodological formulae is
the claim of a fundamental historical dualism between the Land, “tellulocracy,”
“nomoses” of the Earth, Eurasia, the heartland, “the middle land,” “ideocratic
civilization,” and “the geographical pivot of history” on one side, and the Sea,
Talassocracy, Sea Power, the “nomoses” of the Sea, Atlanticists, the Anglo-Saxon
world, trading civilizations, “outer island crescents,” on the other. This can be
described as the main law of geopolitics. All postulations of this dualism count in
this meaning. Despite differences, not one of the founders of the geopolitical
sciences calls into question the fact of this conflict. In its significance, it is
comparable to the universal laws of gravity in physics.
10.2 Geopolitics Cannot Be Biased
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Another feature of the views of the founders of geopolitics is their constant
political commitment. From this springs the obvious prejudice of all of them,
without exception. Geopolitics, proceeding on a scientific basis, is obliged to
acquire its own its own place at one of the geopolitical poles; from this will depend
on the angle of view, under which all world processes can be analyzed. In the
history of geopolitics, we do not find one single author who was indifferent to the
destiny of his own state and people, sharing its basic ethnic and historical
orientation. This is especially starkly manifested at the extreme poles—AngloSaxon authors implacably and unanimously following the logos and values of the
system of Sea Power, talassocracy, formulating their own positions unconditionally
aligned with Atlanticism; the Russia Eurasianists were equally consistent in their
faithfulness of the heartland’s ideals—never questioning the absolute ethnic and
historical superiority of the ideocracy of Russia-Eurasia.
More complicated are the works of the French, who theoretically have the
choice of self-identification—either talassocracy or tellulocracy. In the first case,
solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon world, in the second—Germonophilia. Both
variants undoubtedly have enjoyed national sympathies. Theoretically both of
these tendencies were present amongst French geopoliticians, but the more
graceful Geopolitical concepts were produced by those in the “Atlanticist group”.
followed by Vidal de la Blache, who became established as the central figure in the
field. His geopolitics were antipodal to Laval and de Gaulle and theirs were inferior
to his from this point of view.
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Germany too has a dualistic situation. If in general its geopolitical thought
was predominantly oriented towards continental and “Eurasianist” schools, this
orientation organically complicated relations with the Slavic world, Asia, and
especially with Russia. Thus, there organically existed and Germany attempted to
voluntarily equate its middle-European position with middle-Eurasianism,
ignoring, so persistently, the greater historical significance of Russia-Eurasia, that
in both World Wars Germany was forced to wage war against not only the
talassocratic powers, but against its logical European allies—Russia (USSR).
Geopolitically, it can be called Germany’s “non-Eurasian” continental character.
This arrangement summarizes in a geopolitical formula all German history and
predetermines the very structure of the German national establishment.
It is necessary for geopoliticians to initially define their own position on the
world map and its belts (Mackinder’s schema are an extremely clear illustration of
this idea), this science was influenced by representatives of the great powers
having ambition to become “a world power” (weltmacht), a “superpower,” aiming
for global dominance.
The Americans Mahan and Spykman and the Englishman Mackinder
represent the “island crescent.” They are the “advocates” for Atlanticism and
talassocracy.
Vidal de la Blache (and his school) represent Atlanticist France. Laval and
de Gaulle were inclined towards continentalism, “Europeanism,” and antiAtlanticism. Hence, their mutual Germonophilia, which brought them closer in
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spite of the fact that they belong to two oppositional camps: Laval headed the
collaborationist Vichy government and de Gaulle—the chief of the anti-fascist
French army.
The Germans Ratzel, Haushofer, and Schmitt identified Germany with the
axis of land, tellulocracy, and strove to establish Germany as a “great space,” which
could confront the Anglo-Saxon talassocracy. In this fashion, they are joined by the
Swede Rudolf Kjellen, who; however, was closer to middle Europe, a representative
of German-European space, and not as a “narrowly-Swedish” nationalist. Ernst
Niekisch, Freidrich Georg Junger, Artur Muller van den Brook, and others—went
still further, deeming Germany’s future was only in spatial integration with
Eurasian Russia.
Finally, the Russian Eurasianists (Savitsky, Trubetskoy, etc.) offered the
most complete version of continentalism, the most radical expression of the
“nomos” of the Earth, tellulocracy.
The lack of any exceptional names amongst the geopoliticians from other
countries (although there were some from Italy, Spain Belgium, Romania, Holland,
and others) is explained by secondary states in terms of power only indirectly are
concerned with geopolitical dualism, their influence on the global conflict
unnoticeable, and furthermore its geopolitical essence, its acuity, its actuality, its
“fateful” measurements, are completely irrelevant.
10.3 The Fate of the Scientists—The Fate of the Powers
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The citizenship of geopolitical scientists is the most direct factor
influencing their views. The connection here is obvious. Geopoliticians, in fact, are
the people who with the greatest perspicacity and capability to recognize historical
tendencies of global developments in the spatial arena, understood as the place of
its state and its people in this context, formulating foundational and more
reflective projects for the future. Therefore, they were often either directly or
indirectly involved in world history, in ways that materialized through groups,
parties, leaders, and in completely other ways, instantly relevant slogans
There is one more interesting and consistent pattern. The extant of
influence geopoliticians have on power, the inverse connection between scientific
design and the political course of international relations of their state, varies
widely.
Mackinder, Spykman, and Mahan held high posts in their governments,
their political activity having a most direct result, their personal influence on
Anglo-Saxon politics was obvious and huge. Despite some friction with the
scientific world in their countries and some (tactically) concealed the full meaning
“maritime civilization” as a whole, they lived their lives with distinction, enjoying
all types of support their lives and careers were undoubtedly successful.
The experience was different for the continentalist geopoliticians. Vidal de
la Blache was considered just a geographer, aiming to expand the sphere of his
discipline to political power. His relationship with his government was respectful,
but as a whole indifferent, despite many practical principles (generally outlined in
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“Eastern France”) being put into practice. He did not receive the prestige of the
Anglo-Americans, but his theoretical legacy must be taken into account.
The situation was more serious for the Germans—especially Haushofer and
Schmitt. In the Weimar Republic and under Hitler, their relationship with the
changing waves had them pass from decided influences with power to direct
repression. Compared to the “talassocratic” geopoliticians their fates were tragic
their careers zigzagged, and in their defining moments even becoming victims of
the regime whose national goals roughly coincided with their own. Here, there was
no honor or glory, just historical influence alternating with persecution.
And for the Eurasianists, the picture was even more tragic. Here, there was
no direct influence, not one mention in official sources, only the camps, exile,
arrests, and persecution to the fullest extent; and still, the defining moment in
Soviet history leaves the impression that the fundamental decisions at the
international level were made by followers of Petr Savitsky, verified at every stage
by Eurasianist publications, the watershed moment arrived in 1989 when it became
clear that some in Soviet leadership were incapable of interpreting logically
traditional foreign policy, and as a result the gigantic Eurasianist organism
disintegrated rapidly, created with such exertion by three generation, withstanding
wars, destitution, suffering, and backbreaking labor.
The role of geopoliticians and the extant of influence they have on power
decreases along a west to east axis. The relevance of Mackinder and Spykman
contrast with consistent threats to Schmitt from the SS and the persecution of
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Haushofer (his son was shot), and to an even greater degree the camps of Savitsky
and Karsavin.295 It is striking that ultimately, it was the countries who listened
more closely to their geopoliticians and appreciated them, that achieved
tremendous results and almost completely achieved world dominance. Germany
too paid for its inattention to Haushofer’s theses on the “continental bloc,” and for
half a century it would fall from history, suffering a monstrous defeat and fading
away into a political nonentity. The USSR did not pay attention to the works of
more responsible, deep and far sighted Russian patriots, without a fight or
resistance in almost all situations, so that following Germany—would inevitably
fade away, drastically shrinking in space and the economic and social structures
have become ruins.
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Efron was killed in 1941 on Stalin’s orders during the purges.
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Part 2, Section 3: Globalism
2.3.1 The Prehistory of Globalism
The concept of “globalism” arose long before the West’s ultimate victory in
the Cold War.
The idea of globalism can be reduced to postulating an inevitable, total
global integration—a transition from a pluralism of governments, peoples, nations,
and cultures to a uniform world, One World.
The origins of this idea can be discerned in some utopian and chiliastic
movements dating back to the middle ages and even deeper in antiquity.
Fundamentally, in its representation that in some culminating moment of history
will occur that gathers all the peoples of the earth in One Kingdom, which will no
longer know anymore contradictions, tragedy, conflicts, and problems
characteristic of regular world history. Besides a pure, mystical version of globalist
utopias there were its rationalistic versions, once of which could be considered the
doctrine of “Third Era” positivist August Comte or the humanistic eschatology of
Lessing.
The globalist idea was more often characterized by moderate European and
generally English socialism (some of them were combined in the “Fabian Society”).
Communists spoke of a single World State. In different ways, analogical globalist
organizations were formed beginning at the close of the nineteenth century and
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centering on global business figures, for example Sir Cecil Rhodes—organizer of
the round table group, members of which were supposed to have been
“contributing to the establishment of unimpeded trade for the whole world and
creating a single ‘World State.’” Socialist motives often were interwoven within
liberal-capitalism and communists were flanked in these organizations by
representatives of great financial capital. All were united by their faith in the
utopian idea of a united planet.
It is revealing that the most well-known of these organizations, the League
of Nations—later the U.N. and UNESCO, were continuations of exactly these
globalist circles, who had great influence in world politics.
By the end of the twentieth century, these globalist organizations, avoiding
unnecessary publicity and often cloaked in “secrecy,” had exchanged many names.
There existed a “universal movement for a world confederation,” led by Garry
Davis, “the federalist union,” and “the crusade for world government,” and
organization of English MP Henry Osborne in 1946).
As the whole conceptual and strategic power of the west was concentrated
in the USA, naturally its government became the primary headquarters of
globalism, representatives of which formed parallel power structures, comprised of
advisers, analysts, and centers of strategic development.
Three fundamental globalist organizations have evolved, the existence of
which have only recently been discovered by the general public of the West.
Unlike official structures these groups have benefitted vastly from large,
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unregulated design and development because they were released from formal and
fixed procedures regulating the activities of the U.N. commissions and the like.
First is the “Council of Foreign Relations” (C.F.R.). Its creator was the
greatest American banker—Morgan. This unofficial organization was busy working
on American strategy on a planetary scale, which is connected to the ultimate goal
to completely unify the planet and establish a World Government. Moreover, in
1921 the affiliate “the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace” arose,
consisting of high-ranking politicians attached to the globalist viewpoint on the
planet’s future. Since the majority of the C.F.R.’s members were simultaneously
high-ranking dignitaries of the Freemasons and it can be assumed, that their
geopolitical projects had some kind of humanistic-mystical dimension.
In 1954 the second globalist structure, the Bilderberger Group/Club was
established. It unites not only American Atlanticists, politicians, financiers, and
intellectuals, but their European colleagues as well. From the American side, it was
presented exclusively by members of the C.F.R. and the group was considered its
international extension.
In 1973 activists of the Bilderberger Group established the third important
globalist structure, the “Trilateral Commission.” It is led by Americans and is
included as a part of the C.F.R. and the Bilderberger Group. Apart from its
headquarters in the USA (address: 345 E. 46th St, New York), it has two additional
headquarters in Europe and Japan.

208

The “Trilateral” commission is named for one of the fundamentals of
geopolitics. United under the aegis of America, three large spaces—the
commission’s namesake—will lead technological development and market
economies:
1. The American Space, including North and South America
2. The European Space
3. The Pacific Space, controlled by Japan
At the head of the most important globalist groups—Bilderberger and
Trilateral—is a high-ranking member of C.F.R. the notable banker David
Rockefeller, owner of “Chase Manhattan Bank.”
Except for him, at the center of every globalist project are permanent analysts,
geopoliticians, and strategists of the Atlanticists: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry
Kissinger. It also includes the famous George Ball.
The basic line of every globalist project consists of the transition to a single
world system under the strategic domination of the West and “progressive,”
“humanistic,” and “democratic” values. For this, they have worked out parallel;
structures—consisting of politicians, journalists, intellectuals, financiers, analysts,
and so on who were supposed to prepare the ground before the globalist project of
World Government could be widely organized because without preparation it
would encounter powerful psychological opposition from peoples and states not
willing to dissolve their originality into a planetary melting pot.
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The globalist project, being developed and held by these organizations, was not
homogenous. There existed two if its original versions, which differed in method,
but were theoretically in pursuit of the same goal.
2.3.2 The Theory of Convergence
The first and most pacifistic and “conciliatory” version of globalism is
known as “convergence theory.” Developed in the 1970s in the bowels of the C.F.R.
by analysts of the “leftist” group under the leadership of Zbigniew Brzezinski. This
theory assumes that it would be possible to overcome the ideological and
geopolitical dynamism of the Cold War through the creation of a new culturalideological civilization type, which would be an intermediate between socialism
and capitalism, between pure Atlanticism and pure continentalism.
Soviet Marxism was considered a barrier which could be overcome by
moving towards its moderate, social-democratic, revisionist version through a
refusal of the theses of the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” “class war,” “the
nationalization of the means of production,” and “the abolition of private
property.” In its turn, the West’s capitalism was supposed to restrict the free
market introducing partial governmental economic regulation and so forth. A
community of cultural orientation could possibly be found in the Enlightenment
tradition and humanism, which would be constructed in western democratic
regimes and the social ethics of communism (in its softer, social-democratic
versions). A World Government, which might appear in basic “convergence
theory,” and was conceived by Moscow’s admission, to Atlanticist management
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jointly with Washington. In this case, this would commence an era of universal
peace, the Cold War would end, and peoples could be released from the weight of
geopolitical stresses.
Here, it is important to catch the parallel with the technological transition
from systems rooted in “talassocracy”296 to “efirocracy297”: globalist politicians
started to see the planet not through the eyes of dwellers of the western continents
surrounded by the sea, like traditional globalists, but through the eyes of
“astronauts in cosmic orbit.” In this case, their view really represents One World.
The globalist centers have their corresponding ones in Moscow. A key
figure here was the academic Gvishiani298, director of the Institute of the Systems
of Development, which is a sort of affiliate of the “Trilateral Commission” in the
USSR. But particularly successful were its activities among extreme left parties in
Western Europe, where it set them down the path to “Eurocommunism” and it is
considered a fundamental concentric base for global convergence.
2.3.3 The Global Victory of the West
Theories of convergence were ideologically based and referenced by Mikhail
Gorbachev and his advisors while implementing Perestroika. A few years after

296

Naval based.

297

Airspace based.

298

A murky figure, there are references to a D.Gvishiani known for mathematical economic analysis
and the organization he led was noted for a large proportion of Jewish members. His surname is
Ukrainian (Soviet Economic Thought and Political Power in the USSR, Aron Katsenelinboigen).
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beginning Perestroika, a similar project began to be realized in China, with
representatives of the “Trilateral Commission” installed in the late 1970s. But, the
Chinese and Russian “Perestroikas” would have different fates. China insisted on
an “equitable” distribution of the roles and Soviet shifts in ideology towards the
West on the side of Socialism led the USSR to famously embark on a path of
further concessions.
Following globalist logic, Gorbachev began structuring the organization of
the Soviet space in “democratic” and “liberal” ways. First, this impacted the nations
of the Warsaw Pact, and then the USSR’s republics. This started with the reduction
of strategic armaments and ideological convergence with the West. But, in this
case, one should pay heed to the fact that the years of Gorbachev’s rule coincided
with a period of control in the USA by the Republicans, Reagan and Bush Sr.
Moreover, Reagan was the only President in recent years to consistently refuse to
participate in every globalist organization. By conviction he was a rigid,
uncompromising, and consistent Atlanticist and free marketer not inclined to
compromise with “the left” even in its mild democratic or social-democratic forms.
Consequently, Moscow’s steps in the direction of convergence and the foundation
of a World Government—with significant weight given to the governments of the
Eastern Bloc—were from opposing poles—having not a few unfavorable
ideological obstacles. Reagan, the Atlanticist (later Bush), simply used Gorbachev’s
globalist reforms for purely utilitarian ends. The voluntary concession of the
Heartland was not accompanied by relevant concessions in maritime power and
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the West has not arrived at a compromise—neither geopolitically, nor
ideologically—with a self-liquidating Eurasia. NATO has not dissolved, nor left
Europe or Asia. Liberal-democratic ideology is stabilizing its position more and
more.
In this case, Globalism has not come forward independently of geopolitical
doctrine realized in practice through the pragmatic use of instruments of the Cold
War, from logic, which based on the theories of Mackinder and Mahan, has not
been rejected in the USA.
2.3.4 “The End of History” of Francis Fukuyama
After the breakup of the USSR and the victory of the West, the Atlanticistglobalist project had to either be destroyed or change its logic.
The new version of globalism in the Post-Soviet era was Francis Fukuyama’s
doctrine—published in the early 1990s in an article, “The End of History.” It may
be discussed as the basis for the ideas of neo-globalism.
Fukuyama continues to follow the version of an historical process.
Humanity, from the “law of might,” “obscurantism,” and “irrational management
of social reality” of the Dark Ages moved towards the ranks of the most reasonable
and logical—embodied in capitalism, modern western civilizations, free markets,
and liberal-democratic ideology. History and its progress endured only on account
of irrational factors, which gradually cede their places to the law of reason, a total
monetary equivalency, and other similar goals. The fall of the USSR marked the
defeat of a last bastion of “irrationality.” In this fashion to the end of History and
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the start of a distinct planetary existence, which would occur under the guidance
of Markets and Democracy to unite the world in a coherent, rational, functional
machine.
This New Order, still universally based in purely Atlanticist systems, goes
beyond Atlanticism and all regions of the world will begin to be reorganized on the
new model—centered on the greatest economic development.
2.3.5 “Geoeconomics” of Jacques Attali
European authors have analogues to Fukuyama’s theories. Jacques Attali,
being a longtime advisor to French President Francoise Mitterand, and then
Director of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, explored a
similar theory in his book “Lines on the Horizon.”
Attali considers the present moment the onset of the Third Era, the “era of
money,” which is an equally universal goal, by luring all to digital expressions of
materialism—with these its extremely simple to rule in the most rationalistic
manner. This approach of Attali’s is itself connected with the arrival of a messianic
era understood in a Jewish-Kabbalist context (to read more on this aspect he
develops it in another book, specially dedicated to a messiah, “He Arrives.” This
separates him from Fukuyama, who strictly stays within the limits of pragmatism
and utilitarianism.
Jacques Attali submits his version of the future, which has “already arrived.”
Dominating the entire planet will be a single liberal-democratic ideology, market
systems, and together with the development of information technology, the world
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will become unified and dominated by homogeneity—geopolitics and history will
be relegated to the background. During the “Third Era,” geopolitical dynamism
will be abrogated.
And, the unified world would receive a new geopolitical structuralism on
this occurring, based on the principles of “geoeconomics.” The first conception of
“geoeconomics” was developed by historian Fritz Ringer and popularized by
Ferdinand Braudel.
“Geoeconomics” is a distinct version of globalist geopolitics, which regards
geography, culture, ideology, ethnicity, religion, and the like as not being prime
factors; the true essence of this approach is pure economic reality and its
relationship to space. For contemporary geoeconomists it is unimportant what
people reside here or there, what their history is, or cultural traditions, and so on.
It all boils down to where global exchange centers, useful minerals, information
hubs, and very large spaces are located.
“Geoeconomics” dovetails with political reality as if a World Government
and unified planetary state exists.
The geoeconomical approach of Attali leads to the highlighting of three
important regions, which in a unified world will compose the centers of new
economic spaces.
1. The American Space: Finishing the unification of both Americans in a
single, financial-manufacturing zone.
2. The European Space: Emerging out of the economic integration of Europe.
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3. The Pacific Region: A zone of “new prosperity,” possessing some competing
centers—Tokyo, Taiwan, Singapore, and so forth. (12)
In Attali’s opinion, between these three globalist there would not be any
particular differences or contradictions, so that in economical and ideological
types they would be strictly identical. The single difference will be simply
geographical location of its developed centers, around which will be structurally
concentrated its less developed regions, located in nearby spaces. This concentric
restructuring can only truly happen at “the end of history,” or in other words, upon
the end of traditional reality as dictated by geopolitics.
Geopolitical-civilizational dynamism will be canceled. The lack of a pole in
opposition to Atlanticism has led to a drastic rethinking of spaces. This has
commenced the era of geoeconomics.
In Attali’s model can be found the ultimate expression of the idea, which has
been at the foundation of the “Trilateral Commission” and political-conceptual
instrument being developed and realized for similar projects.
It is revealing that the leadership of the “Trilateral Commission” (David
Rockefeller, Georges Berthoin as its chief of the European branch, and Henry
Kissinger) visited Moscow in January 1989 and were received by USSR President
Gorbachev. Alexander Yakovlev299 was present, as well as several different upper
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Known for being the architect as glasnost
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echelon Soviet Leaders: Medvedev300, Falin301, Akhromeyev302, Dobrynin303,
Chernyaev304, Arbatov305, and Prymakov306. And Jacques Attali himself supported
close contacts with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
One thing is certain: the transition to geoeconomic logic and neoglobalism was
possible only after the geopolitical self-liquidation of the Eurasianist USSR.
Neoglobalism is not a direct continuation of historical globalism, which
initially expected the presence of a final model of socialist, leftist elements. This
intermediate variant between proper globalism and Atlanticism.
2.3.6 Poststructuralist Globalism of Professor Santoro307
There is a more detailed version of neoliberalism. One of the most vivid is
the futurist geopolitical concept developed at the Milanese Institute for the Study
of International Politics (ISPI) under the leadership of Professor Carlo Santoro.
According to Santoro’s model, in the present moment humanity is
inhabiting a period of transition from a bipolar world to a globalist version of
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Longtime foreign policy expert and academic, fluent in English and known for appearing in US
media.
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Foreign Minister and intelligence chief of the USSR and expert on the Middle East, fluent in
Arabic.
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multipolarity (understood geopolitically, as in Attali). International institutions
(like the U.N. and so on) represent an achievable development for the optimistic
globalism of Fukuyama, which is that they would become the core of a World
Government presented by Santoro as ineffectual and mirroring the outdated logic
of bipolar geopolitics. Additionally, the entire world bears a firm imprint from the
Cold War—the geopolitical logic of which remained domination. Santoro foresaw
that this situation cannot but end in a period of civilizational catastrophe.
He expounds further on the scenario of this supposed catastrophe:
1. The further weakening of the role of international institutions.
2. The swelling of nationalist tendencies among nations, including the
Warsaw Pact and the third world, this will bring chaotic processes.
3. The disintegration of traditional blocs (this does not involve Europe) and
progressing the decay of existing governments.
4. Starting with an era of small, middle-intensity wars the results of which will
develop new geopolitical formations.
5. The threat of planetary chaos will force the varied blocs to accept the
necessity of creating new international institutions possessing huge author
that actually denotes the establishment of a World Government.
6. The final establishment of a global government under the aegis of a new
international events (World Government). (13)
This model is in the middle between globalist optimism of Francis Fukuyama
and the Atlanticist pessimism of Samuel Huntingdon.
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Part 4: The Geopolitical Future of Russia, Section 4: The
Redistribution of the World
4.5 An Empire of Many Empires
The New Empire, the construction of which would be a global response, is
the planetary civilizational mission of the Russian people—a super-project having
many sublevels. This New Empire, the Eurasian Empire, will have completely
differentiated structures within which consisting of separate parts of varying
degrees of interdependence and integration. It is completely clear that the New
Empire will not be the Russian Empire, nor the Soviet Empire.
The foundational integrative moment of this New Empire will be a battle
with Atlanticism and a strong rebuff to market liberals, the “Naval,” “Carthaginian”
civilizations, which today are embodied in the USA and the planetary politics,
economic, and military structures, which serve Atlanticism. For this battle to be a
success, it is necessary to establish a gigantic geopolitical continental bloc having
strategic unity. The strategic unity of the continental borders of the New Empire
will be united and organized indivisibly in military-strategic thought and will
impose political constraints under which all blocs that will become a part of the
New Empire will be politically organic in one category, with the one prohibition
against serving Atlanticist geopolitical interests, leaving the strategic alliance,
harming continental security. On this and only on this level will the New Empire
be a holistic geopolitical formation.
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At the next, lower level the New Empire will itself be represented in “a
Confederation of Large Spaces” or Secondary Empires. From between these, four
foundational empires should be highlighted. The European Empire in the West
(around Germany and Central Europe), the Pacific Empire in the West (around
Japan), the Central Asian Empire in the South (around Iran), and the Russian
Empire in the Center (around Russia). It is completely logical that the central
position is the chief one in this project, since the territorial cohesion and
uniformity of the remaining constituent gigantic continental blocs depends on it.
Moreover, separate independent large spaces will exist—apart from the specific
Indian bloc, the Pan-Arabic world, a Pan-African union, and possibly the specific
region of China—whose status is hard to determine. Each of the Secondary
Empires will be based on the particular racial, cultural, religious, political, or
geopolitical integrative factors, which in each case might differ. The degree of
integration of the empires themselves will vary by amount depending on the
concrete ideological basis on which this or that empire will form.
Inside these Secondary Empires there also will be lesser ethnic, national,
and religious units functioning on a confederative principle that, big or small,
might be roughly called “countries” or “states.” Naturally, sovereignty in these
“countries” will have significant limitations, first and foremost in strategy (arising
from all the principles of the continental New Empire), and secondly in the
connections established and entered into by specific large spaces—and in this
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question the principle will be extremely flexibly applied to differentiations
accounting for the historical, spiritual, geographical, and racial features of the
region.
Greater Russia, for example, can be considered like a separate people or
even “country” within the framework of the Russian Empire together with
Ukrainians, Belorussians, possibly the Serbs, and so on, but at the same time all of
these are closely connected with the jurisdiction of Slavic-orthodox types incarnate
in these governmental systems. The Russian Empire will simultaneously hinge on
the Eurasian Empire, the New Empire, the strategic interests of which will be
above the national-racial and confessional interests of the Eastern Orthodox Slavs.
The same might be said, for example, about the French, who will remain a
nation or “country,” within the framework of the European Empire, together with
Germans and Italians. Connecting them is the general European imperial
traditions, the Christian religion, and belonging to the Indo-European race. But
that same European Empire, in its turn, will be subordinate to the strategic
imperatives of the great continental New Empire.
The same thing will take place in Middle Asia, in the Pacific space, in the
Arab world, in Black Africa, in India, and so forth.
While at the global level, for the construction of a planetary New Empire
the chief “scapegoat” will namely be the USA—the undermining of whose power
which (up to the complete destruction of its geopolitical constructs) will be
realized systematically and uncompromisingly by the participants of the New
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Empire. The Eurasian Project presupposes in this its relationship of Eurasian
expansion in South and Central America to remove its output from under the
control of the North (here, the Hispanic factor could be used as a traditional
alternative to the Anglo-Saxon) and also to provoke every kind of destabilization
and separatism within the borders of the USA (it might be possible to lean on the
political forces of the African-American racists). The ancient Roman formula of
“Carthage must be destroyed,” will become the absolute motto of the Eurasian
Empire, because itself will absorb the essence of all geopolitical planetary strategy
awakening to its continental mission.
The specifics in clarifying the status of this or that people, one “country” or
another, one or another “Empire of a Large Space,” in the framework of the general
continental bloc will actually become realized only after geopolitical unification,
after, the establishment of necessary pivots, and only then European peoples and
states can decide their own internal problems with total freedom, without pressure
from Atlanticist forces, which are principally interested only in not allowing
harmony, prosperity, independence, dignity, and the heyday of tradition.
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Part 5: The Interior Geopolitics of Russia, Section 5: The
Threat of the West
5.1 The Two Wests
The problem of organizing space in Western Europe is that topic which
composes basic geopolitics as like the sciences. Western Europe is the Rimland of
Eurasia, and the Rimland is the most complete, single-valued, and historically
identifiable. In relation to Russia itself the Heartland’s West, on the whole, itself
represents the chief planetary protection from the sector of “Coastal Civilizations,”
which fully accepts its functions as a complete Talassocracy and identifies its fate
with the Sea. At the vanguard of the process was England, but every remaining
European country has taken the baton of industrialization, technological
development, and normative values of “Free Trade,” more or less entering into the
Talassocratic ensemble.
In the course of developing historically the final geographical picture of the
West, the championship was passed from England’s Island to the continental
America, especially the USA. Thus, the maximal incarnation of a talassocracy in its
strategic, ideological, economic, and cultural aspects has become the USA and its
control of NATO.
This fully geopolitical fixation of planetary power helps the pole of
Atlanticism and talassocracy move across the Atlantic to the American continent.
Europe itself (even the West, with the exception of England) from the center of
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Talassocracy becomes a “buffer zone,” “coastal belt,” and “strategic appendage” of
the USA.
This transfer of the talassocratic pivot from the ocean somewhat changes
the geopolitical configuration. A century ago Europe (England and France) was the
main enemy of Russia, but after World War II this region lost meaningful strategic
autonomy having transformed into strategic colonies of the USA. This
transformation strictly corresponds with that “view from the sea,” which
characterizes the typical colonial relationship to the motherland like in any
talassocracy. If early “coastal countries” had their potential character, active in the
geopolitical formation of “Islandic England,” but now it accurately corresponds to
the allocation of power. The American geopolitical reality has become a
completely independent pole of the West, with Europe a cultural projection. In the
absolute sense of the word, Western Europe has transformed from a metropolis to
a colony. Everything is situated in correspondence with the classical logic of
talassocratic geopolitics.
Thus, in the present time, the geopolitical problem of the West in its wider
sense for Russia is the disintegration in two—the West of America and the West of
Europe. From the geopolitical perspective, these two realities have different
meanings. The West of America is the total geopolitical enemy of Russia—the pole
of the direct opposite of Eurasian tendencies—the headquarters and center of
Atlanticism. The geopolitical position of war with America constituted and
constitutes the essence of all Eurasian geopolitics, starting in the middle of the
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twentieth century when the role of the USA became evident. In its relations from
the Heartland position, it is clearly necessary to actively oppose the USA’s
Atlanticist geopolitics at every level, in all regions of the Earth, striving to unleash
maximum demoralization, deception, and in the final account, the defeat of the
enemy. It is generally important herewith to introduce geopolitical chaos within
the American daily experience by encouraging all manner of separatism, ethnic
diversity, social and racial conflict, actively supporting every extremist dissident
movement, racist sectarian groups, and destabilizing the political processes within
America. While simultaneously having the essence of supporting isolationist
tendencies in American politics, theses of those circles (often right-wing
Republicans), which believe the USA should confine itself to its own internal
problems. That position Russia has been placed in is supremely favorable, even if
“isolationists” will be undermined by the framework of the original version of the
Monroe Doctrine, such is the organic influence of the USA in the two Americas.
This does not mean that Eurasia should refrain from destabilizing the Latin
American world to withdraw individual regions from under the USA’s control.
Every geopolitical level of the USA should be involved simultaneously, similar to
the anti-Eurasianism of the Atlanticists: “sponsoring” the disintegration of the
strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), governmental unity (USSR), and furthering ethnoterritorial problems under the guise of regionalism, Russia accomplished its
progressive disintegration up to its complete destruction. The Heartland will force
the Sea Power to pay in the same coin. This is basic symmetrical logic. All this
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constitutes to the objective of Russian “external politics,” relative to the USA,
therefore more detailed analysis goes beyond the scope of this work.
The second reality, although denoted by the term “West,” has another
meaning. This Europe, the geopolitical essence of which in the last decades has
sharply changed. Having been traditional metropolises for different parts of the
world, was first strategically, culturally, economically, politically, etc. colonial.
American colonialism differed from the more explicit and cruel forms of the past,
but its essence remained the same. In the present moment Europe does not have
geopolitical and geographical volition of its own. Functionally, it is confined to
following the USA on an ancillary basis and being the most likely setting in a
probable conflict with Eurasia. This position automatically leads to the antiAmerican line becoming the general geopolitical alternative to European states,
uniting them in a single project, which never could have existed earlier. The
unification of Europe in Maastricht is the first signal of the emergence of Europe as
a whole and self-sufficient organism pretending so as to return historical
significance and geopolitical sovereignty. Europe does not want to be Russia or
America. Its will is manifested in all capacities.
Then stands the question: what in broad terms is Eurasia’s relationship to
its western peninsula?
From simply the geopolitical perspective, Eurasia is uniquely interested in
bringing Europe out from under the USA’s Atlanticism. It is the priority task. In
the West, Russia should have Sea Borders—it is a strategic geopolitical imperative
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in the development of Eurasia. The absence of these borders, together with their
land line crossing Europe in the middle, artificially and forcibly led to the final
outcome of the geopolitical loss of the USSR. Accordingly, the task is not to repeat
the mistakes and rectifying the position. Only then will Eurasia be free from Sea
Power, when its strategic borders in the North, East, South, and West will become
Oceans, like in America’s case. Only then can a civilizational duel take place on
equal terms. Therefore, Russia has two paths—a military occupation of Europe, or
a strategic reorganization of the European space, which will be made in the
geopolitical sector by a secure strategic alliance with Moscow –preserving its
sovereignty, autonomy, and its autarky. The first variant is so unrealistic it cannot
be discussed seriously. The second variant—complex, but feasible—has been
carried out on in Europe’s transition to a colony over the past half century, having
left the track of serious European consciousness.
A friendly Europe might arise in this case only if it is unified. In the case of
the Atlanticist opposition, the enemy finds greater freedom in carrying out
fragmentation and schism in the European bloc, provoking conflict analogical to
World War II. Therefore, Moscow should contribute maximally to European
unification and generally support Central European states, and in the first place,
Germany. The alliance of France and Germany, the Paris-Berlin axis (de Gaulle’s
project) is the spine around which its altogether logical to build a new Europe. In
France and Germany there are persistent anti-Atlanticist political traditions (in
currents on both the left and right). For the time being, they are latent and
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potential, and at some point, they will declare themselves in one voice. Moscow
should orient to this line now, and not await the final events to develop.
Moscow’s objective of wresting control of Europe from the USA (NATO),
contributing to its unity strengthening integrative connections with central
Europe under the sign of a basic external political axis of Berlin-Moscow. Eurasia
needs an alliance with a friendly Europe. From a military perspective, it still should
not be able to defend itself (without the USA) from serious threats, and economic
cooperation with Central Europe can solve the great majority of Russian and Asian
technological problems in exchange for resources and a strategic military
partnership.
Proceeding from these external political objectives to analyzing the infernal
political situation of Russian and its Western regions.
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Part 6: Eurasian Analysis, Section 3: Geopolitical Problems of
the Near Abroad
6.3.1 Laws of Great Spaces
The foundational law of geopolitics is the “Principle of Great Spaces,”
detailed by Mackinder and Haushofer and developed by Carl Schmitt. According
to this principle the national sovereignty of the state depends not only on its
military power, technological development, and economic bases, but on the
dimensions and locations of its lands and territories. Classical geopoliticians have
written hundreds of volumes proving that problems of sovereignty depend directly
on geopolitical independence, self-sufficiency, and autarkical regions. Those
peoples and states which truly strive towards sovereignty should first and foremost
decide the problem of territorial self-sufficiency. In our epoch, that self-sufficiency
can only be possessed by very major states, located in regions protected from
possible attacks (militarily, politically, and economically) by different state
formations.
During the period of confrontation between capitalism and socialism and
the necessary Blocs—the Great Spaces were obvious. No one doubted that a
country might be “non-aligned,” but only at the expense of eliminating itself from
the sphere of global geopolitics and marginalization to the periphery. However, all
“non-aligneds” still made a choice in favor of one camp over the other, although
less radically than directly supporting capitalism or socialism. The destruction of
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one superpower certainly altered the Earth’s geopolitical spaces, but at the same
time the Principle of Great Spaces by no means lost its power. Oppositely, it is
more and more common today of the geopolitical project of “Globalism,” an idea
which boils down the transformation of the earth’s surface under the Principle of
Great Spaces—controlled from the American center.
6.2.2 Pax Americana and Geopolitical Globalism
The project of pro-American “Atlanticist” Great Spaces is the creation of the
global Pax Americana or the establishment of a “New World Order,” with a single
“World Government,” these, in fact, are geopolitical synonyms. Precisely such a
plan is being developed and realized today in the West’s international politics, and
chiefly, in the United States. It is obvious that the globalist concept of Great Spaces
excludes any forms of authentic governments and political sovereignty of any kind
for any people or state. Moreover, a bipolar world gave an incomparably greater
degree of freedoms (sovereignty) to states included in the spheres of influence of
one of the two Great Spaces, than in the planned globalist project—even if only
because a global confrontation compels not only the suppression of satellite-states,
but also their purchase. The single large global space of the globalists-futurists will
mean the extinction of any weak shades of sovereignty so that power (military or
economic) to suppress, fragment, and atomize “small spaces” will become the only
way of control (the need for bribery and deception falls away on its own from the
lack of a possible geopolitical competitor).
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The actual situation is set in front of each people and state (and specially to
states and peoples formerly included in the geopolitical bloc that opposed the
Atlanticists of the West) integration in a single Great Space under the rule of
Atlanticists, or a vital alternative, organize new Great Spaces capable of resisting
the last remaining superpower. The question of geopolitical sovereignty having an
immediate alternative relationship, but at the same time some peoples or states
cannot have complete sovereignty in either one of the two cases. In making the
globalist model any sovereignty at all is generally, wittingly excluded since the
“World Government” grows without alternatives and only one center of power—
and sovereign in this case is only a global pseudoempire—the “New World Order.”
Under it, all its parts become colonies. In the organization of a new Great Space,
we have to deal with the matter of relative sovereignty within the framework of
large geopolitical formations, because this possible Great Space will be
comparatively free in determining a dominant ideology and worldview. This means
peoples and states which enter that bloc, could expect, at the least, ethnocultural
sovereignty for direct participants in the creations and design of a new macroideology; whereas the geopolitical variant of the “New World Order,” is already
fully elaborated and offering to the Earth’s peoples as in the colonial analogue of
the Liberal, free-market American model.
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Book 2, Part 5: The Khazarian Question
The Jew and Eurasia
The Inadequacy of Explanatory Schemes (1)
The Eurasian question has continued to excite the minds of our
contemporaries. Neither its artificial silence, nor its hasty apologetic cry, nor
primitive Judeophobia cannot address these problems. The Jewish people are a
unique phenomenon in world history. They clearly have an absolutely special
quality, giving them a religious-ethnic path to fulfill a mysterious and ambiguous
mission across millennia.
On what basis is this mission? How to unravel the enigma of the Jew? What
lies in the so many evocative rumors of the mission des juifs?308
It is a risk to cover this very extensive topic as a whole. Therefore, we turn
only to the role of Jews in twentieth century Russian history, which has harmfully
impacted many peoples, regardless of whichever ideological camp they belonged.
Immediately pay attention to the fact that no convincing, fully satisfactory
interpretation exists on this topic in today’s day and age. A part of historians is
generally inclined to deny the importance of the Jewish factor in Russian and
Soviet history—that is crude violence over truth. It stands to only look over the
lists of the main Bolsheviks and political elite of the Soviet state and a
disproportionately large share of the names will before your eyes. Ignoring this
308
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fact—dismissing all as meaningless phrases—it has been dismissed even from the
simple, scientific-historical perspective.
The second function is concerning the functions of Jews in Russia (USSR) in
the twentieth century in relation to the character of national-patriotic circles. Here
there is a representation that the role of the Jew was negative, subversive, and
disruptive. This notable theory of the “Jewish Conspiracy,” which were generally
popular in Black-Hundredist, and later White Guard, circles. From this
perspective, the Jews, following their unique ethno-religious traditions and
believing itself a single community, convinced of messianic status, knowingly
organizing the destructive Bolshevik movement, occupying prevailing roles in
them, and shaking and rattling the last bastion of conservative Christian
governments, cultures, and traditions. The inveterate conservative Judeophobia
transfers over to the USSR’s collapse, in which also the Jews are accused, referring
to the huge portion of representatives of that nation in the ranks of the reformers.
The weakness of this conception is that Jews are simultaneously accused of
creating the USSR and destroying it; that they are the main proponents of
socialism, its anti-bourgeoisie concept, and they are presented as the main
apologists for capitalism. Moreover, an un-biased observer acquainted with the
destinies of the Jewish-Bolsheviks, would prove that they fully, genuinely believed
in communist ideology, long donating their actual lives to it which be unthinkable
if accepting the all-powerful version of the group as “cynical and deceitful
saboteurs.” In general, the anti-Semitic version is unconvincing, although
233

somewhat closer to the truth, because unlike the first, it recognizes the unique role
of Jews in the historical process. Curiously, this acknowledgement brings together
anti-Semites and the most conscientious followers of Zionism.
The third version belongs to Judeophilic (in the ultimate example, Zionist)
circles. They insist that the Jews are always on the right side, victims of unjust
persecutions from other peoples, carriers of all positive, moral, socialist, and
cultural values. This position recognizes the leading role Jews have had in all the
important historical processes in Russia, but knowingly affirms that in Revolution,
for Soviet history, and in Perestroika Jews have been exactly a positive pole,
embodying in themselves a secret and eternal truth, goodness, wisdom, and
humanism. If an anti-Semitic Jew appears to be unequivocally evil and that
diagnosis is subject to doubt, even in those cases when it leads to a fully logical
and historical absurdity, so that the Judeophile observes a strict reverse image:
here the Jew is always good, even if it categorically opposes the objective real
picture. Accordingly, this extremely apologetic approach cannot be exhaustive,
since it is initially constructed on a structure a priori.
New Version (2)
Note that the anti-Semitic and Zionist versions of explanations for the role
of Jews in modern Russo-Soviet history, springing from some implication in the
deep unity of Jews, a unity of historical reflection and purpose. In other words, the
tendency to discuss Jews on the face of it as simply an ethnos with friends, but as a
kind of organization, party, order, lobby, etc.
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Another opposing version, arising out of no unity existing among Jews and
that in national examples Jews in history are separate and actually, “I, like a
personality only in the background,” psychological thought is determined
secondarily by ethnic factors and accordingly its own term, “Jewry,” as understood
by anti-Semites and Zionists, has no right to exist.
Excluding all these approaches because of their almost obvious inadequacy,
we turn to another version. If we do not arrange a personalist approach, nor a
group approach, nor one that is an undefinable multiple conception, nor a
conception of cohesive unity, we are naturally assuming some intermediate model.
It is sensible to speak of the inner duality of the Jew, about the presence of a
unique ethnos, of not one, but two: two “organizations,” two “orders,” two centers
of historical reflection, two scenarios of messianic paths. This dualistic approach
gives us a completely new, in many ways unexpected, perspective in writing on
this complex phenomenon.
Easterners and Westerners in the Ranks of the Jews (3)
The famous Eurasianist author Yakov Bromberg309 put forward in his time a
very similar idea in his article, “On Jewish Orientalism.” It is about the fact that in
the Russian environment Jews clearly divided into two antagonistic groups,
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themselves representing psychological roles and cultural archetypes. One of these
is the traditional-Hasidic orientation. It has the character of mysticism, religious
fanaticism, extreme idealism, and a deep contempt for the materialist way of life,
greed, and rationalism. In some extreme cases the mystical type of Jew crossed
over from their ethno-religious particularity to universalism, disseminating ideals
of national messiah to other peoples. But apart from orthodox religion, the
medium of the same psychological type was used by secularists, fervent
revolutionaries, Marxists, communists, and populists. The mystical Jew differs
from other branches, not simply in abstract Marxism, but in a deep sympathy and
heartfelt solidarity with the Russian people, generally with the Russian peasants
and workers, those unofficial elements—Tsarist, but radical, earthy—at the
bottom of a parallel Russia, a Russia of Old Believers and Mystics, the “enchanted
Russian wanderers.” It is from here the classical type of Jewish-SR310, who very
often had overt characteristics of Russian nationalist tendencies as deep followers
of national bolshevism.
Bromberg united these Hasidic-Marxist, mystical-socialists into one
group— “Jewish Orientalism.” This was a “Eurasian fraction” of the Jewry. Another
distinguished Soviet historian, Mikhail Agursky311, came to a similar conclusion in
his epochal work “The Ideology of National Bolshevism,” where he identifies the
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origins of the dissemination of Russophilia in Jewish-revolutionary circles, which
was characteristic of multitudes of Soviet National Bolshevist figures of Jewish
origin—in particular for giant ideologues of these currents, Isiah Lezhneva and
Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz, many Jews saw bolshevism as possibility to finally merge
with a large nation, abandoning the ghetto and the Pale of Settlement, to
eschatologically bridge the messianic Russian with the messianic Jew under the
general aegis of Eurasian revolution. The destruction of the alienating laws of
capital and exploitation. Thus, extremist circles of Eastern European Jews of a
mystical orientation (from Hasidim to Sabbateanists) themselves presented a
growth medium for Bolshevism, SR and Marxism, and not accidentally the
majority of leaders of the Reds came from families of Hasidim and mystics, taking
on a mystical eschatological messianic pathos, despite the external paradox, this
convergence of typological and psychological relations between Hasidic types of
Jewish fundamentalists and the ardent atheist builders of Bolshevist society was
intimate, since they both belonged to the “Eurasianism,” “orientalism,” and the
irrational-mystical sects of Judaism.
The opposite group is totally united in another type of Jew—the rationalistJewish, bourgeoisie type, cool regarding religion, but on the opposite, are
overloaded with elements of greed, personal enrichment, of accumulation, and
rationalist economic activity. This, per Blomberg, is “Jewish Westernism.” And
again, as is the case with Jewish Orientalism, we see here the combination of outer
polar positions, with one way belonging to the category of extreme religious
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circles, the Talmudists (“The Rabbanites”), inheriting the orthodox lineage of
Maimonides—that is the Aristotelian-rationalist lineage of the Jewish religion. In
its time, this Talmudist camp actively fought against the spread of Kabbalists,
passionate mystical tendencies, contradicting in its spirit the dry and mythological
creationist form of Judaic theology (for more detailed analysis see the gorgeous
analysis of Gershom Scholem’s “The Kabbala and Its Symbolism,” “The Origins of
Kabbala,” and so on).312 Later, its chieftains spoke against the pseudo-messiah
Sabbatan Zevi, the messiah leader of mystical Jewish hetero-orthodoxy. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a party was drawn up from these
environments, the so-called “Mitnagedov” (verbatim “The Opponents” in Hebrew),
who desperately fought against Hasidism and the renaissance of extreme
mysticism among Eastern European Jews. This camp was based in religious
rationalism, in Talmudic traditions, purifying them of all mystical-mythological
stratifications. Curiously enough, to this same category of Jew belongs the figures
of “Haskalah” and “the Jewish Enlightenment,” who belonged to the modernizing
and secularizing Jews, the rejection of religious ceremonies and traditions in the
name of “humanism” and “assimilation” into the “progressive peoples of the West.”
In Russia, this type of Jew, although extremely opposed to the nominally
monarchical-Orthodox regimes, occupied Westernizing, liberal positions. The
peak of this group’s aspirations was the February Revolution. The “Jewish
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Westernists” as a whole supported the “white cause,” despite their racial closeness
with the Bolshevik leaders as they did not identify with universalist, mystical
orientation of “Jewish Orientalism.”
Like the splitting up of Russians into “Whites” and “Reds” in the revolution,
the Jewry also broke in political thought and in profound archetypical features of
their rationales on deep lines, planned much earlier, into two camps within
Judaism—Hasidic-Kabbalists (Bolshevists) in one, and Talmudist-rationalists (the
Enlightenment, bourgeoisie-capitalists) in the other.
So, the typology of Blomberg-Arusky is supported by historical examples,
the conclusions to which we arrive at by a simple, logical path: the Jewry that
presents itself as an ethno-religious whole (which is still not so obvious!), is
essentially divided into two camps, in two “orders,” into two “communities.” In two
types, which in specific critical situations will demonstrate not only a difference,
but a fundamental hostility. Each have their religious poles and secular
expressions, remaining unified. “Jewish Orientalism,” (per Blomberg) or “Jewish
National-Bolshevism,” (per Agursky) at its religious level includes Hasidim,
Sabbateans, Kabbalists and at the secular level Marxism, revolutionary socialism,
populism, and Bolshevism.
“Jewish Westernists” are also a duality; in their religious plane coinciding
with Maimonides’ rationalistic Talmudism (after the “Gaons” of Vilnius, the
Mitnagedov centers, and the anti-Hasidic circles) and the secular versions
expressing themselves as liberal-democratic, “enlightened” humanism.
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Two Examples (4)
The fundamental duality revealed to us instantly explains a great deal of
factors, remaining incomprehensible in other interpretative methodologies. In
particular, the logical explanation for the cryptic phenomenon of so-called “Jewishanti-Semitism.” This criticism of Marx by Lassalle, that Marx used extremely
Judeophobic phrases and also many radically anti-Jewish passages generally
matched Judaism with capitalism, becoming completely understood since in his
own character the Jew, Marx belongs uniquely to the mystic-Hasidism of the
messianic type, who typically viewed in the bourgeoisie and capitalism, where the
main role—and in philosophical and practical thought—played by the Jew is as its
own chief enemy. In the article, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx writes:
What is the secular basis of the Jewry? Material consumption and selfinterest. What are the Jews’ earthly ideals? Trading. What is their earthly
god? Money…Money is the fervent deity of the Israelites. Empirically, the
being of the Jew is trading.
Note the emphasis on the terms “secular” and “empirical.” Marx could be
hinting at two things. One is their materialism and immanency, which he, not
embarrassed at the expression, impressed and concluded on each the embodiment
of a negative (remember that truly demonic, anti-Christian role Marx attributes to
Capital). In the second non-secular, non-empirical, transcendentalist way we can
only guess. It is in our own reconstruction of the Jewish communist mystical
orientation.
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Another example. In its time a group of Kabbalist-Zoharists (enthusiasts of
the Kabbalist books “the Zohar”), followed the mystical-Sabbatist Yakov Frank,
who carried over into the group aspects of Christianity, and in parallel “exposing”
the misanthropic rites of the Talmudists (Rabbanites)—their eternal enemies. The
Jewish historian G.L. Shtrak in his book “Blood in the Beliefs and Superstitions of
Mankind” wrote on the conflict between followers of Frank and the Talmudists:
In 1759 they (Frankists—A.D.) declared to the Archbishop Vratislav
Lubensky that they craved baptism, like deer for a source of water, and
offered to prove that the Talmudists shed more innocent Christian blood
than the Pagans, thirsting after it and using it. At the same time, they asked
for an area of settlement to be approved for them east of Lemberg, so they
could live by their own labor, where Talmudist-innkeepers breed
drunkenness, sucking dry the Christians and robbing them to their last
thread…soon after this dispute, at the insistence of the Polish clergy, around
1,000 baptisms were administered to the Cossacks.
In these two examples, we see a unified spiritual confrontation at different
levels. The atheist Marx identifies Capital with Jewish figures and in this lies the
basis for the curse of the Jews and their “empirical deity.” The mystic “Frankists”
curse the Talmudists on a completely different basis, reproaching them—in
accordance with the level of all controversies—of “drinking the blood of
Christians.” Strikingly, these Zoharists had social motives: “Rabbanites rob
Christians to the last thread” and the assembling of the Zoharists to “live by their
own labor.” The spiritual conflict of the mystical-contemplators, mythmakers,
Gnostics, fanatics, and spiritualists versus the religious moralists, supporters of
simple rites, cults of formalists somehow unnoticeably and naturally transfers over
to the confrontation of socialists and capitalists, Bolsheviks and liberal-democrats.
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Jew vs Jew (5)
Now we project the scheme we have received onto Soviet history and
identifying through it the Jew’s role.
In general, the Jewry, on the verge of the revolution, was unified in
opposing the existing system. Seemingly in both sectors. The Jewish-orientalist
opposed capitalism and religious conservatism, alienated in formal cultural
spheres, craving a revolutionary change and the opening of a magic era of
messianic fulfillment. The Jewish-westernists did not accept Czarism for
completely opposite reasons, believing that it remained an insufficiently capitalist,
civilized, and humanist regime, in need of an adjustment to the level of Western
Civilization. All Jews had solidarity in the necessary overthrow of the dynasty and
revolution. In this they had an alliance, as among the periphery of Russian
nationalists, dreaming of the destruction of the “prison of nations,” and the “leftist
nationalists” among these same Russians perceived the Romanov-Peterburgist
order as an anti-nationalist, anti-populist, anti-spiritual parody of the true Holy
Rus. Moreover, there were sufficient westernists among the Russian nobility and
merchants, active in building the Russian capitalism of the time and cutting
through the last “cherry orchards” of the rapidly degenerating aristocracy.
The cumulative activity of all these forces at the approach of a favorable
situation was implemented through the February Revolution. But, immediately
after it irreconcilable contradictions appeared in the victors’ camp. After the
overthrow of the regime, with clarity it discovered within itself a second line of
242

division (this time, internal) and it has predetermined all that followed. After the
February Revolution, the first plan was opposed by revolutionist and evolutionist
forces, leftist orientalists and leftist westernists, and Eurasianists and europeanists.
In the same environment. the fundamental dualism of the Jewry was exposed with
clarity.
The Bolshevist pole combined in itself the exact representatives of “Jewish
orientalism,” the Hasidic-Sabbateanist type, the Jewish communist, and the Jewish
socialist—the same as those who at the end of the eighteenth century wanted “to
live by their own labor.” This labor, eschatologically, universally most Russophilic
in its Jewish solidarity with the National-Bolshevist current of Russian “leftist
imperialism,” seeing in the October Revolution not the end of nationalist dreams,
but the beginning, a new red dawn, the second arrival of the Soviet Rus, the secret
Old Believers’ Rite—lost in the gloomy bicentenary of the graceless parody of the
synod in St. Petersburg. Bolshevism gradually soaked up not only orthodoxMarxists, but a huge number of SRs, especially leftists SRs, who might be called
quite the Russian analog for national-revolutionaries. In a word, the Jewish
undercurrent in Bolshevism is logically and triumphantly the completion of a
historical path largely organized by a sector of the Jewry, the roots of which go far
back in the faded religious controversies of the Middle Ages.
The enemies of the eschatological community of “Jewish-orientalists” came
from all over the capitalist world and especially the Jewish bourgeoisie, Whites,
empiricists (per Marx), an incarnation of the ancient Rabbanites. Here, the
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paradoxical Bolshevist “anti-Semitism,” was not unfamiliar to a great deal of
Jewish-communists. Agursky brings up an interesting case in his work, when the
Jew Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz interceded on behalf of the Russian Bolsheviks, not only
interceding himself, but allowing anti-Semitic tirades and generally justifying
them. This recalls the history cited with the Zoharists! By this same token, we find
something analogical in different spheres. Take for example, the famous founder of
the Bavarian Lodge of “Thule,” present for the birth of the National-Socialist
Workers Party in Germany, Baron Von Sebottendorf was in his own time dedicated
to “Egyptian Masonry” in Turkey. The matrimonial couple of Jewish-Sabbateanists
receiving the basics of their own esoteric sciences. But, he himself (not to mention
the ordinary Nazis) differed from the uncovered anti-Semitism. The Jewish
(especially Sabbateanism) trace can be found in several different emphatically
nationalist, and at times, frankly racist or anti-Semitic organizations of the
europeanists (Masons) and the westernists (Young Turks). In different forms, antiSemitism could be directed in opposing ways and in cases the bearers of it could
altogether be the Jew, or their mangers and political leaders. For example, take the
fairly extensive anti-Semitic sayings of Churchill, who pointed out the Jewish
origins of the majority of the Bolshevik leaders, speaking on the “Jewish danger
threatening civilization from the East.” While Churchill based his own political
career in the rightist-Zionist circles of Great Britain and the USA, as convincingly
demonstrated by Douglas Reed. Accordingly, just as there exists something like a
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“right” and “left” in Jewry, there is a “right” and “left” in anti-Semitism. Thus, in
this question we arrive at a more complex model.
From February and October, we come to the parting of the waters of the
two halves of world Jewry and from this certain moment they acquired there
cruelly opposed forms. In extreme cases, representatives from both of these camps
acquire in their polemics and arguments, not dissimilar crass, vulgar anti-Semitic
discourse. But, that is not all. The peak of this confrontational collision acquired
the character of war in physical destruction, so that we see in history Stalinist
purges of the ranks of Soviet leadership.
To Live by Their Own Labor (6)
There is no doubt that the Jew differs in having unique capabilities in some
social, economic, and cultural fields. Their scattering over a great deal of centuries,
teaching the small, but stubborn nation, not wishing to give up on their ancient
dreams. Over many thousands of years of religion from an ancient covenant.
Gazing at all that surrounds them as temporary, detached, and transitory. Jews
have developed a number of striking, dynamic features permitting them a great
deal of orienting themselves to the social dynamics of the fast-flowing processes of
governing and national rule taking place in the environment of “great nations,”
who “always have a sense of being at home,” with a specific delay from a slower, a
posteriori reflection. But, these skills could be used differently in various
situations. Thus, the Jewish-Bolshevists affixed all their efforts, all national talents,
and all spiritual forces towards the creation of a mighty Soviet state, an empire of
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social righteousness, a land-based bastion of Eurasian geopolitics. And many
numbers of the elements of the Jewish diaspora in Europe, America, and Asia, the
offspring of the same religious-spiritualist, mystical, “orientalist” spirit, and a
“Eurasianist” medium, were the ongoing leaders in the structural opera of the
Soviets, geopolitical agents of influence for a Greater Eurasia, and the vessels of
messianic Bolshevism. They formed exactly the basis of the Third International,
later the Comintern, composing a powerful Eurasian network as subtle agents in
all corners of the planet. But, to reiterate, it was not just a matter of the Jews, but
of specific categories of Jews, of certain Jewish camps, and of “Jewish-Eurasianists.”
Along these lines, at a certain precise stage these “red-brown” Jewish-Eurasianists
created and prepared the State of Israel, having begun under the leadership (and
with the sanction of) Moscow, but in a tough fight with English-Atlanticists, with
the forces of capital and liberal-democracy. They composed an axis of leftist forces
in Israel, the fruits of their efforts were the famous Kibbutzim. Just like the
Zoharists— “to live by their own labor.”
Apologies for the Jews, such as the representation that all Jews are included
as innocent victims cannot be reconciled with the fact in the epoch of severe
repression, as during the Leninist and Stalinist purges, Jews were not only the
victims, but also the executioners, not in an individual, purely personal, but in the
group, party, and factional sense. This was not set in anti-Semitism, but in fact is
actually explained by the Judeophilic framework in place at the time as the internal
battle of Soviet forces in Judaism did not cease, the fact that the Bolshevist,
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“Hasidic,” “Zoharist” elements were well known for their skills and the changing
manner of their own tribesmen, their propensity for intrigue and conspiracy,
chameleon-like, mercilessly battling with the bourgeoisie elements of the Jewry,
with residual “Jewish-westernists,” the heirs of the Rabbanite spirit, with the
ideological currents of the “Mitnegedov.” Here the paradox is clearly expressed, the
anti-Semitic purges were very often committed by the Jews themselves. The
classical case of this position is Lazar Kaganovich, the most faithful of Stalin’s
companions, a committed, die-hard National-Bolshevik, who Russian nationalists,
in a misunderstanding, unreasonably turned into a figure of the “Jewish
conspiracy.” Greater “anti-Semites” would be difficult to invent.
From Fracture to Collapse (7)
The critical point in the history of Jewish-Eurasianists is 1948. At that
moment Stalin and his associates came to the conclusion that the creation of the
State of Israel, which was initially supported (as in the Hasidic-Socialist construct)
had turned out to be an instrument of the bourgeoisie West because the capitalistMisnagedim line had gained the upper hand. Zionist tendencies became awakened
in the Soviet Jewry and this meant a transfer of initiative to the remnants of the
“westernist” sector, whose total extirpation turned out to be only superficial,
whose ability to survive surprised even the vigilant suspicion of JewishEurasianists.
This moment was fatal—as demonstrated by the later events at the close of
our century—for the entire Soviet state and for socialism around the world. When
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the anti-Semitic tendencies in the Soviet leadership crossed certain defined
boundaries—especially glaring was the destruction of the Jewish anti-fascist
committee, consisting of practically one hundred percent committed Eurasianists
and direct agents of Lavrentiy Beria (who spoke only in their favor)—only the
committed Jewish-National-Bolshevists themselves could remaining unwavering in
their Russophilic, Soviet-Imperial position. Generally, in the eyes of the Jewish
masses, the influence of Eurasianists were gradually undermined, discrediting
their fundamental ideological and geopolitical line. In their own ways, from party
and military areas, to the heights of power, Great and Small Russia elements drew
closer to those who did not totally comprehend the messianic pathos of left wing
nationalism, messianic National-Bolshevism, that underlies the basic spiritual
union of Jewish and Russian Eurasianists going back to the beginning of the
century. This new generation felt themselves to be greater statesmen, who were
prophets of a “New Truth,” following absolutely the army’s “Romanov” spirit of a
Czarist castes within the military leadership, and finally uprooted the Bolshevists
with common nativism, worker-peasant chauvinism, and with a certain
unreflective share of instinctual anti-Semitism. These army cadres did not know
the revolution and higher spirituality, historically concomitant, and this was
accompanied by not delving into the details of nationalist politics. The natives of
Ukraine were distinguished by being especially deaf to this question, they together
with Khrushchev, plotted to occupy the USSR’s top posts. Although, in the
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environment that existed after Stalin’s death, Beria fully ceased the anti-Semitic
“Doctor’s Cases,” the irreparable damage was complete.313
There is more to this fatal turning point. The Russian Jewry, Eurasianistcontinentalists, international-imperialists, messianic and revolutionary currents,
who had become the backbone of Soviet power, were undermined, broken, and
disfigured at its foundation. The state and economic power organisms became
functionally inert. The purges, in general, were basically always invariably lying
hidden the ideological, meta-political, fundamental causes, once completed in
their place arrive a clash of clans, a gradual “bourgeoisization” of socialism,
backsliding into philistinism, and Babbitry. The revolutionary eschatological
pathos faded. The Soviet State maintained its inertia. The eschatological basis of
the worldwide Eurasian revolution crossed over into an ordinary government
entity. Powerful and gigantic, but peculiarly devoid of the glow of the original,
universal mission.
At the level of the Jewry, this signified the complete defeat of the “HasidicSabbateanists” camp and the gradual emergence of the leading role of Jewishrationalists, Kantians, humanists, Mitnagedov, and westernists. The secret alliance
of the National-Bolshevists was dissolved, Jewish-orientalists accelerated the
tempo of marginalization and their influence and position fell catastrophically.
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More widely known as the Doctor’s Plot in the USA.
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Eventually this same type of Jewish-Bolshevist was moved to the periphery
and to the head of the Jewish community in the USSR advanced those
representatives with the sensibilities of Maimonides and the Talmudists. Even
more often this happened with the secular, as humanist-liberal versions irradiated
outwards.
This bourgeoisie, Zionist-rightist flank from then on worked only for the
breakup of Soviet structures, preparing for the collapse of socialism and grinding
down from within the gigantic geopolitical construction. By this token, in unison
with these destructive anti-Eurasianist tendencies, they worked with certain antiSemitic circles of the KGB, who only aggravated the spiritual-cultural
disintegration of the ideological synthesis and were a secret divisionary force in the
origins of Bolshevism and National-Bolshevism.
Be that as it may, the ruin of the Soviet Government is the direct result of
the retreat of the Jewish lobby from the constructive state building of the
Bolshevist position and its direct or indirect complicity in aiding the hostile, AntiSoviet, Atlanticist capitalist West.
Towards a Eurasianist Future (8)
This model, the general contours of which we have written about, allows
man problems to be seen anew and connected to the mysterious levers of Soviet
history. Note, that this approach could be transferred to other geopolitical
systems, since something analogical could be produced in other countries and
political contexts. Incidentally, on the topic of the fundamental dualism of the
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Jewry, the work of the great writer Arthur Koestler can be applied, who offered a
controversial, from the ethnological perspective, but altogether impressive, from
the typological perspective, thesis on “Turkish” racism originating from the
Eastern European Jews, “Ashkenazim,” existing as the heirs of the religiously
Jewish Khazars, whence the famous dualism between Ashkenazim and Sephardim
(pure Semites). In the case of the Karaites, that is another anti-Talmudist direction
among the Jewry, the fact of their descending from the Khazars was considered
especially proven (see L.N. Gumilyov). Curiously enough, the Turkish theories on
the origins of the “Ashkenazim” (in Hebrew this word means “northern”) adheres
with Douglas Reed, who considered this type of Jew an offshoot of the “TurkoMongolian race!”
It is important for us to underline another aspect. Jewish orientalism is not
a strictly, exclusively modern phenomenon. It is deeply rooted in national history.
Perhaps some kind of terrible religious or racial secrets are behind it. Be that as it
may, it does not raise a doubt over the victory of the “Mitnagedov” lobby and the
Jewish westernists are not, and cannot be a totally irreversible fact. It is impossible
to deny that the position of the Jewish orientalists is now more marginalized and
weaker than ever. But, this may only be just for the time being. There is itself
national identification of certain parts of the Jewry, not conceivable without
sacrifices, great compassion, a painstaking and idealistic quest for truth, without
deep mystical contemplation, without disgusted contempt for the slavish dark laws
of “This World”—to laws of the market and egoistical benefit. Jewish orientalists
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have teased out humility and exultation from the first legendary Tzadiks,
genuinely compassionate to neighbors regardless of their racial and religious
membership, having a fanatical faith in righteousness and a fairly constructed
society, and finally a vague solidarity can be guessed at with the tragic and
beautiful God-carrying peoples of history, the Russian people, all this is
indestructible of certain parts of the Jews, inseparable from their unique destiny.
Squeezed between (a partially justified) anti-Semitism of the Russian
patriots and that of the westernists, rationalists, free-marketers, and subversive
anti-statist masses, sits the Russian Jewish-liberals, the Jewish orientalists are
experiencing tough times.
But, do not despair. The lives of these peoples are being tested also. It is
only important to choose, to comprehend one’s place in history, not opposed to
discovering its geopolitical and spiritual orientation. And in their own ways the
Eurasianists must with all accountability and considering all the tragic historical
experiences declare a place for them among the ranks of the builders of a Great
Eurasian Empire, the Last Empire that will be found.
But, as representatives of the Great Idea we will simply never forget
anything. Not of our own, nor of strangers.
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